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Timely

Federal/Civil
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v.
FOREMOST-McKESSON, INC.

1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Civil

Provident instituted an action in USDC N.D. Cal.,

seeking
a declaration of non-liability
.:. under

16(b) of the Securities and Exchang e

Act of 1934, 15 U.S. C. § 78p(b), for a transaction involving its purchase and
sale of Foremost's securities.
liability and damages.

Foremost ' counterclaimed for a declaration of

The DC (Schnacke) granted Provident's motion for

summary judgment and CA 9 affirmed on different grounds.
Wallace).

(Ely, Trask,

Foremost seeks cert, contending that the CA' s interpretation of when
~

-.......----

a person becomes a "statutory insider" under § 16(b) conflicts with decisions fro El
..-......-- ............
---------.. .....__
~-

Provident has filed a conditional cross-petition in which it seeks

CA 2 and CA 8.
to raise

arg~ents

regarding the particular transaction which were either

rejected or ignored by CA 9.
2.

FACTS: In 1968 Provident, a personal holding company, decided to

liquidate and began seeking a purchaser for its assets.

It entered into

negotiations with Foremost and, although originally insisting that any sale shoul d
V

·n ,}

_J.e for cash, finally agreed to accept a substantial amount of Foremost's

/r}~~vro1~ c~nvertible
~Y, f" ,

debentures and cash in exchange for two-thirds of its assets. In
---~
addition, Foremost agreed to promptly file a registration statement for the

~~debentures,

.r·~
~

which were issued solely for purposes of this transaction, to

permit Provident to offer them to the public,

To accomplish that, arrangemente

were made for Provident to sell $25,000,000 of the debentures, approximately
one-half of what it would re-ceive, to a group of underwriters.
The transaction unfolded as follows:

On October 15, 1969 Foremost

delivered a check and the debentures to Provident; the latter were immediately

.In

.

convertible into common stock in an amount
outstanding shares.

excess of 10% of Foremost's

On October 20 Provident instructed its liquidating trustee

to distribute the debentures which were not to be sold to its shareholders.

'I

'.,

On

October 21 Provident entered into a contract with the underwriters whereby it
agreed to sell Foremost debentures having a face value of $25,000,000 for
$25,366,666. 66; the "time of purchase'' was specified to be October 28, 1969.
On October 24, 1969 the trustee actually distributed the remaining debentures
to Provident's shareholders; at that point Provident no longer had a 1 Oo/o ownership of Foremost.

On October 28 the contract between Provident and the under-

writers was performed by both parties.

Thereafter Provident continued to

liquidate according to California law, a process that was completed in August,
1970.
Provident then filed this action against Foremost seeking a declaration of
nonliability under § 16(b), which permits the issuer of securities to recover
short-swing profits (i.e., profits from a purchase and sale or·· sale and purchase
of securities within a six-month period) from certain corporate insiders.
latter group includes persons who own
of any equity security • . •

11

"~ore

The

than 10 per centum of any class

15 U.S. C. § 78p(a).

Foremost counterclaimed

for a declaration of liability and recovery of profits, and both parties moved
for summary judgment.
The USDC N.D. Cal. (Schnacke) granted Provident's motion and denied
Foremost's.

It noted that Foremost did not contend that speculation was invoh·e c

~~ here and that Foremost had insisted upon, if not dictated, the form of the trans;;J"""
action. These facts, together with the small amount of profit realized by

------

Provident, persuaded the DC that it should not engage in a "mindlessly literal "

------

application of § 16 (b).

CA 9 affirmed, but on different grounds.

___..,.

(Ely, Trask, Wallace).

At the outse t, the CA observed that this Court has recently held that ''potential
for speculative abuse" must be shown in order to establish § 16(b)
for "unorthodox" financial

t:_~tions.

Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).

li~bility

Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
However, this was

essentially~

highly

orthodox cash-for-stock deal, thus permitting strict liability to attach and, in
any event, the facts that Provident entered the transaction voluntarily and could
have acquired inside information during the protracted negotiations satisfied
the Kern County test.
Next, theCA considered Provident's argument that it was not a 10%
owner at the time of the October 28 sale because it had distributed half of the
debentures to its shareholders on October 24.

Thus, it contended, it was not

liable under the following proviso to § 16(b):
./

This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such benefic ial owner [i. e. , of 1 O% of
the shares] was not su :-, h both at the time of the purchase
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved.

However, theCA was of the view that the "sale" actually occurred on October 21
when Provident entered into a binding contract with the underwriters. The
~----~------------------------price was fixed at that time and, although there were some conditions to be

---------

fulfilled, none of them subjected Provident to market risks.

------------

-

The CA then turned to the "purchase" aspect of the transaction.

--

'

___....

It

noted that Provident had not owned 1 O% -- indeed any -- of Foremost's sec uri ties
prior to October 15, and that it had not purchased any more securities between
that date and the October 21 sale.

Thus, under the above-quoted proviso,

Provident would be liable for its profit if the phrase "at the time of" were
interpreted to mean
mean

11

prior to.

11

simultaneously with, ,11 but not if it were interpreted to

11

TheCA adopted the latter reading.

It reasoned that § l6(b) was intended

to reach only persons who do not intend to alter their investment in the corporation, but decide to capitalize on ins ide information and make a quick killing.
Persons who own more than l O% of the corporation are presumed to have access
to such information.

However, the presumption does not apply to a person who

does not own 10% at the time that he makes his decision to buy, so a purchase
under those circumstances is not considered the first step in an illegal shortswing deal.
CA 9 acknowledged that its interpretation conflicted with cases from

j

CA 2,

~·,

Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299 (2d Cir.

1'956), af£ 1 g 104F.Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831
(1956), and CA 8, ~·, Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co.,
434 F. 2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970), af£ 1 d on other grounds, 404 U.S. 418 (1972), but
believed that it was supported by the legislative history of § 16(b)
used by this Court in Kern County.

and language

Finally, it observed that a person who owns

more than 10%, sells below 1 O%, and then purchases above that amount rn:ight
very well have been acting on information gained as a result of his original
position as a statutory insider, so that its holding in this case would not apply
to a sale/purchase.
Foremost seeks cert in No. 74-742, pointing to the conflict and arguing
that CA 2 and CA 8 are correct.

Provident responds that CA 9 is right and

expresses confidence that CAs 2 and 8 will agree the next time they consider
the matter.
Provident has filed a conditional eros s -petition, No. 74-758, in which

------------

it argues that its transaction with Foremost was a merger which is

,----

-~

---

"unorthodox" under Kern County, and that there was no potential for abuse here.
It also points to a clause in its contract with the underwriters which it says

placed the risk of a decline in market price on it, so that the date of the sale
was really October 28.

Finally, it contends that it was merely an agent for its

shareholders so the debentures should have been considered their property .a nd

- - - ---

~

- -------------

that, for the same reason, its sale of assets was exempt from§ l6(b) under
SEC Rule l6a-4, l 7

I

C. F. R. § 240. 16a-4.

Provident admits that none of

these quest ions 't1. important, but argues that the Court shou+d take the whole
case or not take it at all.
·'

Foremost agrees that these arguments are unimportant and asserts that

CA 9 properly rejected them.

With respect to the last of Provident's contentions,

Foremost points out that the liquidation proceedings continued for another 10
months after this transaction was completed and under California law they could
have been 'revoked either by a vote of the shareholders or the court.

Thus, the ·

notion that Provident was merely an intermediary for its shareholders is a
fiction.
3.

ISSUES: No. 74-742:

(a) Does the transaction by which a person

first acquires more than lOo/o of a corporation's securities count as a "purchase' '
~--~------------~--------------for purposes of applying § 16(b)?

·.
•,

No. 74-758:

(b)

Was Foremost required to show "potential for abuse"

in order to establish Provident's liability under § 16(b) and, if so, did such
potential exist?

(c) Did the "sale" of debentures to the underwriters occur

on October 21 or October 28?

(d) Was Provident the beneficial owner of the

debentures or was it merely an agent for its shareholders?
4.

DISCUSSION: It is undisputed that there is a direct conflict among

the Circuits on Issue (a) and the question would seem to be of sufficient

--------------- -

--- -

importance to require resolution by this Court.
--........__

On the merits, the legislative

history cited by CA 9 does not compel its conclusion but there is a certain logic
to its position.

For example, if Congress did not intend that both the purchase

and sale be influenced by inside information the six-month time period would seenl
to be superfluous.

On the other hand, the critical phrase

mod~fies

"sale and

purchase" as well as "purchase and sale" and CA 9 admits that it would have to
r-ead it differently in the former situation.

It also may be that a person who is

attempting to acquire stock sufficient to give him more than 10o/o ownership
could obtain inside information during the negotiations, as CA 9 seemed to
acknowledge in its discussion of the Kern County is sue.

In short, Is sue (a)

. is substantial, a conflict exists, and review is warranted.

l

CA 9 does appear to have resolved the issues presented by the cross-

petition correctly.

With respect to the "orthodoxy" of the transaction, this was

certainly not a merger.

Prov~t

sold only 2/3 of its assets, retained its

-----

~

liabilities, and remained in existence for a considerable period of time after
the transfer was completed.

Similarly, the Securities Exchange Act defines

"sale" to includ e "any contract to sell .

"

15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(14).

Thus,

even if the C ctober 2 1 contract might have been terminated in the event of a
significant decline in the value of Foremost stock, CA 9 1 s conclusion that the
sale occurred on that date is not unreasonable.

Moreover, Provident's board

of dire ctors was aware of possible § 16 (b) problems so it is probably no
accident that the contract's "time of purchase" was after the distribution of
some debentures to Provident's shareholders.
Finally, it should be noted that denial of the cross-petition would not
necessarily preclude Provident from advancing the arguments rejected by CA 9,
see Stelos Co. v. Hosiery Motor-Mend Corp., 295 U.S. 237 (1935), and it has
suggested that it will do just that.

See Cross-Petn at 2 n. 1.

Thus, ii the

Court does not wish to consider Issues (b)-(d) it should grant the pet'ition in
...____
No. 74-742 limited to Issue (a).
The re are responses in both cases.
Walters
1/27/75
JA

.

'

'

CA 9 and DC ops in
both petns
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July 7, 1975

No. 74-742, Foremost-McKesson, Inc. vs. Provident
Securities Company.

The purpose of this brief memo, dictated during
the summer, is to aid my memory as to the issues presented,
and to record my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of the opinions and briefs.

* * * * *
We took this case to resolve a conflict among circuits as to an issue under Section 16(b) of the Securities
Act of 1934.
them.

The facts are complex, and I will merely sketch

Provident was a personal holding company of the wealthy

Crocker family in California.

It decided to liquidate and

distribute its assets, and entered into negotiations with
Foremost-McKesson (Foremost) for the sale of most of its
assets.

From the outset, Provident, desiring to liquidate

by distributing cash to its stockholders, sought a cash
transaction.

In the end, however, Foremost insisted upon

purchasing uhe assets by issuing and delivering to Provident

2.

No. 74-742

convertible debentures, plus a relatively small amount of
cash.

Although Provident wanted Foremost to sell the de-

bentures itself and make payment in cash, the eventual
compromise agreement provided that substantially simultaneously with the closing, Foremost would register the
debentures so they could be sold immediately by Provident
for cash -- which in turn could be distributed to its
stockholders.
The closing

occurre~ on October 15, 1969, at which

Foremost delivered a check and the debentures to Provident.
Prior to acquisition of the debentures, Provident had no
legal or beneficial ownership in any security of Foremost.
The debentures created a debtor/creditor relationship; they
carried no voting rights; and none of the debentures was
converted by Provident.
Provident had entered into an underwriting agreement
with Dillion, Reed, pursuant to which the underwriters purchased
the debentures (at a profit to Provident of about $366,000).
The underwriting agreement was closed on October 28, when
Provident delivered the debentures to the underwriters and
received payment in cash -- which was distributed in due time

.
.

No. 74-742

3.

in the liquidation of Provident.
The question is whether the approximately $366,000
of "profit"

(the difference between the base value at which

Provident received the debentures and the price at which
they were sold to the underwriters)

is a profit which must

be paid over to the issuing company (Foremost) under 16(b).

District Court Decision
The district court decided the case before our
decision in Kern County.

Following decisions in CA9, CAS,

and CA2, the district court held that 16(b) should be
applied in light of the evils intended to be prevented.
The DC said:
Foremost contends for a starkly literal
reading of Section 16(b), which would make
Provident, by virtue of its short-lived
position as holder of the convertible
debentures of Foremost, accountable to it
as provided in 16(b) for the relatively
small profit resulting from the underwriting described above, without regard
to the overall character of the transaction and its ultimate effect.
It makes
no claim that any of the evils against
which 16(b) were directed were present
in this, or that Provident derived inside
information, profit or advantage from its
all but momentary status as an 'insider'

No. 74-742

4.

of Foremost. To require Provident to pay
over to Foremost the amount the latter
seeks under Section 16(b) would be to
confer a c9mp lete windfall upon Foremost
and would be utterly at war with any
concept of equity known to this Court.
(Petition for cert, p. 38-A.)

Opinion of CA9
CA9 affirmed the judgment of the district court
in favor of Provident, but on a different theory.

This

Court's decision in Kern County was handed down before CA9
considered the case.

In Kern County we had distinguished --

although none too clearly -- between "unorthodox" transactions
(such as stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to merger and
other corporate reorganizations) and the more normal transactions where cash is exchanged for stock.

CA9 concluded that

the Provident-Foremost transaction "was essentially a cash
for stock
County.

transaction~

and not within the rationale of Kern

It noted that 16(b) presumes that a shareholder who

owns 10 percent of a corporation •,s stock has access to inside
information; that although this presumption may be rebutted,
it was not rebutted in this case, and therefore Provident must
be presumed to have had access to inside information from

No. 74-742

5.

Foremost's management.

There was, however, no evidence

to this effect (I believe).

CA9 further noted that this

was an entirely voluntary transaction, as distinguished
from being compelled to receive a security by virtue of
a merger or reorganization.
CA9 nevertheless held for Provident on the basis
of language in 16(b), providing as follows:
This subsection shall not be construed
to cover any transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such both at
the time of the purchase and sale, or
the sale and purchase, of the security
involved
After a lengthy discussion of this language, of its
legislative history, and of decisions in other circuits, CA9
held that the defendant in a 16(b) suit must be an "insider"
at both the time of purchase and sale:
Every Section 16(b) fact situation involves a pair of transactions -- an
initial transaction and a closing
transaction • • • In this case Provident
was not a statutory insider at the time
of its initial purchase. The only
possible Section 16(b) transaction was
the sale of the debentures to the
underwriters.

* * * * *

...

(,

No. 74-742

6.

Although we took the case to decide the conflict
based on CA9's interpretation of 16(b), I am

incl~ned

to

agree with the district court that this was not the type of
transaction intended to be covered by 16(b).

If I adhere

to this view, I would not reach the question which prompted
us to take the case.

That would be a close one for me.

BENCH MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Carl R. Schenker
No. 74-742

DATE:

Sept. 19, 1975

Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v.
Provident Sec. Co.

I recommend reversal.
The case presents two significant questions:
Kern County make § 16(b) inapplicable?

(2)

(1)

Does

If not, does the

"at the time of the purchase and sale" proviso make § 16(b)
inapplicable?
A.

Kern County

~~~/~.v::.
.~ .t v'-'-~

- 0P'1 vv

v-

{

,....,-.

~~ r.~1v~ tl ~/,- •lA-/1' ~ :_,AJ~~p/

The Kern County principle is that certain transactions {,-~
l•

within the literal compass of § 16(b) are not within its

Your dictated aid-to-memory indicates that ~

you are disposed to apply the Kern County principle here.

.

~

ifJ I

s-1¥-·

I am inclined to disagree, but I should emphasize that I
doubt my capacity to "educate" you on an issue that turns on
the practicalities of the business world.

I will therefore

primarily try to indicate the problems I see in fitting this
case into the analytical framework of Kern County.
Kern County, somewhat simplified, involved the following:
0 made a tender offer to K shareholders and became a 10%
beneficial owner.

fl~ /~

of~.

purposes and the statute therefore should not be construed
to include them.

l

,.~,v~

K reacted by negotiating for a defensive

,1 ~
VI- •

•

2.
merger with a holding company of T. , In anticipation of the
merger, 0 gave T an option on any T stock it might acquire by
virtue of a merger.

0 then became the owner of T stock by

operation of the merger.

The option was granted and the merger

took place within six months of O's becoming a 10% owner of K.
It was undisputed that O's acquisition of K stock by tender
offer was a "purchase."

-

The issue in Kern County was whether

either the merger or the option was a "sale" within the meaning
\ of§ 16(b).

The Court held that neither event occasioned

\}-

a "sale," because in neither case was there an opportunity
for 0 to tr·a de on the basis of inside information.

In the

case of the merger, 0 was prevented from acquiring inside
information after its purchase by the hostility of the K
management, and the terms of the "sale" were negotiated between
K and T.

In the case of the option, 0 was again acting without

inside information, and it was "selling" to the issuer of the
securities, who would have more information than 0 about the
security.

Thus, in Kern County the holding of no "sale" as to ().i.a_o
H.-.t..

(1) · ~~

the merger and the option was supported by two factors:

the "impossibility" of 0 having inside information and (2)

{ ?~

, ~...c.-1-'

~..-v ~

the "impossibility" of 0 abusing the closing transaction.
This case differs in both respects.
discuss factor (2) first.

1.

Factor (2).

1

,

w~

It will be convenient to

~~

~

C-11\<..~1- '

~~
t~

As I have just indicated, the Kern County holding was ~~~
supported in part by the fact that the closing transactions

"r·

3.
were "abuse proof."

But here the closing transaction was

subject to speculative abuse if Provident had inside information.

-

The closing transaction was an ordinary sale.

It was not

imposed upon Provident as the fait accompli of others (unlike
in the Kern County merger).

And Provident's purchasers were

not more informed than Provident about the security traded
(unlike in the Kern County option).

The whole second leg of

support for Kern County's holding is thus missing.
This places in stark relief an important difference between
the cases. The holding in Kern County was that the closing
transaction was not a "sale".

But here there can be no doubt

that the closing transaction was a wholly conventional cashfor- stock "sale" within the clear embrace of the statute .
Holding § 16(b) inapplicable here would thus require holding
that the opening transaction was not a "purchase."

It does

not seem to me that the purposes of the statute can ever be
served fully by excluding an opening transaction from its
operation.

No matter how one acquires securities, if one sells

in a transaction that could be abused, the evil of insider
trading is possible.

In short, I don't think Kern County

should be extended to embrace a contention that an opening transaction (at least when it is an acquisition) is not a statutory
event ("purchase").

4.
2.

Factor (1).

Although Kern County involved both factors (1) and (2),
it could be held consistently with it that factor (1) suffices
to make § 16(b) inapplicable.

It therefore is necessary to

consider whether it was "impossible" for Provident to get
access to inside information.
The exact content of "impossibility" is unclear.
County never used that word.

Kern

The Court said at one point that

"it [was] totally unrealistic to assume or infer from the
facts before us that [0] either had or was likely to have
access to inside information . . • . "
Emphasis added).

(411 U.S. at 596 ,

At another point the Court said:

There is

nothing "to indicate . • . the possibility: of inside information being available."

(411 U.S. at 599.

Emphasis added).

"Possibility" suggests that less threat of abuse is required
to make the statute applicable than is suggested by "likely".
The different wording points out the central difficulty of
factor (1) analysis.

Kern County allows a certain inquiry

into the actual facts of a case to assess the potential for
abuse.

But too specific an inquiry would convert § 16(b)

into Rule lO(b)-5.

That is, too specific an inquiry would

prevent § 16(b) from serving its purpose as a "rule of thumb"
prophylactic.

The Kern County test, at the extreme, cannot

encompass an inquiry into whether there actually was use of
inside information.

5.
I feel that Provident's argument here takes the factor
(1) inquiry too far down the road toward Rule lO(b)-5.
Provident apparently contends at one point that the inquiry
in unorthodox transaction cases is to be whether there was
in fact acquisition of inside information.

(Brief at 42.)

And Provident's overextension of Kern County can be seen in
its detailed argument on the inside information point.
Provident contends both that it did not acquire inside information from the negotiations and that it could not acquire
information from its position as a mere debenture holder.
Kern County seems to support the argument that Provident
could not have gained information from its status as a debenture
holder.

Debenture holders, even if they hold convertible

debentures, are outsiders as a practical matter.

J -r~

The access

conveyed by stock ownership is not likely to be had without
exercise of the convertibility rights.
managemen~

If the hostility of

in Kern County sufficed to rebut the presumption

of insider information

on the part of a 10% stockholdesit

seems that an argument based on debenture status should be
acceptable.
,

I have more trouble, however, with the argument that

) Provident did not acquire inside information from its negotiations with Foremost.

I

There were extensive negotiations and

contact between the two firms before (and to a certain extent

after) the sale.

One can easily imagine negotiated transactions

like this where inside information would pass to the party in

6.

Provident's position.

The potential recipient of the security

would frequently demand information on the financial status
of the issuer, though Provident contends no such information
passed here.

In such a case it is easy to see

abuse suggested by CA9.

room for the

The recipient might realize that the

issuer would have to pass a dividend to finance the purchase
of the assets, and the recipient could therefore sell after the
announcement of the purchase but before the announcement of
the passed dividend.

The possibility of the acquisition of

inside information in these circumstances should suffice
for § 16(b) liability, since it will sometimes occur.

The

situation is different from the hostility in Kern County
where it could be presumed that as a general matter no inside
information would pass.
This is concededly a difficult line to draw.
§

But if

16(b) is to operate as it was intended to, at some point

inquiry into the actual facts must cease and attention must
focus on the potential for abuse.

Where there are cooperative

negotiations, the potential for abuse seems large enough to
justify cutting off the inquiry into actual facts.
One last rock remains to be turned over.

Is information

potentially available in pretransaction negotiations acquired
by virtue of stock ownership?

In Kern County it was

contended that 0 might have speculated on the basis of
knowledge that its tender offer would stimulate a defensive
merger that would drive K stock up and therefore profit 0.

7.
This argument was rejected.

The Court reasoned that if 0

was so speculating, the information on which it was relying
was knowledge of stock market mechanics, not "information
obtained from substantial stockholding that did not yet exist."
(411 U.S. at 582).

Provident argues briefly that any informa-

tion it may have acquired in the cooperative negotiations was
similarly not acquired from actual stockholding.
at 38.)

(Brief

There may be some factual difficulty in this argument

because the cooperation continued after the sale to at least
some extent (further valuation of the Provident properties).
But there is a more fundamental flaw in the argument.
A it is true that, as in Kern County, pretransaction negotiations
would not furnish information derived from present stockholdings.
But this case is different from Kern County because the information in question is not information that any sophisticated
investor could have.

It would seem undue formalism to apply

the Kern County language that rigidly.

When inside information

is acquired in the very course of acquiring stock, it should
be within the compass of § 16(b).
B.

The Proviso
I find the proviso question very difficult.

The

statutory text, legislative history, and legislative purpose
are all opaque, but I would conclude that the initial purchase
is covered.
The proviso reads:

8.

This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where [the 10%] beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase
and sale. . . .
I think we can safely start from the premise that the
phrase "at the time of the purchase" is subject to construction
either as "prior to the purchase" or as "simultaneously with
the purchase." {Compare Reliance Elec. Co., where it could be
concluded that "at the time of the . . . sale" had a literal
meaning~

-upon legislative history and legislative purpose.

Given this premise of ambiguity, we are cast back
CA9 drew

content for the proviso from the legislative history.

But

since this Court said in Reliance Elec. Co. that "the legislative history affords no explanation of the purpose of the
proviso"(404 U.S. at 424), the legislative purpose seems a
more logical source to turn to first.
1.

Legislative Purpose.

To evaluate the legislative purpose of the proviso,
it is useful to turn initially to the purpose of the whole
section.

It was enacted to prevent abusive trading practices

based on inside information.

But it must be noted that there

are two ways to trade on the basis of inside information.
(Let's take the example of a 10% stockholder.)

The first way

is for a stockholder who is already a statutory insider to
determine on the basis of inside information to make a

--

profitable purchase and sale (i.e., "double-transaction abuse").

9.
The second way is for a stockholder who becomes an insider
by virtue of a purchase to determine on the basis of (newly
available) inside information to make a profitable sale (i.e.,
"single-transaction abuse").
Short-Swing Profits:

(Note, "Insider Liability for

The Substance and Function of the

Pragmatic Approach," 72 Mich. L. Rev. 593, 598-99 (1974).
(This is Mark Pomerantz' Note.))
Congress' purpose in enacting § 16(b) clearly embraced
at least elimination of double-transaction abuses that met
the "rule of thumb" criteria adopted.

But an argument could

be made that the congressional purpose did not extend to
preventing single-transaction abuses that met the "rule of
thumb" criteria.

This argument goes to the effect of

the statute, not the proviso.

But examining it helps in

evaluating the purposesthat might lie behind the proviso.
In addition, some of the arguments advanced in Provident's
brief are really directed less at the meaning of the proviso
than at the proposition that § 16(b) does not reach singletransaction abuses.

(Provident does not explicitly make

this point, since it seems to take the position that singletransaction abuses by those who become directors or officers
after a purchase are covered.

(Resp's Brief at 19-20)).

The following excerpt from the Michigan Note details
the argument that Congress intended to reach only doubletransaction abuses:

10.
The congressional hearings and reports discussing the
provlSlon eventually enacted as section 16(b) repeatedly describe its
purpose in terms referring to double- rather than single-transaction
abuse-the curbing of "short-term," "in-and-out" speculation on the
basis of inside information.u Furthermore, the examples in the con-

------------~r---·~

gTessional hearings and reports of the kind of abuse intended to be
reached by section 16(b) include no instances of single-transaction
abuse, but in all cases describe situations in which advance information tainted both the purchase and the sale. 42
The case from the statute itself is even more clear. Fir.,t, .I..... .,tel.
ute speaks in conjunctive terms of "profit realized ... from any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase ... ," 43 implying that Congress
did not intend section 16(b) to deter abuse of inside information in a
single transaction unless the abuse was converted into a trading profit
by means of a second transaction. 44 This implication is supported by
the statutory provision {or recovery, which provides that the profit
realized from a sale of shares is to be calculated with reference to the
price paid for their purchase. 4 ~ Such a scheme is appropriate if the
purchase and the sale are part of the same profit-making scheme, that
is, if the situation is one of double-transaction abuse. The mechanism
is less appropriate, however, for certain instances of single-transaction abuse. Assume, for example, that an i.nsider, in a purchase free
of any possibility of abuse, buys stock at 85. The price rises to 100 because of generally favorable economic conditions. At this point the
insider becomes privy to advance information about a development
that will send the stock price tumbling to 50, so he sells at 100. The \
recovery under section 16(b) would be 15 dollars per share, but advance information has allowed the insider to avert losses of 50 dollars
per share. Thus, the measure of damages is inadequate if the purpose
of the statute is to inhibit single-transaction aquses.
A similar analysis applies to the failure of the statute to reach
transactions occurring more than six months apart. In situations of
double-transaction abuse, where inside information motivates the initial transaction as well as the final one, the six-month time limit is
quite reasonable-the inside information typically relates to a temporary price fluctuation and is thus worthless if it cannot be turned
to profit within six months. For instance, an investor who receives information in January about a temporary price rise in February will
not buy in anticipation of the up-swing if he cannot sell and be assured of retaining his profits until July. 46 Furthermore, a primary
function of the six-month limitation period is "to serve as an indicator of the existence of the prohibited short-swing intention." 47 The
fact that an insider's purchase is quickly followed by a sale makes it
( more reasonable to assume that the purchase was the beginning of a
short-swing based on advance information, rather than a legitimate

11.

investment decision. In the co_llt~xt of single-transaction abuse, howe~er, the six-month time limit is illogical. Since the defendant's first
transaction is, by hypothesis, completely innocent its only function
as a basis for liability is to start the six-month clock ticking. Though
the investor may later use inside information in deciding to make a
sale, he will not be liable under section 16(b) unless he has made a
fortuitous and unrelated purchase within the preceding six months.
Even more conv~ncing is the statutory exemption for securities
"acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted."48 1£ Congress was concerned about abuse of inside information with reference to the sale only in the "purchase and sale"
situation it would be absurd to create an exception for certain innocent purchases. Indeed, the "debt previously contracted' exemption
indicates that when a section 16(b) purchase presents no possibility
of abuse, the possibility of abuse with respect to a subsequent sale
should be irrelevant. 49
It may be argued that Congress manifested an intent to deal with
single-transaction abuse when it expressly provided that the statute
should apply "irrespective of any intention on the part of" the insider
not to get out on a 'short-swing.~ 0 This provision may be read to indicate that Congress wanted to eliminate any suggestion that some
connection in motivation between the purchase and sale was necessary. In fact, the statutory provision cuts the other way. It removes
the question of intent from the facts to be considered because Congress feared that requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant's
intent to sell or to disprove his intent not to sell would be too onerous.
Therefore, Congress sought to establish an irrebuttable presumption
that the two transactions were linked in a single speculative plan.G 1

12.
I do not find this argument ultimately persuasive.

The bulk of the argument is directed to the proposition
that the provisions of the statute are ill-tailored to prevent
single-transaction abuses.

But it has always been recognized

that § 16(b) is a "rule of thumb" statute.

The fact that

the objective criteria specified by Congress do a better job
of preventing double-transaction abuses does not weigh very
heavily against a conclusion that single-transaction abuses
are covered.
And there is at least one very significant indication
that Congress intended in
abuses.

g~eral

to reach single-transaction

l

In the statutory "preamble" Congress stated its

purpose to be "preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by a [10%] beneficial owner .
by reason of his relationship to the issuer . •

"

Although

Provident cites the preamble in support of its contention,
the language seems more compatible with coverage of singletransaction abuses.

A stockholder who decides to sell on

the basis of inside information acquired after becoming a
10% owner has made "unfair use" of information acquired "by
reason of his relationship to the issuer," even though he
has not made an "in and out" decision on the basis
inside information.

of the

Thus the statutory "preamble" supports

the conclusion that single-transaction abuses are covered.

7

13.
The reasoning that all the examples of abuse of insider
information discussed by Congress involved double-transaction
abuse can also not be deemed conclusive.

If Congress meant

to reach single-transaction abuses, as is suggest .ed . by the
statutory preamble, the focus on double-transaction abuses
is perhaps explicable by their more outrageous nature.

In

addition, the report accompanying a draft of § 16(b) as
enacted states simply that "[t]he expressed purpose of this
provision is to prevent the unfair use of inside information."
(S. Rep. No. 792 to accompany S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(Apr. 20, 1934)).

While CA9 seems correct that earlier drafts

were clearly aimed at double-transaction abuses, the broader
statement of purpose may be explicable on the basis of the
elimination of criminal penalties.

(See infra at 14-16.)

It thus seems appropriate to conclude that in general

7

Congress intended to prevent single-transaction abuses as
1

well as double-transaction abuses.

The question becomes

whether the proviso was intended to exempt 10% stockholders
from single-transaction liability.

The difficulty with

1. This Court gave apparent sanction to the view by
citing with approval Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1959), which held that one who is a director at the time
of sale need not also have-been one at the time of purchase.
(See Reliance Elec. Co., 404 U.S. at 424 n. 4.)
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14.

the CA9 result is that once some single-transaction liability
is conceded, it is difficult to conclude that the proviso was

(?

meant to exempt stockholders.

t'

We begin again with the ambiguity of the proviso.

If

we work from the hypothesis that the general statutory purpose
is to prevent both double - and single - transaction abuse,
an exemptive effect for the proviso cannot be inferred from
the purpose of the statute.

Indeed, i f the purpose of the

statute supported an exemptive effect, no exemption would
be needed.

(That is, if the

statute~e

intended to reach

only double-transaction abuses, no exemption from liability
for certain single-transaction abuses would be required.)
Since an explanation more consistent with the purpose of
the statute appears for the pro.viso (see infra at 16-:1,7 ), the
exemptive effect contended for by Provident is not compelled
by the purpose of the statute.
2.

Legislative history.

Since neither the text of the statute nor the legislative
purpose support an exemptive interpretation, legislative history
is the final recourse.

As already noted, in Reliance Elec. Co.

this Court found that legislative history provided no explanation of the meaning of the proviso.

(See supra at

8.)

Despite that conclusion CA9 relied on legislative history to
support its conclusion.
rejected.

I think the CA9 analysis should be

15.
CA9 relied largely on language in S. 2693 strongly
indicating that liability attached only to stockholders who
were already statutory insiders.

Section 5(b) of S. 2693

provided:
It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or
owner of securities, owning . . . more than 5 per
centum of any class of stock . . . .
(1) To purchase any such registered security
with the intention or expectation of selling the
same security within six months, and any profit
made by such person . . . shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer . . . .
But the fact that this provision was proposed at one time
actually does little to point to a stockholder exemption from
single-transaction liability.
The S. 2693 language embraced directors, officers, and
stockholders.

It clearly contemplated that purchases by any

of these would be covered only if the "insider" status
existed at the time of purchase.

And it is hard to imagine

a criminal provision being drafted otherwise.

This piece

of legislative history may therefore indicate that all of
§

16(b) was originally directed only at double-transaction

abuse.

But that focus was apparently abandoned when criminal
2

sanctions were abandoned.

It is difficult to see how

S. 2693 supports a differentiation between stockholders on
the one hand and directors and officers on the other as
to single-transaction liability.

2.

See footnote 1 supra.

Absent at least some

16.
legislative history supporting such a differentiation, the
inference drawn by CA9 from S. 2693 seems impermissible.
3.

Resolution.

If we conclude that the background of S. 2693 does not
in fact give the illumination that this Court found lacking
in Reliance Elec. Co., we are left with the bare ambiguity
of the statute.

Having reached that point, it seems that the

principle of construction enunciated in Reliance Elec. Co.
should be applied.

There the Court wrote:

"To be sure,

where alternative constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are
possible, those terms are to be given the construction that
best serves the congressional purpose. • . . " (404 U.S. at
424.

It should be noted that the deleted words in the quoted

sentence are "of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate
insiders."

This language is suggestive of a double-transaction

construction of the statute, but that question was, of course,
not under consideration.)
If the Reliance Elec. Co. rule of construction governs
and the statutory purpose embraces the curbing of singletransaction abuses, the "simultaneously with the purchase"
construction should be adopted.

Meaning would then be found

for the proviso by construing it to deal with the minimization
of liability by step transactions.

Reliance Elec. Co. has

already held that the proviso is to be read as allowing
minimization of liability by step sales.

The symmetrical

17.
allowance of minimization of liability by step purchase$
furthers the purpose of preventing single-transaction abuses
while giving meaning to the statutory language.

I

(This solution

has been advocated by L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1060
(2d ed 1961) on just that basis.)
I think this construction finds further support in two
factors.

First, it allows the words "at the time of" to be

given the meaning "simultaneously with" in all cases, while
CA9 realized that its result would require the phrase to be
given one construction for opening transactions
for closing transactions.

and another

Second, this is the construction

that the SEC has always urged for § 16(b).

Although the SEC

it not participating here as amicus, it has long urged that
the qualifying purchase is a § 16 (b) transaction.

er agree

with

Provident that Foremost-McKesson's argument on the meaning
of the proviso based on Rule 16b-2 is not conclusive.

The

Rule would have meaning whether or not the qualifying
transaction is covered.

The SEC might be unable to point

to any action it has taken predicated on the construction
urged here.

But the position itself has long been taken,

and given the closeness of the case, the SEC position should
be weighty.)
4.

Counter Arguments

I am fairly confident that the proviso argument relied
upon by CA 9 and Provident is without merit. Thus on an

18.
analytical basis I think that CA9 can be affirmed only if the
Kern County argument is accepted.

Despite my confidence, I

think one aspect of Reliance Elec. Co. would point to affirmance
on CA9's rationale.

There, after noting that the purpose of

the proviso was unclear, the Court said:

"[I]tmay be that

Congress regarded one with a long-term investment as more
likely to have access to inside information than one who moves
in and out of the 10% category."

(404 U.S. at 424).

This

speculative assignment of purpose suggests that the congressional purpose in regulating stockholders was to reach only
double-transaction abuses.

But I think the Reliance Elec. Co.

result did not depend on t hat remark.

It focuses, rather ,

on s a tisfying t h e tension between the statutory purpose and
finding some meaning for the proviso.
approach, my result here is sound.

On the basis of that

The court in Reliance

Elec. Co. was not forced to consider whether the statute
governed single-transaction abuses.
Summary
Kern County analysis seems inappropriate here because
the closing transaction was subject to abuse.

If Kern County

is applicable, I don't think it governs because there was
potential for abuse of inside information.
The argument that the proviso exempts the qualifying
purchase from the reach of § 16(b) collapses
of its own weight.

-

and largely

The proviso can have that effect only

~

19.
if the section otherwise covers single-transaction abuses.
But no legislative history points to an exemptive effect, so
the purpose of the proviso remains unclear.

Since it remains

unclear what the purpose of the priviso is, it should be
construed to effectuate the h ypothesized statutory purpose
of covering single-transaction abu ses.

It can be so construed

and still have meaning if it is limited to the minimization
of liability by

step transactions.

c.s.
ss

I

To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

10-EJ-75

Carl Schenker
Foremost-McKesson, No. 74-742

This memo embodies the last minute research you asked for in
this case.
1.

The 7th Circuit View
As we discussed this afternoon, the 7th Circuit has just adopted

the "dual-transaction" analysis of§ 16(b).

Judge Swygert writes

in the opinion "that in enacting section 16(b) Congress had in mind
a specific type of two-part transaction consisting MX either of
a purchase and subsequent sale, or a sale ard subsequent repnrchase,
and did not intend section 16(b) to apply to every separate purchase
or sale as to which some use of inside information is a theoretical
possibility."

(Slip op'n at 15-16.)

~

There is nothing startling in what the 7th Circuit has to say ~
~A-t m~
d..u.Al· -tY"~s~ ~ ~ .
In ~act, I find the op1nion less persuasive than Pomerantz' argu-

"1.

ments.

The 7th Circuit bases KKK its entire argument on the

legislative history that CA9 relied upon;

that is, its argument

is based on the previous draft that clearly anticipated dualtransaction analysis, but which included criminal sanctions. ~~~

~~At,r) cA7

takes no account of the possibility that the basis of liability

might have been widened when the criminal sanctions were dropped
from the bill.

In adnition, it takes no account of KKK cases

like Adler, which imposed single-transaction liability upon officers
and directors (and which this Court cited with approval in Relianre
Electric.)

While CA7 may be right, I don't think they make a

very persuasive case.
Furthermore, if I am reading the opinion correctly, they
really

~M~~KM

dropped the ball on the meaning of the proviso.

Apparently CA7 held that the proviso means that only the ownership
percentage before the opening transaction is to be considered.
op'n at 19.)

This could not be the case.

(Slip

First, if it were, then

the single-transaction approach is to be derived from the proviso
rather than from the statute itself.

But I gather that CA7 intends

to apply this holding in director and officer cases as well as in stockholderK cases.

Second, this construction of the proviso is not con-

sistent with Reliance Electric. The Court there clearly contemplated
that there would be inquiry into the stockholding before a
closing transaction.

But, CA7 apparently would not do so.

KIK~~

Rather,

it would hold that the last M 10% of stock sold would never be the
~~

1'\'\\.lsT

basis for liability, since 10% s tockowne rA_ 'lllllt Lpreexis t insider status.
(Slip op'n at 18 n.l2.)
I Thus, CA7 would appa r ently hold that if a 25% owner disposed of all
of his stock at once, he would be liable only for for the
fits on 15% of the sales.

~MXXKX

pro-

No matter what construction ms made of

the proviso, it seems that the entire profit on a single sale should
be recouped.

~6

XXKKMHl:HX~XXID!XXXHM2Qiltli!fmxl:KXHMX~MMKKJi:H~~K:tKDKX

tix:MXUXnXJS}i}i!OOOOUXXXXXMI~Kxx:Hlrn~IDIXXl!IDOOCI.:f~XXKIDIXX
HKNKKMXiMMXIfi»:Itt.!QfX:tKXXKKXlHU}fXIfiMtt:t.K~eQ(JOOUf:IU200rnlKX~
l00gl4:XDUiKMX~~IMN.Kiflil£X~X1ijiXKKIM.K

In fact, after some effort, I can't think of a construction of
the proviso that makes sense within an overall interpretation of
the statute to reach only dual-transaction abuses.
some further thought,)
note

JC found

(This might stand

I should add that upon rechecking Pomerantz'

that he doesn't address himself to this problem.

It

does seem to me that someone attributed the proviso to an excess of
caution.
2.

The Date of 8iaexRxakiemx Sale Problem
You were right to resurrect this problem from the ash heap.

CA9 seems to have overlooked the possible "nonbinding" effect of

,f 5 (h) (found in the Appendix at page 7 following page Al34).
That provision made a condition of the underwriters' duty to perfcrm
the XKIIHXKXXXII absence of adverse market changes in Foremost
stock between the date of the contract and the date of the KXKI
CA7 considered only the possible effect of ,f 7, which allowed

sale.

the underwriters to terminate the contract between the date of the
contract and the effective date of the registtation statement if
there were adverse changes in the overall market picture.

Since

the registration statement became effective the same date as the
underwriting agreement was signed (and before any eistribution),

,f

7 was considered of no help to RM Provident.
I

have not had time to do original research into the law on
I.A.

this matter.

B~

CA9

KIKXM~

clearly contemplated that such a clause

might mean that the"sale" was not
closing.

MXXlU!lflUI

effectuated until

I would think two
questions
might be asked about
.........
,_, ..,

First, DMKK since CA9 would presumably have considered ,f 5
XMXKRKKXM relevant, why did it fail

writers' performance, while
(I doubt it.)

,f

,f

n

to consider the paragraph?

(Did Provident fail to raise the matter below?)
any consequence to the fact that

,f 5.

Second, is there

5 was a condition of the under-

7 expressly allowed termination.

lr;") I·:::.-

Octobe r 6,, 1975
No. 74-742

Foremost-McKesson v. Provident
Chronology (1969)

August 1969

Negotiations resulted in "tentative Agreement".

September 3 - Provident Board decided to recommend dissolution
and liquidation to its stockholders and adoption
of plan of liquidation.
September 8 - Foremost sought permission from Commissioner
of Corporations to issue and transfer its
Debentures to Provident.
September 25 - Purchase agreement executed pursuant to which
Foremost would purchase .about 2/3 of Provident's
assets in exchange of $4,250,000 in cash and
$49,750,000 in Convertible Debentures. Under
the agreement, Foremost was obligated to
register one half of the debentures.
October 15 - Closing under Purchase Agreement. Foremost
delivered the cash and a $40,000,000 Debenture which was later split into one Debenture for
$25 million and one for $15 million. (The
remaining $9,750,000 of Debentures were delivere d
later - namely on October 20, except for $2,500,000
held in escrow).
October 21 - Provident, Foremost and Dillon Reed entered
Underwriting Agreement for sale of $25,000,000
of Debentures.
October 24 - Provident distributed to its stockholders as a
liquid dividend $22,250,000 of Debentures.
October 28 - Closing under Underwriting Agreement: Provident
transferred the $25 million Debenture to Under' writer for $25,366,666.
October 29 - Provident distributed this cash to its stockholders.

· ·-

.·

October 6, 19 75
No. 74-742

Foremost-McKesson v. Provident
Chronology (1969)

August 1969

Negotiations resulted in "tentative Agreement".

September 3 - Provident Board decided to recommend dissolution
and liquidation to its stockholders and adoption
of plan of liquidation.
September 8 - Foremost sought permission from Commissioner
of Corporations to issue and transfer its
Debentures to Provident.
September 25 - Purchase agreement executed pursuant to which
Foremost would purchase . .about 2/3 of Provident 1 s
assets in exchange of $4,250,000 in cash and
$49,750,000 in Convertible Debentures. Under
the agreement, Foremost was obligated to
register one half of the debentures.
October 15 - Closing under Purchase Agreement. Foremost
delivered the cash and a $40,000,000 Debenture which was later split into one Debenture for
$25 million and one for $15 million. (The
remaining $9,750,000 of Debentures were delivered
later - namely on October 20, except for $2,500,000
held in escrow).
October 21 - Provident, Foremost and Dillon Reed entered
Underwriting Agreement for sale of $25,000,000
of Debentures. (
·
)
October 24 - Provident distributed to its stockholders as a
liquid dividend $22,250,000 of Debentures.
October 28 - Closing under Underwriting Agreement: Provident
transferred the $25 million Debenture to Underwriter for $25,366,666.
October 29 - Provident distributed this cash to its stockholders.

74-742

FOREMOST-McKESSON v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES

Argued 10/6/75
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Carl Schenker

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
No. 74-742

DATE:

November 19, 1975

Foremost-McKesson v.
Provident Securities

This memorandum will reflect my initial, perhaps superficial, reaction to the draft of November 17.

I commend you

on getting it out expeditiously, and the draft reflects
careful thought and research.
The following comments are not "criticism".

Rather,

they are a part of a process designed to result in an opinion
that reflects the best of our combined thinking and draftsmanship:
1.

I have drafted two or three riders, that you will

find attached.

The only important one is a revision of the
I

introductory paragraph.

I am not sure that/have it exactly

right, but I would like something along this line.
2.
facts.

I would prefer a somewhat fuller statement of the
Your succinct statement is perhaps all that is

necessary to address the narrow issue which the opinion
resolves.

Yet, the facts of most 16(b) cases foreshadow the

ultimate outcome.

The bar is interested, and the unfamiliar

reader should have a fairly full factual presentation in
the text.
In the limited time available to me today, I have not
reviewed your footnotes except in the most cursor.y fashion.

L..

I think the text and footnotes combined should identify the
other main issues raised, and state that we do not reach them.
These issues include (i) the Kern County "unorthodox transaction" position of the district court, and (ii) the view
that I have that the critical "sale" did not occur until
October 2S (the closing under the underwriting agreement)
and at that time Provident was not a 10% holder.
3.

Take another look at your discussion of the contra

decisions in Stella and Emerson Electric (CAS).

I have

thought that both of those cases take myopic views of 16(b),
and particularly the exemptive provisions.

In Stella, as

you did note, the district court seemed obsessed with the
"sale-repurchase sequence", and gave little or no attention
to the more typical type of transaction such as that
involved in this case.

In Emerson, while the rationale was

somewhat more "affirmative" (as you say)Jthe illustration
you quote (51% acquisition· followed by manipulation) is
atypical in respect to 16(b).

If one goes to the trouble

of acquiring 51% of another corporation he is likely to
retain control rather than "gut" his own acquisition.

In

the typical tender offer situation, the objective is to
attain 51% and retain it.

In any event, the "horrible

example" dreamed up by CAS would be a classic lOb-5 case.
Accordingly, I suggest that at least you relegate this example
to a footnote.

I would not dignify it by textual treatment.

Jo

4.

Subject to further thought and to your views, I

would be inclined not to commence Part III on page 7.

Rather,

I would start Part III at the top of page 9 with the legislative history.

This is hardly a major suggestion, but at

the moment it seems to have merit.
5.

Your discussion of the legislative history is excellent

and persuasive.

I have not compared it with similar discus-

sions in (i) CA9's opinion, (ii) respondent's brief, and (iii)
the amicus brief filed on behalf of Gulf and Weston.

If you

.:~r J.---1-u. '--<t~

have not done so, take a look with the view to possibly
•\

strengthening - in footnote or text - the draft.

I do recall,

for example, the reference in the amicus brief (p. 14) to
the Senate Report which refers .to the "benefit of advance
information", which is helpful.

Possibly you have it i 'ftone

of your notes - which I have not examined carefully.
6.

I am generally with you (subject to the above

comments) to the beginning of the last paragraph on p. 15.
At this point, it seems to me that the opinion "fades away"
without emphasis of several considerations which I deem
important.

Without attempting to put them in any particular tYJ'-.:6 .,v
1

or to articulate them with precision, they include the
following:
(a)

The discussion in the cases and commentaries

as to whether the language of the exemptive provision
should be construed to mean "before the purchase",
"after the purchase", or "simultaneously with the

'+.

purchase", simply makes no sense to me.

As a matter of

"plain language" one must turn the sentence "on its head"
to construe "at the time of the purchase" to mean "after
the purchase".

But apart from semantics, as you noted,

there can be no presumption that inside informat·ion is
available to a purchaser until after he has become an
insider.

The decision to purchase a security is the

critical act.

This necessarily precedes - often by a

significant interval of time - the actual consummation
of a purchase.

The relevance of "insider information"

relates only to the decisional process; not to the
mechanical execution of a purchase.

Thus, there is a

perfectly rational basis for construing this language
as meaning what it would normally mean, i.e., that before
one becomes a statutory purchaser, enjoying "insider
status", he must have completed the purchase.
that time he is a statutory outsider.

Prior to

Against this back-

ground of reality, the language "at the time of purchase"
can mean only one thing.
(b)

The exemptive provision applies only to

beneficial owners of more than 10%, not to officers and
directors.

Congress must have had a purpose in mind for

this deliberate distinction.

The CA2 and CA8 decisions have,

in effect, obliterated the distinction, something we have
decided not to do.

In truth, as you know from our discus-

sions, even one who enjoys the status of a 10% stockholder is

·,

J.

not entitled by virtue of that status to any inside
information.

To be sure, if such a stockholder is able

to place a representative on the board, the stockholder
may end up obtaining the information.

This would certainly

be true if an individual owned 10% and also served as an
officer or a director.

But absent a presence on the

board there would be a clear violation of lOb-S for a
corporation (or its officers or directors) to disclose
to any stockholder information not available to all
holders.
Not only is a 10% stockholder not entitled to
information by virtue of that status, the fairly
typical situation today involves a tender offer resulting
in an adversary position • . The amicus brief for Gulf
and Weston presents this situation with some force.
(c)

You have, as I recall, one s entence mentioning

the availability of lOb-5 remedies.

I consider this a

fairly major point that should be elaborated.
(d)

Section 16(b) creates liability without fault

where it is applicable.

Putting this another way, it

creates a conclusive presumption of wrongdoing without
regard to the facts, and imposes liability on the basis
of a purely mechanical formula.

Where the operative

language is clear and explicit, we must accept congressional judgment - absent constitutional infirmity.

But

here no one- no court and) to my knowledge)no commentator-

o.

thinks that the language of the priviso is clear or
explicit.

Viewed in the light ' most favorable to

petitioner's arguments in this case, the language is
ambiguous.

And the "ambiguity" is perceived not so much

from the language of the proviso as from what seems to
be undesirable results in some instances (the salerepurchase, for example) if the language is applied in
accordance with its normal meaning.
It is one thing, however, to be concerned about
undesirable results that do not impose liability, and
which may well be prevented by lOb-S or other provisions.
It is quite something else to construe admittedly
ambiguous language to impose such liability by an
irrebuttable presumption of fault.
This point was very much in the minds of some of
the Justices who voted to affirm in this case.

It

merits appropriate emphasis.
Note:
There is something of a problem as to how to work the foregoing thoughts into the structure of your draft.

I think I

would add a new Part IV, following your fine discussion of the
legislative history, and address it in policy considerations
that are supportive of that history and our holding.

I think

most of the foregoing ideas could be blended into such a
discussion.

I have not reread Kern County, but it may be that

some of the language in it would be helpful either as a
"springboard" or as tangentially relevant.

I •

7.

I have not focused on present Part IV, and will

try to do this upon my return from Harvard.
8.

Nor have I had an opportunity to review the

footnotes, beyond some haphazard reading.
that they seem

c

to~ fulsome,

I agree with you

and may include some topics that

could well be omitted entirely.

I do not like to have the

footnotes outweigh the text; nor, should they indicate views
on issues not before the Court.

This is a hurried memorandum, so that you will have
the essence of my preliminary thinking before I go away.

L. F. P. , Jr.

ss

1 p

88

11/19/75

Rider A1 p. 15 (Foremost-McKesson)

But the insider status was viewed as deriving from the fact
of stock ownership and its consequent access to inside
information.

The focus of concern was on preventing a

large stockholder from profiting by trading on the basis
of such information.

It would hardly be consistent with

this view of the threat to impose liability on the basis
of a purchase when there was no insider status and
presumptively no access to information unavailable to
investors at large.

11/19/75

lfp/ss

Rider A, p. 9

~Foremost-McKesson)

III.
The exemptive provision, which applies only to
beneficial owners of more than 10% of the security involved
and not to other statutory insiders, must have been
included in the Act for a purpose.
legislative history.

We look first to the

Although the extensive record of

that history is bereft of any explicit explanation of
congressional purpose and intent, see Reliance Electric
~·

of

v. Emerson Electric Co., supra at 424, the evolution
§

16(b) from its initial proposal through passage

does shed significant light on the exemptive provision.

lfp/ss

Rider A, p. 1 (Foremost-MCKesson)

11/19/75

This case presents an unresolved issue under

§

16(b)

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896, 15

u.s.c.

§ 78p(b).

That section of the Act was designed to

prevent corporate officers, directors and the beneficial
owners of more than 10% of a corporation's equity
securities from profiteering on the basis of insider
information through short-swing transactions.

Section

16(b) contains an exemptive proviso excluding "any
transaction where such beneficial owner [of more than
10%] was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security
involved

* * *"·

The question presented here is whether

a person who purchases more than 10% of a corporation's
equity securities, and thereafter sells them within six
months, was a beneficial owner of such securities "at
the time of the purchase" as well as at the time of the
sale.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit answered this
601 (1974).

qu~stion

We affirm.

in the negative.

506 F.2d

-;'-/-- stz
Supreme Court of the United States
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Carl R. Schenker
Rider A, p. 20.

No. 74-742 Foremost

I think your presumption analysis may be summarized
as follows:

Section 16(b) defines insiders as including those

who own 10% .

From the fact of ownership it is presumed that

a trading stockholder (1) has access to inside information and
(2) has misused inside information.

It is, however, irrational

to infer (1) and (2) until one who is already an insider purchases
and sells.
I don't think this analysis can carry us very far.
First, (1) and (2) are not both presumed from the fact of
ownership.
§

Second, the perc eived irrationality assumes that

16(b) deals only with dual-transaction abuses and not with

single-transaction abuses, while that is the very question at
issue.
First.

The commentators who have par sed carefully

-

the operation of § 16(b) agree that the section includes two

-

presumptions.

Presumption (1) is that 10% ownership gives one

inside information.

Presumption (2) is that a purchase and

sale (or sale and purchase) within 6 months was based on use
of the inside information.

That is, access is presumed from

the fact of ownership, but misuse is presumed from the fact of

2.

a short-swing transaction.
in the CA 9 analysis.
Second:

(This bifurcation can be seen

506 F. 2d 611-614.)

Even if we clarified this point, the

analysis in Rider A does not work.

The central thrust of

Rider A is that it is irrational to conjoin a presumption of
access and a presumption of misuse unless both the purchase
and sale followed the fact of insider status.

In other words,

Presumption 2 may only rationally mean that a purchase-and-sale
after access to information was based on misuse of information.
But note that this position also implies that it is irrational
to presume misuse of inside information in the sale of stock
unless there was a presumptive misuse in the purchase of the
stock.

I think that is demonstrably not so.

Congress would

be entitled to presume that a sale shortly after any substantial
purchase reflects a misuse of inside information available
after the purchase.

(See the appendix for an elaborated discussion).

Let's call this Presumption 2'.
that kind of abuse.

It could legislate to cover

I am not arguing that Congre ss incorporated Presumption
2' into§ 16(b).

[Maybe it did

as to directors and

officers, but we are holding that it didn't as to 10% owners
because of the proviso.]

I am only arguing that it could

rationally enact a statute tha( incorporated Presumption 2'.
From the foregoing I would make two arguments.
~

you statements in Rider A are far too
A

First,

sweeping in their

strong suggestion that a statute including Presumption 2' might
be unconstitutional.

Second, the very question that this opinion

addresses is whether or not the proviso was intended to negate
Presumption 2' for stockholders.

If Presumption 2' were

irrational, it would be valid to argue Congress couldn't have
intended it.

But since Presumption 2' is rational, Rider A is

a bootstrap argument.

(Please note that the CA 9 argument based

on presumptions recognized this point.

506 F. 2d at 611-614.

It therefore argues n ot that Presumption 2' is irrational, but
that Congress demonstrated that it wanted Presumption 2 by
deleting tippee liability.

The argument is that tippees were

3.

outsiders, as are 10% owners before the purchase.

Therefore

the deletion of tippee liability shows an intention to exclude
outsiders, including those who owned less than 10% before
purchase.

This argument, however, does not work because

10% owners are insiders after the purchase, while tippees are
always outsiders.

The deletion of tippee liability therefore

proves nothing about Presumption 2 or Presumption 2' when it is
conjoined with Presumption 1.)
Suggestion:

I wrestled with this presumption

argument before rejecting its inclusion in the draft.

But

I am now perfectly clear on its bootstrapping nature.

And I

think the weakness of the CA 9 argument demonstrates that it
can't be remedied .

For that reason I prefer the alternative

suggested in your previous memo to me.

The liability without

fault argument is not a bootstrapping argument.

Congress knew

it was imposing liability without fault and definitely did not
want to make it too broad.

Of course, that desire doesn't

answer the question whether it chose to incorporate Presumption
2 or Presumption 2', but it allows a more coherent and analytically
sound policy argument.

You seem to feel that my argument on

this point was not strong enough.

I recommend strongly that we

rework my section together to tone it to the pitch you want
rather than sticking with the presumption analysis.
Appendix:

Imagine for a moment that Congress

deliberately and unambiguously set out to pass a statute that

4.
covered both dual-transaction abuses and single-transaction
abuses.
(1)

It could follow a thought-process like this:

One who purchases over the 10% level may or may not have

made that purchase on inside information.

(If the purchase

was based on inside information, that information was not
derived from the fact of relationship to the corporation, but
from some other source.)

When he sells within 6 months there

are three possibilities.

(a)

He had inside -information when

he bought and intended to sell on the short-swing.
(b)

After he became an insider, he acquired information and

sold on the short-swing.

(c)

Both the purchase and the sale

were inn~

l 3)
~ ~~
~

;{'

As you have pointed out to me, one who purchases

substantial block

~sually

does so for purposes of long-term

investment (especially when he has the prospect of control); )

~~

((4)

Therefore, when a substantial purchas« sells

~--~ within 6 months, the profits can be taken out of the sale because

~~~

(3) makes it rational to assume a significant probability of
either (a) or (b) abuse.
In a (b) abuse situation of an innocent purchase
followed by an abusive sale, the rationality stems from essentially
the same two presumptions that operate at present in§ 16(b).
When one becomes an insider, he has access to inside information.
When such a person sells within 6 months he was trading on that
information.

The rationali ty for covering (a) situations is

5.

is slightly different, but it need not be discussed.

Congress

would be entirely justified in saying that (b) abuses were so
likely that the rule was justified on that basis alone.

Since

you can't tell an (a) abuse from a (b) abuse, Congress would
be entitled to subsume both under the same rule.
The possibility remains that many (c) situations
of an innocent purchase followed by an innocent sale would be
covered by this statute.

But it is not irrational to cover

these situations in order to reach all of the (a) and (b)
situations.
~

This is especially true because the "only" penalty

imposed upon the (c) people is loss of profits.

This is liability

without fault, but of a very limited variety.

Carl
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\
To:

LFP

From:

CRS

Re:

Foremost-McKes son v. Provident,

Throat clearing.

No. 74-742

I have been working my way up to preparing

a memo that would allow us to discuss the basic strategy that the
opinion should take.

at

l•11t ~io case;
~$:/~

a_

not presented here that we want to hold harmless

in this opini9n (as I
~·

My strategical problem is that there ·aPe IS

un~ tand

b..d .

.

our previous discussions).

This ~~

~s a longer range ' matter than the immediate problem that has arisen

so I will discuss
memorandum.

AA'\

that · ~tter

YYXYM¥ at the second part of the

I will turn first to my shorter range problem:

--right way in Provident.
--...........

the

~

Conference vote the

Did

--~

(Please read

on before you come to the conclusion that I'm a sore loser.)
A.

The KKKM basic outcome.

As you know, the Court's previous foray into the meaning of
the proviso in § 16(b) was KK in Reliance Electric.

There the

question presented was what the words "at the time of • . • sale"
meant.

They were held to mean that a b eneficial owner could

"minimize" his liability by making step sales.
Reliance Electric's

facts are easily summarized:* R The

stockholder bou ght 1~ of the corporation, then sold in two blocks
of $X

6%and

9%.

The stockholder contended that the proviso "both at the time
of the purchase and sale" excluded any liability for either s a le.
But the Court found that ques tion not MK to be properly presented
in the case.
that the

Thus it confined itself to the further contention

~

second sale should not b e covered.

The Court

held that the "plain meaning" of the phrase "at the time of • • . sale"
;yl

;-e'l ~--TVU J~

~s.

&

'--h; ~· ~Qf) ~

0..0

iS~CI

was that the second sale was excluded from operation of the
statute because after the

6%sale,

1'J'%owner

a

a "beneficial owner of more than 10%."
Now let's consider Provident.

was no longer

Seems sound enough.

Provident became a more KMXM

than !XX 10% owner XMX in a single pnrchase of 15%.
sold HX 6%.

It then

The Conference has voted to hold that the words

"both at the time of the purchase • • • "mean that since Provident
was not a 10% owner at the time of the original purchase, its
subsequent sale cannot be matched against that purchase.

Seems

sound enough.

Consequently~

/
cessary / to p

Provident

purchase
purchase
ale
le.
Now,under

6 - 9

"at the
the K]QI s

• . sale"
down

be

11M'4k~~~'~'.'

Th~oblem
be wrong.

~

is that if Provident is right RelianceXMHKK MUST

Let me demonstrate:

~KXKM

Imagine that all three

of the following transactions take place within 6 months--

XKXll

a 15% purchase
a 6% sale
a 9% sale

In World A, Stella and Reliance are the c ontr olling cas es.
stockholder would therefore be liable for lX
Provident is the
for nothing.
changes.

contr~ing prcedent.

6%.

The

In World X B

The stockholder is liable

The trouble is not that the amount of liability

irrelevant~

The trouble is that Rrovident makes Reliance

Reliance KHni:KXXIDfK is only pertinent to the extent that 11 sales ' made
after one gets to less than 10% are safe.

But they will always
It

be safe under Provident because that case holds that the purchase

,,

by which one becomes a KlfKKHXMKM beneficial owner will never
be a statutory "purchas e."

Therefore no sale can be matc hed against

it, whether or not the stockholder held 10% at the time of
the s a le.
I have had some trouble conveying some of this to people

~

orally.
KKXK~Xlf~lf.MMXX.KKU

~ ~n

order to be sure the point is clear

let me repeat it.
~A#,.

s~ockholder

~~.JYt'1me

~

) d1

~~'V~~~r
'-!'\

~

But Provident holds that the hans action by which

his KXM ''s ale 1' to be matched against .
~

~~

Accordingly, the Provident

~11

c onstruction of "at the time of"'--.L... sal?

.

.

Therefore

stockholder# sells out that stock, there is no \\ purchasel'

F}f~··
_(~.,/
~.
c ~~
ns~
t- r~
uwct,io~
n of

1[1-"

his "basic" 10% because at no other

one act\ ires "more than 10%" status is not a "purchase."

jY<~r;hen a
"------ 'If'

111

would he fail to be a "more than 10%,. owner"at the time of

, , . sale,"

\c;''v~

was sell ing

would only apply when a

0

r enders Reliance's

• .. . 9 ~

"at the time of 'the purchase" sup~~u~
can take two basic ~lf.K approache~ One c ould say

It;

r)

~(..~~

that Congress didn't realize thi ~ its all a mistake; Provident
~
is right; the~ anguage ~ superfluous; it wasn't MRMIM« evident
that the language was superfluous in Reliance because we weren't
considering the whole

~

clause.

Or one could seek to find a way to prevent the "at the time of
• sale" language from being superfluous.

KMIDUI Believe it or

~

not, there are~ ways.

+{Jl

Let me start first with the most plausible.

As you may recal\
~· ~\(t~ ,, fKiiL'A·
from my original memorandum in this case, I said that th~oviso
could be given meaning by construing it to permit minimization
of KK liability

b~

step purchases.

converse of Reliance.)

(Obviously this is the

That would work out as follows:

Imagine

that the following threetransactions all occur withinX six months-a« 9% purchase
a 6% purchase
a 15% sale
Under the Schenker interpretation this 9 + 6 - 15
would result in liability of 6%.

sequence

That result would obtain because

of the language "at the time of the purchase." At the time of the first
"more than
XKK purchase the stockholder was not a 110%"owner, so the 9% li£
"buy" was not a statutory "purchase."

~IJ

But the 6% purchase

makes one a statutory insider under the general principle of Stella
(which, of course, also applies if one buys all 15% in one "swell
foop").

Therfore one is an insider when all 15% is sold, but

only I::XXX 6% of the"sales" have a ~purchasJ' to be matched against.

RMIIXMMK

To emphasize the role of Stella in this case, let's rename

this the Stella-Schenker approachQ
~()-.j

Reliance retains its role under the Stella-Schenker appr&dch,
as can be seen by imagining the following four transactions to occur
within 6 months-a 7%
a\\ 8%
1 6%
a 9%

purchase
purchase
sale
sale.

This 7 + 8 - 6 - 9 sequence would yield liability of 6% ,
the Stella-Schenker interpretation because of Reliance.

under
"At the time

of the [8%] purchase," the stockholder made a matchable transaction
under the statute.

KHK All 8% of that amount could be recaptured

in later sales but for Relianc@.

Because under Reliance the 6%

sale means that"at the time"of the 9% sale (which includes 2% of
the Stella "purchase") the stockholder was not a more than 10%
owner.

Thus Reliance and the "at the time of l.tMK • • • sale"

t:uwL.

-to (red~ .ffAu "'~ r""~

language have meaning under the Stella-Schenker approac~

~

Note

that in this context under frovident, Reliance would be irrelevant:
neither the 6% nor the 9% "unloading" is a "sale" because "at the
~

uX0

time ~\\ purchase"A.the stockholder

IMia IU!l t

a "more than 10%"

owner.
This Stella-Schenker-Reliance approach seems relatmvely
~
straightforawrd.

it.

As I mentioned in my original memo, Loss adopts

But he does so because he views the "at the time of the

purchase"

I~~

language to be ambivalent and thinks this

interpretation comports with the purposes of the KKK statute.
does not

appe~r

He

to notice that this interpretation is necessary

to avoid rendering the Reliance interpretation of "at the time

of

• sale" superfluous.
OK.

That is approach # 1 to a nonsuperfluous construction
"at the time of

...

sale."

Under
,......,_

that interpretation both "at the time of the purchase" and "a t the

time of • • • sale" are relatively straightforward.

XK

It is necessary to sketch another kind of case to complete
the picture under the Stella-Schenker-Reliance interpretation.
Imagine the following four transactions all occur within a six
month period:
an
a
a
a

11% purchase
4% purchase
6% sale
9% sale

Under the Stella-Schenker-Reliance approach the result in this
11 + 4 - 6 - 9 ~~· is liability for 6%.

Th.e "Schenll:er" aspect

0
~ h ~s
. not re 1evant to t h.~s case b ecause t h ere are no
o f t h e appraec

step KKXKK purchases.

Stella makes the entire 15% of holding

a potential "purchase," but Reliance saves harmless the 9% sale.
UNder Provident, of course, liability would be 4%.

Th.e 11% holding

was not a "purchase," so the 4% is the only "purchase" available
against which to match the 6% sale.
Ok.

'That fleshes out the reasonable interpretation of "at the

time of the purchase" which

11!~

the

Relianc~

of "at the time of • • • sale" not superfluous.

interpretation

Now let's look

at some of the MMRMXKMKKKIKXXKXK~KKXX~~ other ways to prevent
"at the time of • • • s;:-le" from being superfluous. ·k
Let's call epproach
· # 2 the Zero interpretation. Under
the Zero interpretation, one could construe "at the time of • • . sale"
to mean that the stockholder must hold "more than 10%" after the
saleg In other words, unless one had "more than 10%" left after
the sale in a purchase/sale case, one would not be liable.

Imagine

~·(
Please note that there are two ways to prevent the phrase "at the
ximexa£xxk.ex11M time of • • • sale" from being superfluous. ONe is
to construe "at the time ~f the purchase" in such a fashion that
"at the time of • . • sale" M1D!MKXJOifAM~~ can still mean what it
~KK was said to mean in Reliance.
'That's interpretation# 1. Th.e
other is to say that Reliance was wrong, and that"at the KKI. time
os . . • sale" means something other than what Reliance said. 'That's
interpretatiorf # 2 ~

this case anyway you like to take it:

it is a loser.

For

illustration, imagine the following three transactions within
six months:
an 11% purchase
a 4% purchase
a 15% sale
Under Provident, the stockholder would have liability for 4%.
Under Stella-Schenker-Reliince, the stockholder would be liable
for 15% (not having availed himself

~-Mil

of ~ .

Under the Zero

approach he would have liability for nothing, since he didn't
have "more than 10%" left after the KK1U: sale.
But the Zero approach does make eat the time of

.sale"

mean something.

Combined with Provident it prevents the superfluity
when
of the phrase that results/~ the Reliance X~~XM~ approachis

combined with Provident.
approach.

There are two big problems with the Zero

The first, obviously, is Reliance.

The more important

is that everybody agrees that the statute would really be gutted
by such an approach, and that it can't mean this.

XHX

The Zero approach would be bad law, but at least it prevents
superfluity and not a great deal of
tion is necessary to reach it.

KXXXMKN~JXXM~

XKKM~~~MXMK

tortured construc-

Approach # 3J

to which we now turn, would be very tortured but it also avoids
superfluity.

Let's call approaah # 3 the Juggernaut approach.

(Totally arbitrary.) Under the Juggernaut approach, one would
construe (as in if 1) the "at the time of the purchase" phrase.
the result

liability

The Juggernaut approach would

XKKM~~

interpret the proviso

to mean that whenever a Provident insider made an additional
purchase he «KK would be liable for aales matched against all
"purchases," whether or not they themselves were purchases that
would have passed muster under Provident.

~~KMKK

The only

limitation on liability is that in Reliance for step sales.
paraphrase, under Juggernaut

fiKKKX~M~

To

nonstatutory purchases

becomes statutory~ purchases~ when a KHM statutory purchase~ is followed
by a statutory'' sale .'t Let me illustrate this before I try to
j ustmfy it.

First, imagine the following three transactions

~KX

within

six months '1
a 9% purchase
a 6% purchase
a 15% sale
Under Provident there would be no liability here.
Schenker-Reliance there would be 6% liability.
there would be no liability.

Under Stella-

Under Juggernaut

The Provident t6st is applied

to KKXRM determine that nemther the 9% not the 6% purchase was
\PM-~

L..

'!/

a statutory ~en the statutory ''salel' has no transaction
against which to be matched.

Second, imagine the following three

transactions within six months:
an 11% purchase
a 4% purchase
a 15% sale.
Under Provident, there would be 4% liability.
Reliance there would ee 15% liability.
be 15% liability.

Under Stella-Schenker-

Under Juggenaut there would

The Provident test is utlized to identify the

4% purchase as one MXKH made by a statutory insi er.
purchase is thus a

~:KKMXMXM~~X}UI~lf.MXX.M

followed by a statutory "sale."

The 4%

statutory "purchase"

Under Juggernaut such behavior

converts nonstatutory KKlK "purchases" within six MMXK months of
the"sale" into "statutory purchases".

Therefore all 15% of the

liability is capturable. KKiiXKKK

Reliance~

however, would also enter any case where there were

step sales to allow minimization of K liability.
an

ltx~*X

11

would be 6%.

Thus, in

+ 4 - 6 - 9 sequence, liability under Juggernaut
Under Provident, of course, it would be 4% and under

Stella-Schenker-Reliance

it would also be 6%.

To hazaed a generalization that I am not sure would prove out
logically in all cases, the Juggernaut liabilitywould be the same
as Stella-Schenker-Reliance in any case where one made a purchase
afte r becoming a Provident insider, but would be the same as in
Provident in any case where no purchases were made after becommng
a statutory inscbder.

Obviously, neither

11 at

the time of the purchase"

nor "at the time of • • • sale" is treated as sy.perfluous.
Before I try to justify Juggernaut on the XMK language of
the statute, let me say why it makes some sense as a theoretical
matt er.

Compare Stockholder Innocent with Stockholder Pernicious.

Innocent engages in a 7 + 8 - 15 sequence.

Under the basic theory

of Provident, he is a good guy because neither of his
was made on the basis of inside

IKf~

~R

information.

He is

therefore entitled to sell his holdings free of liability.
engages in an 11 + 4 - 15 sequence.
holdings gave him inside informationQ

He is a real bum.

purchases

Pernicious

His 11%

That put him in a position

to learn iQside infarmatiou iadieatiag· that a killing could be made
in the stock.

He then rushed out, bought an additional 4% and un-

loaded all of it.

He is a pretty low form MXf of life.

Now, does the statute allow us to draw this
The proviso reads in

ful~

disti~ction?

"This subsection shall not be construed

[0
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such

..

both at the time of the purchase and sale •

II

The use of the

word "transaction" shows that "purchase and sale" come as a unit
in the statute.

~KXXXKX~KKKKIKKM

Pernicious proceeded by means

of a nonstatutory purchaee + a statutory purchase + a statutory
The statutor¥ purchase + the statutory sale constituted

sale.

a statutory "transaction."

Thus he has realized profit on "any

purchase and sale" while being a beneficial owner "both at the
time of the purchase and sale."
~KKK

X1iMXKXMX.HX.KXRiNX:KI}1KXiGUUlX10Ufi:l:}f

Although the original purchase would not have been

a XXX statutory purchase, the second purchase and the sale are
clearly within the statute.

Since the stockholder has acted
~»XX

on the basis of inside information, we will

get him for all

his sales.
I

guess I don!t need to say that the rationale is more

convincing than the attempt to twist it out of the statute.
this is a rather tortured

~MH«M

Let's turn finally to the

I

think

approach.

~!lis-Chalmers

approach.

The 7th

Circuit has construed XMXK the proviso in the following fashion:
The use of the word "transaction" in the provism shows that
a purchase/sale and a sale/purchase should be thought of as a
unit.

The proviso theeefore should be read to mean "both at the

x±max3fxxkRX~Hx~kaxexaHsxxaie;x8xxxkexxale

sale/purchase."

purchase/sale,

££

the

Thus, when one looks to time, one asks only a

single time question in each case:

"'~
the initial .transae.t:ian..
• or" construction.

What was the stockholder before

The "both" is the first part of a "both

Thus there is no second time question
the
in a given case. Under KKK this construction, Rnt:xMKK "at the
/construction of Relia!ce
time of • • • sale" is not KHtGUfftMH superfluous. Rather, it is
misconceive~,

unnecessary.

!(
The Allis-Chalmer* approach has two
ONe is that Reliance is on the books.

MXXX~

difficulties.

The second is that

"both • • • or" is very unusual English.
~XHHXDRX~X.K.MXKMMXXX~mt~

five possible ~ solutions to the fact
fixex~axxiklex~RRKXXH~XiGH&xa£XKKKX~~RXKMX

So, there you have
that Provident renders

~iJxx~xaxiiHHXJXXRHHRXiRgxKMlXKKKKXK~XXIHM«K

the Reliance

interpretation of "at the time of • • • sale" superfluous:

(1)

Say IX the language is superfluous and Reliance was wrong;

(2)

adopt the stepped-up purchase analysis (Schenker);
Zero approach;
Chal ers a
'

N

(3) the

and(t~ e Allis(A ~ \..'-.1~ .~ fv ~( ~ ({..PJ...u));t J~ ~

(4) the Juggernaut approach;

roacq.

~~ P--ur-J-f~D . .$.ee. ~,')
rn for a mbment to the "bothat the time of the • • •

sale or purchase" part of the proviso.

It should be noted that

the most likely construction of that part of the proviso is
that one must own "more than 10%" before the lfii:KIDO!K:IiXXKK
sale and after the purchase.

Under that construction the

"at the time of • • • [re]purcbsse" would not be superfluous,
4o

because it would preben ~he application of liability in an 11 - 4 +
2 sequence.

Of course, under the Allis-Chalmers approach there

might be liability in an
~ifKMK

~

11 - 4 + 2 sequence, since the

sale/purchase transaction would create a progit when one

was a "more than 10% owner" "at the time of the sale/purchase"--i.e.,
befu re the sale;·
Reliance.

But that result is also out of whack with

Therefore I don't think that the lat t er part of the

proviso casts much light on the first part.
My problem is that I don!t know how to write the Provident
~sult

under the shadow of Reliance.

What is Justice

Stewnr~

What do I say about it?

in particular going to do when he realize&

that Reliance looks pretty silly in
Let's look at our options.

~

light of Provident.

The first option is to plow

right ahead and simply dump on Reliance on the

XKKRM~

theory that

in fact the language is superfluous:

either because it out -

and-out is superfluous or because the Allis-Chalmers

is

correct.

the

The second alternative is to

time of •

sale"

$
languag~ ther

This MN«lMXMKXKMH

____

than ._

means starting out by dumping on Reliance

not as superfluous but as wrong. Then we adopt
Zero approach, the Juggernaut
The Zero approach is simply
is very tortured;

appro~ch,

~

the

or the Schenker approach.

unaccep~ble;

the Juggernaut approach

the Schenker approach comes easiest.

It is

tortured to the extent that "at the time of" means simultaneously
with purchases and bec6ore sales.

But that basic fact of"at the

time of" meaning different things in :MXX differamt areas is nKfA
almost a necessity of the statute.

If it doesn't have that

flexible meaning and Provident is correct, there will be no
liability in an

11 - 11 + 11 situation, 'Because if "at the time

of"always MMHK.KXM1!lto!.Kmeans "before," you never get the 11 - 11 + 11
stockholder.
Those

are ~wo

ignore all this.

alternatives.

There is a third possibility:

Then you end up with egg on your face rather than

xxMXi«H Justice Stewart, though it is possible no one but
me will ever notice this.

I have talked to Stewart's clerk and

Blackmun's clerk assigned to this case and neither of them had thought
of the problem.

We could also say that we leave the possibility

that Juggernaut is the real meaning until we have a case
presenting the meaning of the "at the time of •
But that obviously just points up what a
has created.

o

o

~RKMH

sale" language.

MMXKXRKIKIH~

Perxonally, I haven ! t changed my initial

mess Reliance
view that

the Schenker approach is correct, but I am yours to command.

B.

The strategic problem.

I had planned to discuss this at greater length, but the
part of the memo is too long to allow that.

~irst

lA ~ .

~

.are t ue

ea£W~B·

i i iasa

A:

we want to hold harmless in this

As I said, there

opinion~

~ase

ai:K

a person buys 5% of a corporation's stock, becomes a

director, and sells his stock all within six months.
i.s

ooQ1 lit

C:

a

"m~ran ~o e-wHEH"

~a etfi~

&ei:t-s below

~ ~ :1JQa) Ce.4e A
e in an

Case A and Case B are very similar cases.

In both an "outsider"

performs an event that makes him an "insider" and then unloads his
stock.

In Case A he becomes a director;

stock.

Now, you are familiar from our previous discussions with

the dual-transaction analysis of § 16(b).

in Case B he buys his

JO'ro

Under that approach,

there should be no liability in either CAse A or CAse B.

But,

as I've said before, XKKX those results would stem not from the
proviso (which of course doesn't even apply to directors) but
from the basic structure of the statute.
was put in.

But the proviso MKK

It says that"More than 10%" stockholders have to

be such "both at the :¥1l time of the purchase and tale."
no such requirement for directors.

There is

NKK If the proviso controls t ~ s

case as to stockholders, then by negative implication the result
would be the opposite XK without the proviso.

Since the proviso

doesn ( t apply to directors/officers, by negative implication
Case A is

KMM~Nl

a situation for liability.

It is enough for

an officer or director that he be such either at the time of
purchase of his stock or at the time of sale.

The only wa¥ to

avoid this conclusion is to say that the proviso deals with another

1

problem entirely. But even the commentators who support dualtransaction analysis can't suggest what that might be.
The reason this point is troubling is demonstrated by Reliance.
In Rel i ance the Court chose to deal wi t h just a portion of t he
statute;

it now appears that the Court's hands are

locked by that e rro r.

~M»K

The same thing could happen here.

somewhat

Tf

the Court relies on the proviso when it shouldn 't bec a use the dualtransaction analysis is right, then the eAse A is controlled by
that ap proac h when the case comes up.
I KKIXK think we should rely on the proviso (assuming that
the Court pres s es on on its present path).
the proviso might mean.

I don't see what else

I think Case A should make for liability,

even though KK the stat ute may primarily be aimed at dual-transaction
abuses.

I am prepared to write Provident that way--bu t somebody has

to tell me wha t to do abou t Rel i anc e .

lfp/ss
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No. 74-742 Foremost-MCKesson, Inc.
v. Providet Securities Co.

-

This case is here on certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Section 16(b) of

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows a corporation
to recover the profits realized by an officer, director,
or beneficial owner of more than 10% of its shares, where
there has been a purchase and sale of its shares within
a six-months' period.
We took this case to determine the meaning of an
exemptive provision which specifies that the statute
does not cover any transaction where the beneficial
owner was not such both "at the time of" the purchase and
the sale of the shares involved.
As the facts of this case are too complex for oral
summary, I will announce only our decision.
We conclude, in view of the language of the exemptive
provision, that a beneficial owner is accountable for
profits, in a purchase-sale seQuence, only if he was
such an owner "before the purchase", as well as at the
time of the sale.

·,

>

<

2.
As the respondent in this case was not a statutory
beneficial owner before the purchase, the subsequent sale
within six months was not subject to § 16(b).
The Court of Appeals was of the same view.

Accordingly,

we affirm its judgment.
The Chief Justice and Justices Brennan, _Stewart,

Marshall, Blackmun and Rehnquist join in the opinion of
the Court.

Mr. Justice White joins in all but Part IV-C

thereof.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case.
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74-742

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 7, 1976

4
Re:

C/._.;

];~

Foremost-McKesson~ ~

No. 74-742 Provident Securities Co.

Dear Lewis:
I join your very good opinion in this case
except for Part IV C.

Would you please add an

appropriate note to this effect at the bottom of
your opinion?
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

Mr. Justice White joins in the
judgment of the Court, and in all
but Part IV-C of the Court's
opinion.

~
·

.:§ttpTnn.t <q~t of t!r.t .,tti:tt~ ;§tatta
~aaltinghm. ~. QJ. 2ll~J.l.~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

January 7, 1976

Re:

No. 74-742 - Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v.
Provident Securities Co.

Dear Lewis:
I join your very good opinion in this case
except for Part IV C.

Would you please add an

appropriate note to this effect at the bottom of
your opinion? '
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

Jiu:vrtmt Qtttud ttf t4t ~tb ~tldts
'llasftiugfttn, !9. Qt. 2llgt'!~
CHAMBERS OF

/

January 8, 197 6

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 74-742 --Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Securities Company

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely.

J1t{
T.M.
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.·,

..

~u.p:rtntt

'!fltlttt ltf tqt ~b ~taftg

Jfasftinghtn. ~. <!f.

2ll.;t'!~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 9, 197 6

Re:

74-742 - Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Securities Co.

Dear Lewis:
I join your proposed opinion.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

. 2.

held that GW was liable only for 'the profits realized
on the purchase and sale of the second block of
securities. At the same time, however, the Seventh
Circuit adjusted the calculations of profits in such a
way that GW's liability actually was increased even
.
though fewer shares were involved. (The District Court
had valued the $93 million note at its discounted value
as of the day of the transaction; the Seventh Circuit
required it to be valued at face because GW eventually
received full payment.)
The issue in No. 75-580 is AC's contention
that GW is liable for its profits on both blocks of
securities purchased and sold. Since the result below
anticipated our decision in No. 74-742, the Seventh
Circuit reached the correct result on this point.
Although we reserved judgment in No. 74-742 on some of
the Seventh Circuit's language, the case need not be
taken on that score.
This should be denied. *

*****
No.

74-758 Provident Securities Co. v.
Foremost-McKesson Inc.

This is a cross-petition by respondent in the
case we decided, apparently filed as a precautionary
measure. It raises alternative arguments which we did not
reach.
The cross-petition should be denied.

* GW's objection to the valuation principle
utilized by the Seventh Circuit on the second block of stock
has been presented in a cross-petition for certiorari,
No. 75-890 (filed December 23, 1975).
Denying No. 75-580
will not prejudice our taking No. 75-890 should it appear
certworthy on its own merits.
L.F .P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

I

No. 74-742

On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States
v.
Court of Appeals for
Provident Securities Company.
the Ninth Circuit.
Foremost-McKesson, Inc.,
Petitioner,

[January -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opm1on of the
Court.
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 48
Stat. 896, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). That section of the
Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer
or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum"
of a corporation 1 from profiteering through short-swing
transactions on the basis of inside information. It provides that a corporation may capture for itself the profits
realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of
its securities within six months by a director, officer, or
beneficial owner. 2 Section 16 (b)'s last sentence, how~The corporate "insiders'' whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b)
are defined in § 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), as "[e]very
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than
an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to Section 12 of
this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such
security."
2 Section 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b), reads in full:
"(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director,
or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur-
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ever, provides that it "shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security involved ... ." The question presented here is whether a person purchasing securities that put his holdings above the 10% level is a beneficial owner "at the time of the purchase" so that he must
account for profits realized on a sale of those securities
within six months. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the negative. 506 F. 2d 601 (1974). We affirm.

I
Respondent, Provident Securities Co., was a personal
holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively
to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find
a purchaser for its assets. Petitioner, Foremost-McKesson, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive
chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
security) within any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficia.! owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a
period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or in equity in any court of competent juirsdiction
by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the
name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to
bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail dilligently
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such at the time of the purchase and sale,
or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
subsection."
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negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over
the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay.
Provident wanted cash in order to facilitate its dissolution, while Foremost wanted to pay with its own securities. Eventually a compromise was reached whereby
Provident agreed to accept Foremost convertible deben·tures and Foremost agreed to cooperate in the registration and sale to the public of up to half of the debentures.
Provident and Foremost executed a purchase agreement embodying their deal on September 25, 1969. The
agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds
of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures. 8
The agreement further provided that Foremost would
register under the Securities Act of 1933 $25 million in
principal amount of the debentures and would participate
in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures
would be sold to the public. At the closing on October
15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a
$40 million debenture that was subsequently exchanged
for two debentures in the principal amounts of $25 million and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 million debenture to an escrow on the closing date. On
October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 million debenture representing the balance of the purchase
price. These debentures were immediately convertible
into more than 10% of Foremost's outstanding common
stock.
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of
underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be
closed October 28. The agreement provided for sale
to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. 4 On
The debentures were issued expressly to acquire Provident's
assets, and all of them were used for that purpose.
4 The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 in cash to Foremost.
That amount represented a purchase price of 1011,4% of the
3
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October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million and
$7.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing the
amount of Foremost common into which the company's
holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October
28 the closing under the underwriting agreement was
accomplished. Provident thereafter distributed the cash
proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and
dissolved.
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of
October 20 were large enough to make it a beneficial
owner of Foremost within the meaning of§ 16. 5 Having
acquired and disposed of these securities within six
months, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Fore~
most to recover the profits realized on the sale of the
debenture to the underwriters. Foremost therefore sued
for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under
§ 16 (b). The District Court granted summary judg~
ment for Provident and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Provident's principal argument below for nonliability
was based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held
that an "unorthodox transaction" in securities that did
not present the possibility of speculative abuse of inside
information was not a ''sale'~ within the meaning of
principal amount of the debentures ($25,312,500.00) plus interest
accrued from the date the contract was executed to the date of
closing ($54,166.66). The amount of profit, if any, realized by
Provident has never been established.
5 A beneficial owner is one who owns more than 10% of an
"equity security" registered pursuant to § 12 of the Act. See n. 1,
supra. The owner of debentures convertible into more than 10%
of a corporation's registered common stock is a beneficial owner
within the meaning of the Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§§3 (a)(lO), (11), 15 U.S. C. §78c (a)(10), (11); Rule 16a-2 (b).
17 CFR § 240.16a-2a (b) (1975). Foremost's common stock was
registered; thus Provident's holdings made it a beneficial owner.
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§ 16 (b). Provident contended that its reluctant acceptance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets
was an "unorthodox transaction" not presenting the possibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a
"purchase" within the meaning of § 16 (b). Although
the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had
adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 791 (ND
Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning
that Provident's acquisition of the debentures was not
"unorthodox" and that the circumstances did not preclude
the possibility of speculative abuse.
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories
of nonliability based on § 16 (b)'s exemptive provision:
"This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase . . . ." The first was Provident's argu:rp.ent that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time
qf ... sale." After the October 24 distribution of some
debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provident were convertible into less than 10% of Foremost's
outstanding common stock. Provident contended that
its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the underwriting agreement was closed on October 28. If this
were the case, the sale would not have been covered by
§ 16 (b), since Provident would not have been a beneficial owner "at the time of ... sale." 6 The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument because it found that
the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the
underwriting agreement. 7
6 This contention was based on Reliance Elect.ric Co. v. Emerson
Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). There we held that a sale made
after a former beneficial owner had a.lready reduced its holdings
below 10% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the "at the time of ..•
sale" requirement. See n. 25, infra.
7 Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78c (a) (14), defines
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The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of
nonliability based on the exemptive provision that we
consider here. 8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." But Provident a.rgued that the October 28 closing date
was the day of sale because rontmctual conditions prevented the
contract from becoming binding until closing. The underwriting
agreement provided in paragraph 7:
"7. Termination of Agreement: This agreement may be terminated, prior to the time the Registration Statement becomes effective, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed
hereunder to purchose in the aggregate at least 50% of the Debentures, if, in your judgment or in the judgment of any such group
of• Underwriters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable
change in political, financial or economic conditions generally."
(App. A134.)
And in paragraph 5, the agreement provided: "The several obligations of the Underwriters hereunder are subject to the following
conditions:
"(h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and
the time of purchase, there shall occur no material and unfavorable
change, financial or otherwise (other than as referred to in the
Registration Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the
Company and its consolidated subsidiaries as a whole; and the Company will, at the time of purchase, deliver to you a certificate of
two of its executive officers to the foregoing effect." (App. A134.)
The Court of Appeals agreed that conditions to performance
might prevent a contract from being a "sale" prior to closing. But
it ruled that all significant conditions here were satisfied when the
registration sta,tement required by paragraph 7 became effective on
October 21, the day the underwriting agreement was executed. The
court also fotmd that a.fter . October 21, Provident was no longer
subject to the risk of a decline in the market for Foremost's stock.
506 F. 2d, at 607. For reasons not apparent from the opinion,
the court did not address the possibility that paragraph 5 (h) left
Provident subject to market risks. See n. 8, infra.
8 Our holding on this issue disposes of this case by precluding
any liability on Provident's part. We therefore do not consider
whether the Ninth Circuit properly rejected Provident's arguments
based on Kern County and the sale not having occurred until
October 28.
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the phrase "at the time of the purchase," "must be
construed to mean prior to the time when the decision
is made." 506 F. 2d, at 614. Although Provident's
receipt of the debentures was a "purchase" that made
Provident a beneficial owner of Foremost, Provident was
not a beneficial owner of Foremost "before the purchase."
Accordingly, the exemptive provision removed the purchase from the operation of § 16 (b).

II
The meaning of the exemptive provision has been
disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discussion has focused on the application of the provision to
a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement
being whether "at the time of the purchase" means
"before the purchase" or "immediately after the purchase." 9 The difference in construction is determinative of a beneficial owner's liability in cases such as
Provident's where such owner sells within six months
of purchase the securities whose acquisition made him
a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immediately over which construction Congress intended/0 and
The alternative construction to "before the purchase" is sometimes denominated "simultaneously with the purchase." See, e. g.,
Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 959-960
(SDNY 1952), recognized as law of the case, 132 F. Supp. 100
(SDNY 1955), aff'd in part, remanded in part on other grounds,
232 F. 2d 299 (CA2), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 831 (1956).
1 ° Compare C. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at
112 (1934) (adopting a "before" construction), with Seligman,
Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L, Rev. 1,
20 (1934) (adopting an "immediately after" construction).
n Compare, e. g., Munter, Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to "Burning Down t.he Barn
in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 Cornell L. W. 69, 74-75 (1966);
Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and
Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 5.92, 61&9
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they remain divided. 11 The courts of appeal also are
!n disagreement over the issue.
The question of what Congress intended to accomplish by the exemptive provision in a purchase-sale
sequence came to a court of appeals for the first time
in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299
(CA2), cert. denied, 352 U.S. (1956). There the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit without discussion,
but over a dissent, affirmed the District Judge's adoption
of the "immediately after the purchase" construction.
·The District Judge had been impelled to this construction at least in part by his concern over what the phrase
"at the time of ... purchase" means in a sale-repurchase
sequence. He reasoned:
"If the ['before the purchase'] construction urged
by [Graham-Paige] is placed upon the exemption
provision, it would be possible for a person to purchase a large block of stock, sell it out until his
ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then
repeat the process, ad infinitum." 104 F. Supp.
957, 959 (SDNY 1952).
The District Judge apparently thought that since "before
the purchase" seemed an unlikely construction of the
exemptive provision in a sale-repurchase sequence, it
could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sa1e
·sequence. 12 The Stella construction of the exemptive
619 (1974); Comment, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 582 (1957) (adopting a
"before" construction), with, e. g., 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation
1060 (2d ed, 1961) (favoring an "immediately after" construction).
The weight of the commentary appears to be with the "before the
purchase" construction. The ALI Federal Securities Code (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1973), § 1413 (d) and Comment, considers the
Stella result "questionable" on the statutory language and proposes
an amendment to codify the result.
u Stella was decided before § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR
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provision has been adhered to in the Second Circuit,
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 355-356
(CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); Perine v.
William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA2 1974)/ 8
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co.,
434 F. 2d 918, 924 (CA8 1970), aff'd on other grounds,
404 U. S. 418 (1972). 14 But in none of the foregoing
cases did the court examine critically the legislative
history of § 16 (b).
The Court of Appeals considered this case against the
background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the pertinent statutory language, continued disagreement among
the commentators, and a perceived absence in the relatively few decided cases of a full consideration of the
purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court
found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and
its progeny for the "immediately after the purchase"
construction. It noted that construing the provision to
require that beneficial-ownership status exist before the
§ 240.10b-5 (1975), developed £ully as a private remedy for actual
abuses of insider information. See 6 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3553.
The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would
now invite § 10 (b) liability, see n. 30 infra, as well as possible liability under § 16 (b).
1.a To rationalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence,
the court in Newmark wrote:
'I[T]he presumed aecess to [inside] information resulting from
[the] purchase [that makes one a beneficial owner] provides him
with an opportunity not available to the investing public, to sell
his shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus a
purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an
opportunity for the type of speculative abuse the statute was
enacted to prevent." 425 F. 2d, at 356.
1.4 When this Court decided Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson
Electric Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972), the question presented here was
no longer in the case. See n. 25, infra.
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purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not foreclose an "immediately after the purchase" construction
:ln a sale-repurchase sequence. 15 506 F. 2d, at 614-615.
More significantly, the Court of Appeals challenged
directly the premise of the earlier cases that a "before
the purchase" construction in a purchase-sale sequence
would allow abuses Congress intended to abate. The
court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to
teach only beneficial owners who both bought and sold
on the basis of inside information that was not presumptively available to them until after they became
statutory "insiders." 506 F. -2d, at 608-614. 16

III
A
· The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b)
- is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 tJ. S.
582, 591-593 (1973); Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson
Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972), and the authori:1 5 The view of the Court of Appeals that "at the trrne of" may
mean different things according to the particular statutory sequence
that is under construction is not unique. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, F. 2d (1975). We
need express no opinion here on this issue.
16 Shortly before this case was argued the Court of Appeals for
Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion on somewhat difF. 2d, at - . The
ferent analysis. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 'Court apparently would have reached its result even in the absence
of the exemptive provision, reasoning that § 16 (b) covers no
transactions by any § 16 (b) "insiders" who were not insiders
before their initial transaction. F. 2d, at - . Since we rely
on the exemptive provision, we intimate no view on the proper
analysis of a case where a director or officer makes an initial transaction before obtaining "insider" status. See, e. g., Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840 (CA2 1959) . Nor do we have occasion here
to assess the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for Seventh
F. 2d, at & n. - .
Circuit to the exemptive provision. 'see n. 25, infra.

74-742-0PINION
FOREMOST-McKESSON v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES 11

ties cited therein. Congress recognized that "insiders"
may have access to information about their corporations
not available to the rest of the investing public. By
'trading on this information, these persons could reap
profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In
§ 16 (b) Congress sought to "curb the evils of insider
trading [by] . . . taking the profits out of a class of
transactions in which · the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably g·r eat." Reliance Electric Co.,
supra, at 422. It accomplished' this by defining "directors,
officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have
access to inside information 17 and enacting a fla~ "rule
that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders
made on a pair of security transactions within six
months. 18
Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the observation in Reliance Electric Co. that "where alternative
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves
the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing trading
by corporate insiders." 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote
omitted). From these premises Foremost argues that
the Court of Appeals' construction of the exemptive pro1 7 The purpose of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be "preventing
the unfajr use of information which may have been obtruned by
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer." 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b).
1 8 Section 16 (b) states that any short-swing profits "shall inure
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months."
15 U. S. C. § 78p (b).
19 In lieu of the Court of Appeals' construction, Foremost offers a
construction whereby any purchases prior to the purchase making
one a beneficial owner are exempted from the operation of § 16 (b).
See L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 1060.
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vision must be rejected 19 because it makes § 16 (b) inapplicable to some possible abuses of inside information
that the statute would reach under the Stella construction.20 We find this approach unsatisfactory in its focus
on situations that § 16 (b) may in fact not reach rather
than on the language and purpose of the exemptive provision itself. Foremost's approach also invites an imposition of § 16 (b)'s liability without fault that is not
consistent with the premises upon which Congress enacted the section.
B
The exemptive provision, which applies only to beneficial owners and not to other statutory insiders, must
have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although
the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent, see Reliance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of§ 16 (b)
from its initial proposal through passage does shed significant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision.
The original version of what would develop into the
1934 Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1934). It
provided in § 15 (b) :
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any director, officer,
or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or
beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of
stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered
on a national securities exchange" ( 1) To purchase any such registered security with
the intention or expectation of selling the same security within six months; and any profit made by
such person on any transaction in such a registered
security extending over a period of less than six
An example of a possible abuse of inside information covered
only under the Stella construction is the hypothetical posed in
Newmark. See n. 13, supra.
20
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months shall inure to and be recoverable by the is~
suer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on
his part in entering into such transaction of holding
the security purchased for a period exceeding six
months."
In the next version of the legislation, H. R. 8720, 73d
Gong., 2d Sess. (1934), § 15 (b) read almost identically
to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enac:ted. 21
"(b) Any profit realized by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer from any purchase and sale or
sale and purchase of any such registered equity
security within a period of less than six months, un~
less such security was acquired in good faith in con~
nection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six
months.... This subsection shall not be construed
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale or sale and purchase of the security involved,
nor any transaction or transactions which the Com~
mission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection
of preventing the unfair use of information which
As can be seen by comparing H. R. 8720's version to § 16 (b),
Formally, the statement of purpose has been moved to the front of the statute and
various grammatical changes have been made. A significant substantive change not apparent from the faces of the two sections is that
§ 16 (b) beneficial owners are those owning 10% of a registered security, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693's 5% requirement. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a),
with H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 15a ( 1934).
21

supra, n. 2, the changes are relatively minor.
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may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer."
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693's drafters, introduced § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider "to
carry on any short-term speculations in the stock. He
cannot, with his inside information get in and out of
stock within six months." Hearings on H. R. 7852 and
H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934).
The Court of Appeals concluded that S. 2693 would
have applied only to a beneficial owner who had that
status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated, 506
F. 2d, at 611, and we agree. Foremost appears not to
contest this point. Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 29.
'The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's
change in the language imposing liability and its addition of the exemptive provision were intended to change
S. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no
such intent.
S. 2693 and its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a
number of scores, including various provisions of § 15.
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 7852 and
H. R. 8720, supra, at 1-623. 22 S. 2693 was recast into
H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the
22 Corcoran termed § 15 "one of the most important provisions in
'[S. 2693] ." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555.
But most of the proposed legislation was directed at regulation of
the stock exchanges themselves and certain trading practices that
were considered undesirable regardless of who performed them.
See id., at 6465. Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with other
vroblems.
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bill's drafters thought valid. Hearings on H. R. 7852
and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary substantive criticism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was
that it did not prevent the use of inside information
to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situation. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra,
at 6557- 6558. Criticism was also directed at making
liability for short-term profits turn on ownership "as
of record and/ or beneficially." See id., at 6914. H. R.
8720 remedied these perceived shortcomings by providing in § 16 (b): "Any profit realized by such beneficial
owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or
sale and purchase ... shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer." 23 The term "such beneficial owner"
drew content from § 15 (a)'s definition of a beneficial
owner as one owning "more than 5 per centum of any
class" of a registered security.
The structure of the clause imposing liability in the
revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693's
requirement that beneficial ownership precede a purchase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that
Congress intended to eliminate the requirement in the
revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the
requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no complaint was made about it.
The testimony on S. 2693 demonstrates that the drafters were emphatic about the requirement. In introducing the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in
28 The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by
H. R. 8720 was the elimination of the potential criminal liability.
The criminal liability aspect of S. 2693's version of § 15 (b) appears not to have been discussed in hearings. It may have been
thought, however, that a criminal case could never be made out.
The difficulties of proving the elements on which criminal liability
turned had already led the drafters to eliminate those questions of
fact in civil suits to recover profits. See n. 26, infra.
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S. 2693's language: "It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record
and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class
of stock. ... " It was possible to construe the phrase
"owning . . . 5 per centum" to apply to directors and
officers as well as to stockholders, so that trading by
directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b)
'if their previous 'holdings did not exceed 5o/G . But Corcoran made clear that the requirement of pre-existing
'Ownership applied only to benencial owners.
"Mr. CoRCORAN . . . . The bill is not very well
drawn there. It ought to read to cover every director, every offioer, and every stockholder w~o own's
more than 5 percent of the stock. That is the way
'it was intended to reaci.
"Mr. MAPES. That is not the language there now.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. It is not. It is not properly
·worded as to the 5 percent.
"Mr. MAPES. It ought to read 'anCVor beneficially
more than 5 percent' followed by 'is a director, or
officer.'
"Mr. CoRCORAN. It is badly drawn. We slipped
on that. It ought to read 'every director and every
officer' and. then 'every big stockholder.'"
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133;
see Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, silpra, at
6555.
We thus have a legislative record that revals the drafters focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a
short-term purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner
only if his status existed before the purchase, and no
concern was expressed about the wisdom of this requirement. But the concept was omitted from the operative
language of the section when it was restructured to
cover sale-repurchase sequences. In the same draft,
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however, the exemptive provision was added to the
section. On this record we are persuaded that the
exemptive provision was intended to preserve the requirement of beneficial ownership before the purchase.
Later discussions of § 16 (b) in the hearings are consistent with this interpretation. 24 We hold that, in a
purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must account
for profits only if he was a beneficial owner "before the
purchase." 25
"MR. PECORA. The theory was that the ownership of 5 percent
of the stock would practically constitute him an insider, and by virtue of that position he could acquire confidential information which
he might use for his own enrichment by trading in the open market,
against the interests of the general body of the stockholders. That
is the main purpose sought to be served."
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand
Percora was counsel to the subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency that conducted e},.'"tensive hearings on
stock exchange opemtions prior to the enactment of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. He was also one of the draftsmen of § 15
(b) of S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1934).
25 In Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, the Court also had
occasion to consider the application of the exemptive provision in a
purchase-sale sequence. There Reliance acquired 13.2% of Emerson's shares pnrsuant to a tender offer and within six months disposed of its holdings in two sales of 3.24% and 9.96%. The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the purchase, by which
Reliance became a beneficial owner, was covered by§ 16 (b). But
it ruled that Reliance was liable for the profits on only its first
sale, because "at the time of ... sale" of the 9.96%, it was not a
beneficial owner.
The Court granted certiorari on Emerson's petition to review this
construction of "at the time of ... sale," and affirmed. The construction of "at the time of the purchase," however, was not before
the Court. 404 U. S., at 420-421. Reliance thus remained liable
for the 3.24% sale, although it would have had no liability under
our holding today. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has recognized correctly that the construction of "at the time of ...
24
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IV
Additional considerations support our reading of the
legislative history as the proper one.
A

Section 16 (b) imposes a strict prophylactic rule with
respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County
:Land Co., 411 U. S., at 595, we noted:
"The statute requires the [statutorily defined] .inside, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits
realized on all 'purchases and sales' within the specified time period, without proof of actual abuse of
insider information, and without proof of intent .to
profit on the basis of such information."
In short, this statute imposes liability without fault
within its narrowly drawn limits. 26
sale" in Reliance Electric Co. is superfluous in light of our construction of "at the time of the purchase" here, see Allis-Chalmers
F. 2d, at n. 12, but we agree that with that
Mfg. Co., court's further · observation that the procedural posture of Reliance
Electric Co. prevented a full consideration of the meaning of the
exemptive provision. See ibid. We express no opinion on the in·t erpretation of the provision by which the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh ·Circuit sought to avoid the apparent superfluity of the "at
the time of ... sale" language. ld., at - , - , supra, n. 16.
26 "Mr. CoRCORAN.
. . . You hold the director, irrespective
of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months
after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence
of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having
to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out
• on a short swing.
"Senator GoRE. You infer the intent from the fact.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. From the fact.
"Senator KEAN. Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he
had to sell?
[Footnote 26 is continued on p. 19]
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Foremost recognizes the ambiguity of the exemptive
provision, but argues that where "alternative constructions" of§ 16 (b)'s terms are available, we should choose
the construction that best serves the statute's purposes.
Foremost relies on statements generally to this effect in
Kern County Land Co., supra, at 595, and Reliance Elec, tric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In neither of those cases,
, however, did the Court adopt the COl!-f>~ruction that imposed liability, recognizing that not every ambiguity
must be resolved in favor of the application of § 16 .(b).
And we think it is generally appropriate not to. reach
the harsh result of imposing § 16 (b)'s liability without
fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress
wishes to impose such a result, courts must assume that
it will do so expressly or by unmistakable inference. We
note further that there is nothing to suggest that the
construction urged by Foremost would serve better to
further congressional purposes. Indeed, the legislative
history of § 16 (b) indicates that Congress by adding the
exemptive provision deliberately expressed a contrary
choice. In a different context a more expansive construction of § 16 (b) may well be adopted to advance its
purposes.
It is not irrelevant that Congress itself limited carefully
the extraordinary liability imposed by§ 16 (b). See Reliance Electric Co., supra, at 422-425. Even an "insider"
may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability
if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals
"Senator BARKLEY. All he would get would be what he put into it.
He would get his original investment.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. He would get his money out, but the profit goes
to the corporation.
"Senator KEAN. Suppose he had to sell.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. Let him get out what he put in, but give the
corporation the profit."
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6557.
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greater than six months. When Congress has so recognized the need to limit carefully the "arbitrary and
sweeping coverage" of § 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough,
428 F. 2d 693, 696 (CA7 W70), courts should not be
quick to determine that, despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Congress intended the section to cover a particular
transaction.
B
Our construction of § 16 (b) also is supported by the
distinction Congress recognized between short-term trading by mere stockholders and such trading by directors
·and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Congress thought that all short-swing trading by directors
and officers was vulnerable ·to abuse because of their
·intimate involvement in corporate affairs. But trading
"by stockholders was viewed as being subject to abuse
only when the size of their holdings afforde.d the potential
of access to corporate information. 27 These different
27 This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange,
directed to § 15 (a)'s reporting requirements for beneficial owners:
"Senator KEAN. Suppose a man is not a director at all and does
not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy
5 percent. Do you think you are going to get him to file with the
exchange all the time just the number of shares he has?
"Mr. CoRCORAN. I think so, sir.

"Senator KEAN. I think it is all right to apply it to a director or
officer, but I think to require the ordinary investor-"Mr. CoRCORAN. Five percent is a lot in a modem corporation.
Many corporations are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent.
"Senator KEAN. They may own it or they may sell it. This applies to all corporations, and you are getting down to the point where
you are interfering with the individual a good deal there. I agree
with you with respect to the officers and directors.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. A stockholder owning 5 percent is as much an
insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or
not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director.
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perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life.
It would not be consistent with this perceived distinction to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made
when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to insider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the
possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial
owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information
attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But
the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Congress considered intolerable, since it was made when the
purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage
deemed necessary to make one an insider. Such a purchaser is more analogous to the stockholder owning less
than 10%, and thereby excluded entirely from the operation of § 16 (b), than to a director or officer whose every
purchase and sale is covered by the statute. While this
reasoning might not compel our construction of the exemptive provision, it explains why Congress may have
seen fit to draw the line it did. Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267
F. 2d 840, 845 (1959).

c

Section 16 (b)'s scope, of course, is not affected by
whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of
inside information. But the process of determining what
§ 16 (b) covers, and what it does not, should not obscure
the fact that Congress left some problems of the abuse of
inside information to other remedies. It was thought,
for example, that § 16 (a)'s publicity requirement 28
"Senator KEAN. He might not be."
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556. It is also reflected in the discussion of the technical flaw in S. 2693. See id.,
at 6555-6556, at 7741-7743; Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720,
supra, at 133.
28 Section 16 (a), 15 U.S. C. § 78p (a) provides:
"(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity secu-
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would afford indirect protection against some potential
misuses of inside information. 29 See Hearings on H. R.
'7852 and R. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. Rep. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323, 73d
·cong., 2d Sess., passed by the House April 27, 19M,
without the present § 16 (b)). Congress also has passed
general antifraud statutes that sanction abusive practices
by insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat.
84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b); 3 L. Loss, supra,
rity (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant
to section 78l of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of
such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective
date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 78l (g)
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and,
if such security is registered on a national securities exchange,
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of
such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been
a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the
Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar
month."
29 The drafters clearly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter
a.buses not covered by § 16 (b).
'"[Mr. Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer,
'or principal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file
with the exchange and with the commission a statement of how
many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each
month to show whether there has been any change in his position
during the month. That is to prevent the insider from taking advantage of information to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of
information to the public about the company."
·Those remarks were addressed to S. 2693. Hearings on H. R 7852
·and H. R 8720, supra, at 132.
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n. 11, 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who can
show harm from the actual use of material inside information may have recourse, in particular, to § 10 (b) and
Rule lOb-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975). 30 These sanctions alleviate concern that ordinary investors are unprotected against actual abuses of inside information by
s~ockholder transactions not covered by § 16 (b).

IV
We must still consider briefly Foremost's contention
that the "before the purchase':. construction is inconsistent with other enactmen~s of Congress and ~he interpretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and Exchange
ComVJ.ission.
Foremost and the amicus point to §§ 16 (d) and 16 (e)
of the Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78p (d), (e), as congressional
actions that would not have been necessary unless one
selling the securities whose acquisition made him a beneficial owner would be liable under § 16 (b). Section
16 (d), in part, exempts from § 16 (b) certain transactions by a "dealer in the ordinary course of his business and incident to the establishment or maintenance
The dramatic development of Rule 10b-5 has now embraced
evils that Foremost urges its construction of § 16 (b) is necessary
to prevent. The Rule has been applied to trading by one who acquired inside information in the course of negotiations with a
corporation, such as the negotiations for Provident's purchase of the
Foremost debentures. Van Alystyne, Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1081
(1969), 3 L. Loss, supra, at 1451. And a stockholder trading on
information not generally known has been held subject to the sanctions of the Rule. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2 1974) ; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968). The liability of insiders who "tip"
others, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301 (CA2 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972), may even reduce the threat
that beneficial owner~ not themselves represented on the board of
directors will be able to acquire inside information.
30
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by him of a primary or secondary market." 31 Section
16 (e) provides an exemption for certain "foreign or
domestic arbitrage transactions." 32 They argue similarly that the SEC's Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b-2
(1975), is unnecessary if our construction of § 16 (b) is
correct. Rule 16b-2 exempts from § 16 (b) specified
transactions "in connection with the distribution of a
substantial block of securities." 33
31

Section 16 (d), 15 U.S. C.§ 78p (d), provides:
" (d) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the provisions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale,
of an equity security not then or therefore held by him in an investment account, b~r a dealer in the ordinary course of his business
and incident to the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national securities
exchange or an exchange exempted from registration under section
78e of this title) for such security. The Commission may, by such
rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, define and prescribe terms and conditions with respect to securities held in an investment account and transactions
made in the ordinary course of business and incident to the establishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market."
"Dealer" is defined in § 3 (a) (5) of the Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78c (a) (5).
3 2 Section 16 (e), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (e), provides:
"(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or
domestic arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to
carry out the purposes of this section."
33 Section 16 (b)
provides in its final clause that it shall not
cover "any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection." 15 U. S. C. ~ 78p (b). Rule 161-2
provides:
"(a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase,
of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions
of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b-
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We do not consider these provisions to be inconsist~nt
with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make
them applicable to one selling the securities whose purchase made him a beneficial owner. But the exemptions
would be necessary to protect stockholders already qualifying as beneficial owners when they purchased 34 and
2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the
following conditions:
" ( 1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the business of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in
the ordinary course of such business, in the distribution of such
block of securities;
"(2) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such
block of securities and is acquired by the person effecting the transaction, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or
other person on whose behalf such securities are being distributed
or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribution of such block of securities, or (ii) a security purchased in good
faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction
for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the
class being distributed or to cover an over-allotment or other short
position created in connection with such distribution; and
"(3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of
the Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securities on terms at least as favorable as those on which such person is
participating and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate participation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section
16 (b) of t.he Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance
of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt
of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not preclude an exemption which would otherwise be available under this
§ 240.16b-2.
"(b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this § 240.16b-2
with respect to the participation therein of one party thereto shall
not render such transaction exempt with respect to participation of
any other party therein unless such other party also meets the
conditions of this § 240.16b-2."
34 The press release accompanying the SEC's promulgation of
Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this point. It explained: "The new Rule
[16b-2] affords an exemption for certain cases by providing that
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they would, of course, apply to transactions by directors
and officers as well.
Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the
interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they
contend has been adopted explicitly by the SEC. In
the past the SEC has contended for this position as an
amicus. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 22-27,
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S.
418 (1972). But the Commission has not appeared as an
amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commission's views have not changed, we would not afford them
the deference to which the views of the agency administering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance
Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 418, the Court rejected the
basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation
of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the
exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC's
theory did not reflect the intent of Congress.
The judgment is
Affirmed.

underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an
officer or director of the issuer or one of its principal stockholders
who are regula,rly engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities need not account to the company for profits realized from
purchases and sales made in the distribution of a security for the
company . . . ." SEC Release No. 34-264, June 8, 1935.
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Foremost-McKesson, Inc,,
Petitioner,

\On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States
v.
Court of Appeals for
Provident Securities Company,
the Ninth Circuit.
[January -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 48
Stat. 896, 15 U S. C. § 78p (b). That section of the
Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer
or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum"
of a corporation~ from profiteering through short-swing
transactions on the basis of inside information. It provides that a corporation may capture for itself the profits
realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of
1ts securities within six months by a director, officer, or
beneficial owner 2 Section 16 (b)'s last sentence, how1 The corporate "ins1ders" whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b)
are defined in § 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), as "[e]very
person who IS d1rectly or md1rectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than
an exrrnpted srcurity) whJCh 1s registered pursuant to section 78l of
thi::; title, or who is a. director or an officer of the issuer of such
security."
~ 8ecnou 16 (h), 15 U.
. C. 78p (b), reads in full:
'' For thr purpo.--e of prewntmg the unfmr usc of mforrnation
which may have been obtamed by such beneficial owner, director,.
Jt" officer by CP:t.-:on o( hlll relationship to the issuer, any pJ::ofit
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ever, provides that it "shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security involved ... ." The ques~
tion presented here is whether a person purchasing securities that put his holdings above the 10% level is a beneficial owner "at the time of the purchase" so that he must
account for profits realized on a sale of those securities
within six months. The Umted States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the negatJVe. 506 F 2d 601 (1974) . We affirm.

I
Respondent, Provident Securities Co., was a personal
holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively
to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
securtty) Witlun any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acqmred m good fa1th in connectwn with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
secur1ty purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a
pertod exceedmg s1x months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instltuted at law or m eqmty m any court of competent jurisdiction
by the 1ssuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the
name and m behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to
brmg such smt wit.hm s1xty days after request or shall fail dilligently
to prosecute the same thereafter, but no such suit shall be brought
more than two years after t.he date such profit was realized. This
subsect10n shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
benefic1al owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and
salt', or the sale and purchase, of the secunty involved, or any transactiOn or transact.10ns wluch the CommissiOn by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended w1thm the purpose of this
!:>'Ubsection_ ,.
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a purchaser for its assets. Petitioner, Foremost-McKesson, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive
negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over
the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay.
Provident wanted cash in order to facilitate its dissolution, while Foremost wanted to pay with its own
securities.
Eventually a compromise was reached, and Provident and Foremost executed a purchase agreement
embodymg their deal on September 25, 1969. The
agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds
of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures. 8
The agreement further provided that Foremost would
register under the Securities Act of 1933 $25 million in
principal amount of the debentures and would participate
in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures
would be sold to the public. At the closing on October
15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a
$40 million debenture that was subsequently exchanged
for two debentures m the principal amounts of $25 million and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 million debenture to an escrow on the closing date. On
October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 milbon debenture representing the balance of the purchase
price. These debentures were immediately convertible
into more than 10% of Foremost's outstanding common
'tock.
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of
underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be
closed October 28. The agreement provided for sale
to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. On
The debentures were issued expressly to acquire Provident's
assets, and all of them wer<" used for that purpose.
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October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million ana
17.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing ,the
amount of Foremost common into which the company's
holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October
28 the c1osing under the underwriting agreement was
accomplished ..4 Provident thereafter distributed the cash
proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and
dissolved, .
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of
October 20 were '~p;rge enol,:\gh to make it a beneficial
<;>wner of For~most )V'Ithin the meaning of § 16. 5 Hav.i.ng
9.cqmred and disposed of these securities within .six
roonths, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Foremost to recover any . pr.ofits realized on the sale of the
debenture to the underwriters. Provident therefore S\led
for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under
§ 16 (b). ..'The District Court granted s.ummary judgment for Provident al'\d the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Provident~ s pcincipal argument · below for nonliability
was based on Kern County ·Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held
that an "unorthodox transaction" in securities that aid
not present the possibility of speculative ab-use of insid.e
I

,

,I

•

The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 In ca.sh to Foremost.
That amount represented a purchase price of 1011,4% of the
principal amount of the debentures ($25,312,500.00~ plus interest
accrued from October 15 to the date of closing ($54,166.66) . The
amount of profit realized by Provident ha.s never been estahlishfd.
5 A benefiCial owner is one who owns more than 10% of an "equity
secunty" registered pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 7$l.
See n. 1, supra. The owner of debenture.s convertible mto more tha.Il
10% of a corporation's registPred common stock is a beneficial ownel{
withm the meaning of the Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§§3 (a)(lO), (11), 15 US . C. §78c (a)(lO), (11); Rule 16a.-2 (b) ,
17 CFR § 240.16a-2 (b) (1975) . Foremost.'s common stock wa.s
regiswred , thus Provident's holdmgs made it a beneficial owner~
4
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information was not a "sale" within the meaning of
§ 16 (b). Provident contended that its reluctant acceptance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets
was an "unorthodox transaction" not presenting the possibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a
"purchase" within the meaning of § 16 (b) . Although
the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had
adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 787 (ND
Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning
that Provident's acquisition of the debentures was not
"unorthodox" and that the circumstances did not preclude the possibility of speculative abuse. 506 F. 2d, at
604-605.
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories
of nonliability based on § 16 (b)'s exemptive provision:
"This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase . o o o" The first was Provident's argument that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time
of . . sale." After the October 24 distribution of some
debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provident were convertible into less than 10% of Foremost's
outstanding common stock. Provident contended that
its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the underwnting agreement was closed on October 28. If this
were the case, the sale would not have been covered by
' 16 (b), since Provident would not have been a benefiCial owner "at the time of
sale." 6 The Court of
Appeals rejected th1s argument because it found that
o

0

0

0

6
Thls contention was based on Reliance Elect.ric Co. v. Emerson
Electnc Co., 404 U. S. 418 (1972) . There we held that a sale made

after a former beneficial owner had already reduced its holdings
below lO% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the phrase "at. the time
of .•. snle'' LD the exempt1ve proviSIOn. See n 25, infra.
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the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the
underwriting agreement.~
The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of
nonliability based on the exemptive provision that we
consider here.8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence
7 Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U. S. C.
78c (a) (14), defines
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." But Provident argued that the October 28 closing date
was the day of sale because contractual conditions prevented the
contract from becoming bmding until closing. The underwriting
agreement prov1ded in paragraph 7 ·
"7. Termmation of Agreement: This agreement may be terminated, prior to the time the Registration Statement becomes effective, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed
llereunder to purchase in the aggregate at least 50% of the Debentures, if, in your judgment or m the judgment of any such group
'Of Underwnters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable
change in political, financtal or economic conditions generally."
(App. A134.)
And m paragraph 5, the agreement provided. "The several obligations of the Underwnters hereunder are subject to the following
cond1twns:
' (h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and
the time of purchase, there shall occur no material and unfavorable
change, financ1al or otherwise (other than as referred to in the
RegistratiOn Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the
Company and 1ts consolidated subs1dianes as a whole; and the Company will, at the tlffie of purchase, dehver to you a certificate of
two of 1ts execut1ve officers to the foregoing effect." (App. A134.)
The Court of Appeals agreed that condttions to performance
m1ght prevent a contract from bemg a "sale" prior to closing. But
Lt ruled that all s1gmficant conditions here were satisfied when the
reg1stratwn sk'ttement reqmred by paragraph 7 became effective on
October 21, the day the underwntmg agreement was executed. The
court also found that after October 21, Prov1dent was no longer
subject to the nsk of a declme in the market for Foremost's stock.
506 F. 2d, at 607. For reasons not apparent from the opinion,
the court d1d not address the poss1b1llty that paragraph 5 (h) left
Prov1dent subJect to market nsks. See n 8, mfra.
g Our holdmg on th1s 1ssue du;;poses of th1s case by precluding,
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the phrase "at the time of the purchase," "must be
construed to mean prior to the time when the decision
to purchase is made." 506 F. 2d, at 614. Although
Provident's receipt of the debentures was a "purchase"
that made Provident a beneficial owner of Foremost,
Provident was not a beneficial owner of Foremost before
the purchase. Accordingly, the exemptive provision removed the purchase from the operation of § 16 (b).

II
The meaning of the exemptive provision has been
disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discusawn has focused on the application of the provision to
a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement
being whether "at the time of the purchase" means
"before the purchase" or "immediately after the purchase." 9 The difference in construction is determinative of a beneficial owner's liability in cases such as
Provident's where such owner sells within six months
of purchase the securities whose acquisition made him
a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immediately over which construction Congress intended, 10 and
they remain divided. 11 The courts of appeals also are
in d1sagreemen t over the issue.
any liability on Provident's part. We therefore do not consider
whether the Ninth C1rcuit properly rejected Provident's arguments
based on Kern County and the sale not having occurred until
October 28
9
The alternative construction to "before the purchase" is some-.
times denommated "simultaneously with the purchase," as It was
by the Court of Appeals. 506 F . 2d, at 608.
1
° Compare G Meyer, The Secunties Exchange Act of 1934, at
112 ( 1934) (adoptmg a "before" construction), with Seligman,
Problems Under the SecuntJes Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1,
19-20 (1934) (adoptmg an "Immediately after" construction) .
11
Compare, e. (] ., Munter, Section 16 (b) of the Securities Ex<;ha,nge Act of 1934 . An Alternative t.o "Burning Down the Bam
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The question of what Congress intended to accomplish by the exemptive provision in a purchase-sale
sequence came to a court of appeals for the first time
in Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299
(CA2), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 831 (1956). There the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit without discussion, but over a dissent, affirmed the District Court's
adoption of the "immediately after the purchase" constructiOn. That court had been impelled to this construction at least in part by concern over what the phrase
uat the time of .. . purchase" means in a sale-repurchase
equence, reasoning
61
If the ['before the purchase'] construction urged
by [Graham-Paige] is placed upon the exemption
provision, It would be possible for a person to purchase a large block of stock, sell it out until his
ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then
repeat the process, ad infinitum." 104 F. Supp.
957, 959 (SDNY 1952) .
The District Court may have thought that "before
the purchase'' seemed an unlikely construction of the
exemptive provision in a sale-repurchase sequence, so it
could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sale
sequence. 12 The Stella construction of the exemptive
in Order to K1ll the Rats,'' 52 Cornell L. Q. 69, 74-75 (1966) ;
Note, Ins1der Liability for Short-Swing Profits : The Substance and
Functwn of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 616619 (1974), Comment, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 582 (1957) (adopting a
"before" construction), with, e g., 2 L. Loss, Securit1es Regulation
1060 (2d ed. 1961) (favoring an "immediately after" construction).
The weight of the commentary appears to be w1th the "before the
purchase" constructiOn. The ALI Federal Securities Code (Tenta~lVe Draft No.2, 1973) , § 1413 (d) and Comment (6), cons1ders the
.,immediately after the purchase" ~"questiOnable" on the statuf.ory language and propo;;es an amendmPnt. to codify the result.
12
Stella was decided before § 10 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C.
~ 7Rl (b) , a;, Implemented by RulP lOb-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5

C.~
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provision has been adhered to in the Second Circuit,
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 355,.--356
(CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); 13 Perine v.
William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA2 1974),
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co.,
434 F. 2d 918, 923-924 (CA81970), aff'd on other grounds,
404 U. S. 418 (1972). 14 But in none of the foregoing
cases did the court examine critically the legislative
history of § 16 (b).
The Court of Appeals considered this case against the
background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the pertinent statutory language, continued disagreement among
the commentators, and a perceived absence in the relatively few decided cases of a full consideration of the
purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court
found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and
its progeny for the "immediately after the purchase"
construction. It noted that construing the provision to
require that beneficial-ownership status exist before the
( 1975), developed fully as a private remedy for actual abuses
of insider information. See 6 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3559.
The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would
now mvite § 10 (b) liability, see n. 28, infra, as well as possible liability under § 16 (b) .
ts To rationalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence,
the court in Newmark wrote :
" [T]he presumed access to [inside] information resulting from
[the] purchase [that makes one a beneficial owner] provides him
wtth an opportunity, not available to the investing public, to sell
hts shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus, a
purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an
opportuntty for the type of speculative abuse the statute was
enacted to prevent." 425 F. 2d, at 356.
14 When thts Court decided Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418,
the question presentRd here was no longer in the case. See n. 25,
irrfra.
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purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not foreclose an "immediately after the purchase" construction
in a sale-repurchase sequence. 15 506 F. 2d, at 61~615.
More significantly, the Court of Appeals challenged
directly the premise of the earlier cases that a "before
the purchase" constructiOn in a purchase-sale sequence
would allow abuses Congress intended to abate. The
court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to
reach only those beneficial owners who both bought and
sold on the basis of mside informatiOn that was not presumptively available to them until after they became
statutory "insiders." 506 F 2d, at 608-614/ 6

II

A
The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b)
is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 U. S.,
at 591-592#1; Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric
Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972), and the authorities
u The view of the Court of Appeals that "at the time of" may
mean different thmgs m different contexts is not umque. See AllisF. 2d Chalmers Mfg Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries, (1975) We express no opm10n here on this view .
16 Shortly before thi::; case was argued the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh CircUit reached the same conclusiOn on somewhat different analysiS. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., F 2d, at - . The
court apparently would have reachrd Its rrsult even in the absence
of the exemptive provision, reasonmg that § 16 (b) covers no
transactiOns by any § 16 (b) msiders who were not insiders
before their imhal transactiOn. "F . 2d, at - . Since we rely
on the exempttve provision, we mt1mate no view on the proper
analysis of a case where a director or officer makes an initial transactiOn before obtaining ms1der status. See, e. g., Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F 2d 840 (CA2 1959) Nor do we have occasiOn here
to a:;sess the approach takf'n by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit to the rxcmpt1ve proviSIOn F. 2d, at &
n. - . See n 21i, 'nfm.

0
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cited therein. Congress recognized that insiders may
have access to mformation about their corporations
not available to the rest of the investing public. By
trading on this information, these persons could reap
profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In
§ 16 (b) Congress sought to "curb the evils of insider
trading [by]
taking the profits out of a class of
transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great." Reliance Electric Co.,
supra, at 422. It accomplished this by defining directors,
officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have
access to inside information 11 and enacting a flat rule
that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders
made on a pair of security transactions within six
months.18
Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the observation in Reliance Electric Co. that "where alternative
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves
the congressiOnal purpose of curbing short-swing trading
by corporate msiders." 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote
omitted). From these premises Foremost argues that
the Court of Appeals' construction of the exemptive proVISIOn must be reJected 19 because it makes § 16 (b) in0

0

•

17 The purpooe of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be "preventing
the unfair use of information whiCh may have been obtained by
such benefiCial owner, director, or officer by reason of h1s relationhlp to the Issuer." 15 U S. C. § 78p (b) .
18 SectiOn 16 (b) states that any short-swmg profits "shall inure
to and be recoverable by the Issuer, Irrespective of any intention
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer m entenng
into such transaction of holdmg the security purchased or of not
repurchasmg the secunty sold for a penod exceeding six months ,.
:15 u s. c. § 78p (b)
19 In lieu of the Court of Appeals' construction, Foremost offers a
constructiOn whereby any purchases prwr to the purchase making
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?J.pplicable to some possible abuses of inside information
that the statute would reach under the Stella construe-.
t10n.20 We find this approach unsatisfactory m its
focus on situations that § 16 (b) may not reach rather
than on the language and purpose of the exemptive provision itself. Foremost's approach also invites an imposi~
tion of § 16 (b)'s liability without fault that is not
consistent with the premises upon which Congress en·
acted the ection.

B
The exemptive provision, which applies only to bene•
limal owners and not to other statutory insiders, must
have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although
the extensive legislative history of the Act is bereft
of any explimt exp1anation of Congress' intent, see Reliance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of§ 16 (b)
from its initial proposa1 through passage does shed sig·
nificant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision.
The original version of what would develop into the
Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).. It proVlded in § 15 (b) :
"It shall be unlawful for any director, officer,
or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or
beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of
stock of any issuer, any security of which is registered
on a national securities exchange-" ( 1) To purchase any such registered security with
the intention or expectation of selling the same secunty withm six months; and any profit made by
such person on any transaction in such a registered
security extending over a period of less than six
\me a benefic1al owner are exempted from the operation of § 16 (b) .
Sf'(-' 2 L . Loss, supra, n 11, at 1060
20
Newmark de ·cribes a possible abuse of inside mformation covered
'only nnder the 8tPlla eonstrnrtion See n. 13, supra.

74-742-0PINION
FOREMOST-McKESSON v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES 13

months shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on
his part in entering into such transaction of holding
the secunty purchased for a period exceeding six
month ,"
In the next version of the legislation, H. R. 8720, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), § 15 (b) read almost identically
to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enacted.21
"Any profit realized by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer from any purchase and sale or
sale and purchase of any such registered equity
security within a period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering mto such transaction of
holding the secunty purchased or of not repurchasing
the secunty sold for a period exceeding six
months. . . . This subsection shall not be construed
to cover any transactiOn where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale or sale and purchase of the security involved,
nor any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended w1thin the purpose of this subsection
As can be seen by companng H. R.. 8720's version of § 15 (b)
w1.th § 16 (b), supra, n . 2, the differenc!'s are relat1vely mmor. Formally, the statement of purpose was moved to the front of the statute and vanous grammatiCal changes were made. A significant substantiVe change not apparent from the faces of the two sect10ns IS
that § 16 (b) benefic1al owners are those owning more than / 10% of
a reg1st!'red sccunty, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693's 5% requirement
Compare Secuntie.-; Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15
U S. C ~ 78p (a), w1th H. R. 8720, 73d. Cong., 2d. Sess., ~ 15 (a)
(1934,.
21
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of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer b reason of his relationship to
the issuer."
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693's drafters, mtroduced § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider "to
carry on any short-term specumtions [sic] in the stock.
He cannot, with his inside information get in and out of
stock within siX months.'' Hearings on H. R. 7852 and
H . R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934) .
The Court of Appeals concluded that S. 2693 would
have applied only to a beneficial owner who had that
status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated, 506
F. 2d, at 609, and we agree. Foremost appears not to
contest this point. Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 29.
The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's
change in the language imposing liability and its addition of the exemptive provisiOn were intended to change
. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no
such intent.
. 2693 and Its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a
number of scores, including vanous provisions of § 15.
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearmgs on H. R. 7852 and
H . R. 8720, supra, at 1-623.22 S. 2693 was recast into
22 Corcoran termed § 15 "one of the most Important provisions in
[S. 2693] " Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6555 (1934).
But most of the proposed legislation was d1rected at regulation of
the stock exchanges themselves and certam trading practices that
\vere cons1dered undesirable regardless of who performed them..

aJL-
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H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the
bill's drafters thought valid. Hearings on H . R. 7852
and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary substantive cntiCism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was
that 1t d1d not prevent the use of inside information
to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situation. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra,
at 6557-6558. Criticism was also directed at making
liability for short-term profits turn on ownership "as
of record and/ or beneficially." See id., at 6914. H. R.
8720 remedied these perceived shortcomings by providing m § 15 (b) : "Any profit realized by such beneficial
owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or
sale and purchase . . . shall mure to and be recoverable
by the issuer." 23 The term "such beneficial owner"
drew content from § 15 (a)'s definition of a beneficial
owner as one owning "more than 5 per centum of any
class" of a registered security.
The structure of the clause imposing liability in the
revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693's
requirement that benefiCial ownership precede a purchase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that
Congress mtended to eliminate the requirement in the
revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the
requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no com·p laint was made about it.
See id., at 6465-6466 Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with
other problems.
~ 8 The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by
H R 8720 was the ehmmatwn of the potential criminal liability.
The cnmmal liability aspect of S. 2693's version of § 15 (b) appears not to have been diScussed m hearings. It may have been
thought, however, that a cr1mmal case could never be made out
The d1fficultJes of proving the mental elements on which cnmmal
liabihty turned had already led the drafters to eliminate those quest-tom: of fact. m civil smts to recover profits. See n. 26, injr{L
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The testimony on S. 2693 demonstrates that the drafters were emphatic about the requirement. In mtroducing the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in
. 2693's language: "It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record
and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class
It was possible to construe the phrase
of stock ..
"ownmg
5 per centum" to apply to directors and
officers as well as to stockholders, so that trading by
directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b)
tf their previous holdings did not exceed 5%. But Corcoran made clear that the reqmrement of pre-existing
ownership of the specified percentage applied only to
beneficial owners.
''lMr. CoRCORAN.] .. . There IS a mistake in the
draftmg. I would suggest that the language of the
first lines of section 15 (a) seem to confine the application of the sectiOn only to those directors and
officers who own more than 5 percent of any class
of securities. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, if I
might, that the language should be corrected so that
the section applied to every director and every officer, irrespective of how much stock he owns; and
also to every owner of more than 5 percent of any
class of securities . . . . '
0

0

,

."

•

Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555;
see Heanngs on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133.
The legislative record thus reveals that the drafters
focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a
short-term purchase-sale sequence by a benefiCial owner·
only if his status existed before the purchase, and no·
concern was expressed about the wisdom of this reqmrernent. But the explicit requirement was omitted from
the operative language of the section when It was restructured to covf'r sale-repurchase sequences. In the same
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draft, however, the e~emptlve provision was added to
the section. On this record we are persuaded that the
exemptive provision was intended to preserve the requirement of beneficial ownership before the purchase.
Later discussions of § 16 (b) in the hearings are conSistent with this interpretation. 24 We hold that, in a
purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must account
for profits only if he was a beneficial owner "before the
purchase " 25
"' '' Mr PECORA. The theory was that the ownership of 5 percent
of the stock would_practiCally constitute him an insider, and by virtoo of that position hP could acquire confidential information which
he might use for Ius own enrichment by trading in the open market,
agamst the mterests of the general body of the stockholders. That
is· the mam purpose sought to be served."
Hearmgs on Stock Exchange PractiCes, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand
Pecora was counsel to the subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Bankmg and Currency that conducted extensive hearings on
stock exchange operations pnor to the enactment of the Act. He
was also one of the draftsmen of S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852
and H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1934).
25 In Reltance Electnc Co., 404 U S. 418, the Court also had
occasiOn to consider the applicatiOn of the exemptive provision m a
purchase-sale sequence. There Emerson acqUired 13.2% of the
shares of Hebance's predecessor pursuant to a tender offer and·
Withm s1x months disposed of its holding~; in two sales of 3.24%
and 9.96%, The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circmt held that
the purchase, by which Emerson became a beneficial owner, was
covered by § 16 (b) . But. It ruled that Emefi:ion was liable for the
profits on only 1ts first sale, because "at the time of . . salP" of
t.he 9.96%, It was not a beneficial owm·r.
The Court granted certiOrari on Reliance 's petition to review this
constructiOn of "at the time of
sale," and affirmed. The con,;truction of "at the time of the purchase," however, was not before
the Court. !d., at 420-422 Emerson thus remained liable for
the 3.24% sa.le, although It would have had no liability under·
our holding today. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
h.as tecognized correctly that the constructinn uf "at the time of ...
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IV
Additional considerations support our reading of the
legislative history.
A
Section 16 (b) imposes a strict prophylactic rule with
respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County
Land Co., 411 U. S., at 595, we noted:
"The statute requires the [statutorily defined] inside, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits
realized on all 'purchases' and 'sales' within the specified time period, without proof of actual abuse of
insider information, and without proof of intent to
profit on the basis of such information."
In short, this statute Imposes liability without fault
within its narrowly drawn limits. 26
sale" in Reliance Electric Co. is superfluous in light of the construction of "at. the time of the purchase" adopted by the Court of
Appeal.H for the Ninth Circtut, whiCh we affirm here. See AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., F. 2d, at n. 12. But the procedural
posture of Reliance Electnc Co. prevented a full consideratiOn of
the meanmg of the exemptive provisiOn. See ibid. We express no
opmwn on the InterpretatiOn of the provision by whiCh the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Cucu1t sought. to avoid the apparent
superfluity of the "at thr time of
sale" language. ld., at - ,
- , supra, n. 16"
26 " Mr
CoRCORAN. . . . You hold the director, irrespective
of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months
after, because it will be absolutely imposs1ble to prove the existence
of such mtentwn or expectation, and you have to have this crude
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having
to prove that the dtrector intended, at the t1me he bought, to get out
on a short swing .
"Senator GoRE. You infer the intent from the fact.
" Mr CoRCORAN From the fact.
"Senator KEAN Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he
bad to ell ?
[Ji'ootnotP .'36 is continued on p. .1.9]
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As noted earher, Foremost recognizes the ambigmty
of the exemptive provision, but argues that where "alter- ...,.-·
nat1ve constructions" of § 16 (b)'s terms are ~lable, ;{.rl-"
we should choose the construction that best serves the
statute's purposes. Foremost relies on statements generally to this effect in Kern County Land Co., supra, at
595, and Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In
neither of those cases, however, did the Court adopt the
construction that would have imposed liability, thus
recognizing that serving the congressional purpose does
not require resolving every ambiguity in favor of the
applicatiOn of § 16 (b). We reiterate that nothing suggests that the construction urged by Foremost would
serve better to further congressional purposes. Indeed,
the legislative history of § 16 (b) indicates that by adding the exemptive provision Congress deliberately expressed a contrary choice. But even if the legislative
record were more ambiguous, we would hesitate to adopt
Foremost's construction. It is inappropriate to reach
the harsh result of Imposing § 16 (b)'s liability without
.fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress
wishes to Impose such liability, we must assume it will
do so expressly ·~ by unmistakable inference.
b-1'
It is not irrelevant that Congress itself limited carefully the strict liability imposed by § 16 (b). See Reliance Electric Co, supra, at 422-425. Even an insider
may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability
if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals
"Senator BARKLEY All he would get would be what he put into it.
He would get his original mvestment.
"Mr. CoRCORAN He would get his money out, but the profit goes
o the corporatiOn.
"Senator KEAN . Suppose he had to sell
"Mr. CoRCORAN . Let him get out what he put in, but give the
corporatiOn the profit."
Hrarmg~ on Stork Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556-6557.
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greater than six months. When Congress has so recog~
nized the need to limit carefully the "arbitrary and
sweeping coverage" of § 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough,
428 F. 2d 69·3, 696 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S.
992 ( 1971) , courts should not be quick to determine that,
despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Congress intended
the section to cover a particular transaction.

B
Our construction of 16 (b) also is supported by the
distinction Congress recognized between short-term trading by mere stockholders and such trading by directors
and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Congress thought that all short-swing trading by directors
and officers was vulnerable to abuse because of their
intimate mvolvement in corporate affairs. But trading
by mere stockholders was viewed as being subject to abuse
only when the size of their holdings afforded the potential
for access to corporate information. 27 These different
perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life.
27

This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange,
dtrected to the reportmg reqmrements 1mposed by § 15 (a) of
S. 2693 on beneficwl ownert>
" Senator KEAN . Suppose a man is not a director at all and does
not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy
5 percent. Do you think you are going to get him to file w1th the
exchange all the time just the number of shares he has?
" Mr. CoRCORAN. I think so, sir.
" Senator KEAN. I think it is all right to apply it to a director or
officer, but I think to require the ordmary investor-" Mr. CoRCORAN Five percent 1s a lot m a modern corporation.
Many corporatiOns are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent.
'Senator KEAN They may own 1t or they may sell it. This applies to all corporatiOns, and you are getting down to the point where
you are mterfermg w1th the md!v!dual a good deal there. I agree
vith you w1th respect to the officers and d1rectors.
" Mr CoRCORAN, A stockholder owmng 5 percent is a. much a.n.
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It would not be consistent with this perceived distinction to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made
when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to insider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the
possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial
owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information
attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But
the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Congress considered intolerable, since it was made when the
purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage
deemed necessary to make one an insider. 28 Such a stockholder is more analogous to the stockholder owning less
than 10% at all times, and thereby excluded entirely from
the operation of § 16 (b), than to a director or officer whose
every purchase and sale is covered by the statute.. While
this reasoning might not compel our construction of the
exemptive provision, it explains why Congress may have
insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or
not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director.
"Senator KEAN . He might not be."
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556. It is also reflected in the discussion of the technical flaw in S. 2693 . See id.,
at 6555, Hearings on H . R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133 .
See also Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 7741-7743.
28 Thus, accordmg to the presumpt.ion of the statute, the purchaser did not have access to ms1de mformation in makmg the
purchase. It should be noted further that as a matter of practicalities the crucial point in the acqmsition of securities is not the technical " purchase," but rather the decision to make an acquisition.
In the case of an acquisition of a considerable block of a corporation's stock, tha.t decision may precede the "purchase" by a considerable penod of time. A prudent investor will want to investigatf' all available information on the corpora.twn Such an investor
also may need time to finance the purchase, and may wish to
effectuate purchases without mfluencing the market price. These
realities emphasize that the acquisi tion decision by a beneficial
owner normally Will occur well in advance of the event that is
presumed to a.fford access to mside information
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seen fit to draw the lme it did.
F. 2d 40, 845 (CA2 1959) .

Cf. Adler v. Klawans, 267

c

Section 16 (b rs scope, of course, is not affected by
whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of
inside information. Congress, however, has left some
problems of the abuse of inside information to other
·remedies. These sanctions alleviate concern that ordinary investors are unprotected against actual abuses of
inside information by transactions not covered by
< 16 (b).
For example, Congress has passed general
antifraud statutes that sanction abusive practices by
insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat.
84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b) ; 3 L. Loss, supra,
n. 11, 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who
can show harm from the actual use of material inside
~information may have recourse, in particular, to § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975). 29 It
also was thought that § 16 (a)'s publicity requirement 30
Rule lOb-5 has been held to embrace ev1ls that Foremost urges its
constructJon of§ 16·(b) 1s necessary to prevent. The Rule has been
applied to tradmg by one who acqUJred ms1de mformatwn m the
course of Iwgotlatwns w1th a corporatwn, such as the negotmtwns
for Provident's purchase of the Foremost debentures. Van Alstyne,
Noel & Co. , 43 S. E. C. 1080 (1969), 3 L. Loss, supra, at. 14511452 . And a stockholdt>r trading on information not generally
known has been held subJect to the sanctwns of the Rule. Shapiro
v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Sm~th, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2'
1974), SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968),
cert. demed, 394 U. S. 967 (1969) . The hability of ins1ders who
" t1p ' others, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d 1301 (CA2),
cert. demed, 404 U. S. 1005 (1971), may reduce the threat that,
beneficml owners not themsdves represented on the board of dJrectors will be able to acqmre ms1de mformatwn from officers and
dm•ctor;,.
Jn Section 16 (a), 15 U S. C. § 78p (a.) provid<.'s '
·Evrn Jwr:-;oliJI who i~ d1rectly or mrlirectly t.he fwndiriar
2n
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would afford indirect protection against some potential
misuses of inside information. 31 See Hearings on H. R.
7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., passed by the House, May 7, 1934,
w1thoutthepresent § 16 (b) ).
We must still consider briefly Foremost's contention
that the "before the purchase" construction is inconsistowner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted secunty) which is registered pursuant
to sect10n 78l of thts title, or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of
uch security on a nat10nal securities exchange or by the effective
date of a registratiOn statement filed pursuant to section 78l (g)
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and,
if such security is registered on a national securities exchange,
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of
such issuer of which he ts the benefictal owner, and within ten days
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, tf there has been
a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the
Commtss1on (and if such secunty is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange) , a statement indicatmg h1s ownershtp at the close of the calendar month and such
changes m h1s ownership as have occurred during such calendar
month "
n Th e drafters clearly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter
abuses not covered by § 16 (b) .
"[Mr Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer,
or prmcipal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file
w1th the exchange and with the commission a statement of how
many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each
month to show whether there has been any change in his position
during the month . That is to prevent the insider from taking advantage of mformat10n to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of
information to the pubhc about the company."
Those remarks were addressed to S. 2693 Hearings on H . R . 7852
und H R. 8720, .~upra , at 132.
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ent with other enactments of Congress and the interJ
pretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Foremost and amicus Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
o. point to §~ 16 (cl) ancl 16 (e) of the Act, 15 U.S. C.
§§ 78p (d), (e), as congressional actions that would not
have been necessary unless one selling the securities
whose acquisition made him a beneficial owner would be
liable under ~ 16 (b). Section 16 (d) in part, exempts
from § 16 (b) certam transactions by a securities "dealer
in the ordmary course of his business and incident to
the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary
or secondary market." a2 Section 16 (e) provides an
exemption for certain "foreign or domestic arbitrage
transactiOns." 33 They argue similarly that the SEC's
Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b-2 ( 1975), is unnecessary
32 Section 16 (d), 15 U . S. C. § 78p (d), provides :
"The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the proVlSlOns of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale,
of an eqmty ::;ecnrity not. then or theretofore held by h1m m an Illvestment account, by a dealer in the ordinary course of his business
and incident to the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national secunties
exchange or an exchange exempted from. registration under sectwn
78e of this tit.lc) for such security. The Commission may, by such
rules and rrgulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the
public interest , define and prescribe terms and conditions with respect to securities held in an investment account and transactwns
made in the ordinary course of business and mcident to the establishment, or maintenance of a primary or secondary market."
" Dealer" IH drfined 111 §a (a) (5) of the Act. 15 U . S. C. § 78c (a) (5) .
J 3 Sect10n 16 (c), 15 U.S. C. §78p (e) , provides ·
"Thr provi>iiOnR of tim; section shall not a pply to foreign or
-domestiC arbitragr transactions unless made m contravention of
·uch rule:; and regulations as the Comm1S~:>1on may adopt in order to.
&:a rry out the p11rpose» of th1s srction."
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if our construction of § 16 (b) is correct. Rule 16b-2
exempts from § 16 (b) specified transactions "in co nne~
tion with the distribution of a substantial block of
securities." 84
84

Section 16 (b) provides in its final clause that it shall not
eover "any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection." 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) . Rule 16f-2
provides :
"(a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase,
of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions
of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b-2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the
following conditions :
" ( 1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the business of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in
the ordinary course of such business, in the distribution of such
block of securities;
"(2) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such
block of securities and is acquired by the person effecting the transaJction, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or
other person on ~vhose behalf such securities are being distributed
or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribution of such block of securities, or (ii) a security purchased in good
faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction
for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the
class bemg distributed or to cover an over-allotment or other short
position created in connection with such distribution; and
" (3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of
the Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securities on terms ::tt least as favorable as those on which such person is
participating and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate participation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section
16 (b) of the Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance·
of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt
of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not preclude an exemption which would otherwise be available under this
§ 240.16b--2.
" (b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this § 240.16b-2'
with respect to the participation therein of one party thereto shalt

/.

u-
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We do not consider these provisions to be inconsistent
with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make
them applicable to one selling the securities the purchase of which made him a beneficial owner. But the
·exemptions would be necessary to protect stockholders
already qualifying as beneficial owners when they purchased 35 and they would, of course, apply to transactions
by directors and officers as well.
Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the
interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they
contend has been adopted by the SEC in the past. See
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 22-27, Reliance
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418
(1972). But the Commission has not appeared as an
amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commission's views have not changed we would not afford them
the deference to which the views of the agency administering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance
Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 425-427, the Court rejected the
basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation
of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the
exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC's
theory did not reflect the intent of Congress.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
not render such transaction exempt with respect to participation of
any other party therein unless such other party also meets the
conditions of this § 240.16b-2."
35 The press release a.ccompanying the SEC's promulgation of
Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this point. It explained: "The new Rule
[16b-2] affords an exemption for certain cases by providing that
underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an
officer or director .of the issuer or one of its principal stockholders
who are regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling
securities need not account to the company for profits realized from
purchases and sales made in the distribution of a security for the
company . ... " SEC Release No. 34-26.4, June 8, 1935.
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MR, JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court,
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 48
tat. 896, 15 U. S. C, § 78p (b), That section of the
Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer
or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum" of a
corporatiOn 1 from profiteering through short-swing securities transactions on the basis of inside information. It
provides that a corporation may capture for itself the
profits realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of its securities within six months by a director, officer, or beneficial owner. 2 Section 16 (b)'s last sentence,
1 The corporate ''insiders" whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b)
1tra defined in§ 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U S. C. § 78p (a), as "[e] very
person who 1s directly or md1rectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than
an exempted secunty) whiCh 1s registered pursuant to section 78l of
this title, or who is a. cbrecJ,or or a.n officer of the issuer of such
security '
Section 16 (b), 15 U S. C § 78p (b), reads in full:
"For the purpose of preventmg the unfair use of infonnation
which may have been obtamed by such beneficial owner, director,
or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit
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however, provides that it 11shall not be construed to cover
any transactiOn where such beneficial owner was not
uch both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security mvolved .. .." The question presented here IS whether a person purchasing securities that put his holdings above the 10% level is a beneficial owner Hat the time of the purchase" so that he must
account for profits realized on a sale of those securities
within six months. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circmt answered this question in the negative, 506 F 2d 601 (1974) , We affirm,

I
Respondent, Provident Securities Co., was a personal
holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively
to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
security) w1thin any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering mto such transaction of holding the
secunty purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a
period exceedmg s1x months. Suit to recover such profit may be
instituted at law or m eqmty m any court of competent jurisdiction
by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the
name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to
brmg such smt within sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter, but no such suit shall be brought
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsect10n shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
beneficml owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transactiOn or transactions wh1ch the Comm1ss1on by rules and regula.
t10ns may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this
:JUbsert.ion."

T
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a purchaser for its assets. Petitioner, Foremost-McKesson, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive
negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over
the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay,
Provident wanted cash in order to facilitate its dissolution, while Foremost wanted to pay with i~ own
securities.
Eventually a compromise was reached, and Provident and Foremost executed a purchase agreement
embodying their deal on September 25, 1969. The
agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds
of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures. 3
The agreement further provided that Foremost would
register under the Securities Act of 19·33 $25 million in
principal amount of the debentures and would participate
in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures
would be sold to the public. At the closing on October
15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a
$40 million debenture that w~s subsequently exchanged
for two debentures in the principal amounts of $25 million and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 million debenture to an escrow on the closing date. On
October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 million debenture representing the balance of the purchase
price. These debentures were immediately convertible
into more than 10% of Foremost's outstanding common
stock
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of
underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be
closed on October 28. The agreement provided for sale
to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. On
s The debentures were issued expressly to acquire Provident•,
assetsp and all of them were used for t,hat purpose.
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October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million and
$7.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing the
amount of Foremost common into which the company's
holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October
28 the closing under the underwriting agreement was
accomplished,4 Provident thereafter distributed the cash
proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and
· dissolved.
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of
October 20 were large enough to make it a beneficial
owner of Foremost within the meaning of§ 16. 5 Having
·acquired and disposed of these securities within six
months, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Foremost to recover any profits realized on the sale of the
debenture to the underwriters. Provident therefore sued
for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under
§ 16 (b). The District Court granted summary judgment for Provident and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Provident's principal argument below for nonliability
was based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held
that an "unorthodox transaction" in securities that did
not present the possibility of speculative abuse of inside
4

The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 in cash to Foremost.
That amount represented a purchase price of 101%,% of the
principal amount of the debenture ($25,312,500.00) plus interest
accrued from October 15 to t.he date of closing ($54,166.66). The
amount of profit realized by Provident has never been established.
3 A beneficial owner is one who owns more than 10% of an "equity
security" registered pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78l.
See n. 1, supra The owner of debentures convertible into more than
10% of a corporation 's registered common stock is a beneficial owner
withm the meaning of the Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§§3 (a)(10) , 11, 15 US. C. §§78c (a)(lO) , (11) ; Rule 16a-2 (b),
17 CFR § 240.16a-2 {b) (1975) . Foremost's common stock was
Tfl~istered , thus Provident' holdings made it a beneficial OWJ.le~.
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information wa not a "sale" within the meaning of
§ 16 (b) . Provident contended that its reluctant acceptance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets
was an "unorthodox transaction" not presenting the possibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a
upurchase" withm the meaning of § 16 (b). Although
the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had
adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 787 (ND
Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning
that Provident's acqmsition of the debentures was not
"unorthodox" and that the circumstances did not preclude the possibility of speculative abuse.. 506 F . 2d, at
604-605.
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories
of nonliability based on § 16 (b)'s exemptive provision :
"This subsection shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
11
and purchase
The first was Provident's argument that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time
of
sale.11 After the October 24 distribution of some
debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provident were convertible mto less than 10% of Foremost's
outstanding common stock. Provident contended that
its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the underwriting agreement was closed on October 28. If this
were the case, the sale would not have been covered by
§ 16 (b), smce Provident would not have been a benefimal owner "at the time of
sale." 8 The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument because it found that
0

0

0

0

0

o

o

0

0

8 This contention was based on Reliance Electric Co . v. Emerson
Electnc Co , 404 U S. 41R (1972) There the Court held that a sale
made after a former beneficial owner had already reduced its holdings
below 10% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the phrase "at the time
of • • . S~Jle" m the exempbve proviston, See n. 25, infra.
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the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the
Underwriting agreement. 1
The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of
nonhability based on the exemptive provision that we
consider here. 8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence
1 Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14), defines
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." But Provident argued that the October 28 closing date
was the day of sale because contractual conditions prevented the
contract from becoming binding until closing. The underwriting
agreement provided in paragraph 7:
"7. Termination of Agreement : This agreement may be terminated, prior to the time the Registration Statement becomes effective, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed
hereunder to purchase m the aggregate at least 50% of the Debentures, if, in your judgment or m the judgment of any such group
of Underwriters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable
change in political, financial or economic conditions generally."
(App. A134 .)
And in paragraph 5, the agreement provided: "The several obligations of the Underwriters hereunder are subject to the following
conditions :
" (h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and
the time of purchase, there shall occur no material and unfavorable
change, financial or otherwise (other than as referred to in the
Registration Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the
Company and its consolidated subsidianes as a whole; and the Company w!ll, at the time of purchase, deliver to you a certificate of
t,wo of its executive officers to the foregoing effect." (App. A134.)
The Court of Appeals agreed that conditions to performance
might prevent a contract from being a "sale" prior to closing. But
it ruled that all sigmficant conditions here were satisfied when the
registration statement required by paragraph 7 became effective on
October 21 , the day the underwriting agreement was executed. The
court also found that after October 21, Provident was no longer
subject to the r1sk of a declme in the market for Foremost's stock.
506 F 2d, at 607 . For reasons not apparent from Its opinion,
the court did not address the possibility that paragraph 5 (h) left
Provident subJect to market risks. See n. 8, infra.
8
Dur holding: on this tssue d1sposes of this case by precludme;
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the phrase 11at the time of the purchase," 11must be
construed to mean prior to the time when the decision
to purchase is made.'' 506 F. 2d, at 614. Thus, although
Provident became a beneficial owner of Foremost by acqmring the debentures, it was not a beneficial owner "at
the time of the purchase.'' Accordingly, the exemptive
provision prevf'nted anv § 16 (h) liability on Provident's
par.

II
The meaning of the exemptive proVIsion has been
disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discussion has focused on the application of the provision to
a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement
being whether "at the time of the purchase" means
ubefore the purchase" or "immediately after the purchase." 9 The difference in construction is determinative of a beneficial owner's liability in cases such as
Provident's where such owner sells within six months of
purchase the securities the acquisition of which made him
a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immediately over which construction Congress intended,t0 and
they remain divided. 11 The courts of appeals also are
in disagreement over the issue.
any ltabthty on Provident's part. We therefore do not consider
whether the Court of Appeals properly rejected Provident's arguments based on Kerrt County and on the sale not having occurred
until October 28
9 The alternative construction to "before the purchase" is sometimes denommated "stmultaneously wtth the purchase," as it was
by the Court of Appeals. 506 F. 2d, at 608.
1
° Compare C. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at
ll2 (1934) (adoptmg a "before" construction), with Seligman,
Problems Under the Securities Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1,
19-20 (1934) (adoptmg an "immedtately after" construction) .
11 Compare, e. g., Munter, Sectton 16 (b) of the Securities Ex~ba,nge Act of 1934: An Altema.tivA to "'Burning Down the Bam
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The question of what Congress intended to accomplish by the exemptive provision in . a purchase-sale
sequence came to a court of appeals for the first time
in Stella v Graham-Patge Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299
(CA2), cert. demed, 352 U. S. 831 (1956). There the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circmt without discussion, but over a dissent, affirmed the District Court's
adoption of the "immediately after the purchase" construction. That court had been impelled to this constru0tion at least m part by concern over what the phrase
"at the tJme of . purchase" means in a sale-repurchase
equence, reasonmg
ulf the ['before the purchase'] construction urged
by [Graham-Paige] IS placed upon the exemption
proviswn, It would be possible for a person to purchase a large block of stock, sell it out until hi8
ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then
repeat the process, ad infinitum." 104 F. Supp.
957, 959 (SDNY 1952) .
The District Court may have thought that "before
the purchase" seemed an unlikely construction of the
exemptive provision in a sale-repurchase sequence, so it
could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sale
equence 12 The Stella constructiOn of the exemptive
in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 ornell L. Q. 69, 74-75 (1966);
Note, Insider L1abthty for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and
Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 616619 (1974), Comment, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 582 (1957) (adopting a
"before" construction), w1th, e. g., 2 L Loss, SecuntJes Regulation
1060 (2d ed, 1961) (favormg an ' tmmedmtely after" construction) .
The wmght of the commentary appears to be wtth the "before the
purchase" construction The ALI Federal Securities Code (Tentative Draft No.2, 1973), § 1413 (d) and Comment (6), considers the
tmmeduttely after the purchase'' construction "questionable" on the
,tatutory language and proposcs an amendment to codify the result.
12 Stella was dectded before § 10 (b) of the Act, 15 U. S. C.
, 7~j (h), ~.~ tmj1lcmcnt.ccl. hy Rll.l<' lOh-li, 17 CFR § 240,101>-S
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provision has been adhered to in the Second Circuit,
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F . 2d 348, 355-356
(CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); 13 Perine v.
William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA2 1974),
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co.,
434 F. 2d 918,923-924 (CA81970), aff'd on other grounds,
404 U. S. 418 (1972) .14 But in none of the foregoing
cases did the court examine critically the legislative
history of § 16 (b).
The Court of Appeals considered this case against the
background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the pertinent statutory language, continued disagreement among
the commentators, and a perceived absence in the relatively few decided cases of a full consideration of the
purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court
found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and
its progeny for the "immediately after the purchase"
construction. It noted that construing the provision to
require that beneficial-ownership status exist before the
(1975), developed fully as a private remedy for actual abuses
of mside mformat10n. See 6 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3559.
The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would
now mv1te § 10 (b) liability, see n. 29, infra, as well as possible liability under § 16 (b)
13 To rationalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence,
the court in Newmark wrote :
11
[T]he presumed a~cess to [inside] information resulting from
[ the] purchase [that makes one a beneficial owner] provides him
w1th an opportunity, not available to the investing public, to sell
Ius shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus, a
purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an
opporturuty for the type of speculative abuse the statute was
enacted to prevent." 425 F. 2d, at 356.
14
When thiS Court demded Reliance Electric Co ., 404 U. S. 418,
the queshpn presenU>d here was no longer in the case. Se~ Jl. 25,

injm.
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purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not foreclose an "immediately after the purchase" construction
in a sale-repurchase sequence. 15 506 F . 2d, at 614-615.
More significantly, the Court of Appeals challenged
directly the premise of the earlier cases that a "before
the purchase" construction in a purchase-sale sequence
would allow abuses Congress intended to abate. The
court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to
reach only those beneficial owners who both bought and
sold on the basis of inside information, which was presumptively available to them only after they became
statutory "insiders/' 506 F, 2d, at 608-614,16

III
A
The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b)
is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 U. S.,
at 591-59Q; Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric
Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972), and the authorities
u The view of the Court of Appeals that "at the time of" may
mean different things in different contexts is not unique. See AllisChalmers Mfg Co v. Gulf & Western lndustries, F. 2d (1975) We express no opmwn here on this view.
u Shortly before this case was argued the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion on somewhat different analysis. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., F. 2d, at - . The
court apparently would have reached its result even in the absence
of the exemptive provision, reasoning that § 16 (b) covers no
transactiOns by any § 16 (b) insiders who were not insiders
before their initial transaction. F. 2d, at - . Since we rely
on the exemptiVe provision, we intimate no view on the proper
analysis of a case where a director or officer makes an initial transaction before obtaining msider status See, e. g., Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F . 2d 840 (CA2 1959) Nor do we have occasion here
to assess the approa.ch taken by the Court of Appeals for the
eventh CircUit to the exemptiVe proviSion. F. 2d, at &
:n. 13. Seen 25, infra.
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cited therein. Congress recognized that insiders may
have access to information about their corporations
not available to the rest of the investing public. By
trading on this mformation, these persons could reap
profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In
§ 16 (b) Congress sought to "curb the evils of insider
trading [by] . . , taking the profits out of a class of
transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great." Reliance Electric Co.,
supra, at 422. It accomplished this by defining directors,
officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have
access to inside information 17 and enacting a flat rule
that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders
made on a pair of security transactions within six
months.1 8
Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the observation in Reliance Electric Co. that "where alternative
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves
the congressional purpose of curbing short-swing trading
by corporate insiders.11 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote
omitted) . From these premises Foremost argues that
the Court of Appeals' construction of the exemptive provision must be rejected 19 because it makes § 16 (b) in1 '~'" The purpose of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be "preventing
the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by
such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer."' 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) .
1 8 Section 16 (b) states that any short-swing profits "shall inure·
to· and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months."
15 u. s. c. § 78p (b).
19 In lieu of the Court of Appeals' construction, Foremost offers a
ctnnstruction whereby any purcha!!!es prior to the pu;rchase makin~
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applicable to some possible abuses of inside information
that the statute would reach under the Stella construction.20 We find th1s approach unsatisfactory in its
focus on situations that § 16 (b) may not reach rather
than on the language and purpose of the exemptive provision itself. Foremost's approach also invites an imposition of § 16 (b)'s liability without fault that is not
consistent with the premises upon which Congress enacted the section.
B
The exemptive provision, which applies only to benefiCial owners and not to other statutory insiders, must
have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although
the extensive legislative history of the Act is bereft
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent, see Reliance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of§ 16 (b)
from its initial proposal through passage does shed significant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision.
The original version of what would develop into the
Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess, (1934) .. It provided in § 15 (b) :
"It shall be unlawful for any director, officer,
or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or
beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of
<3tock of any issuer, any security of which is registered
.on a national securities exchange-" ( 1) To purchase any such registered security with
the intention or expectation of selling the same secunty within six months; and any profit made by
such person on any transaction in such a registered
ecunty extending over a per1od of less than six
one a beneficial owner are exempted from the operation of§ 16 (b).
See 2 L Loss, supra, n 11, at 1060.
20 Newmark describes a possible abuse of inside information covered
.only nnder t he Stella construction. See n. 131 supra.
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months shall inure to and be recoverable by the is·
suer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on
his part in entering into such transaction of holding
the security purchased for a period exceeding six
months."
In the next version of the legislation, H. R. 8720, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. ( 19·34), § 15 (b) read almost identically
to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enacted.21
"Any profit realized by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer from any purchase and sale or
sale and purchase of any such registered equity
security within a period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six
months.... This subsection shall not be construed
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale or sale and purchase of the security involved,
nor any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection
21 As can be seen by comparing H . R. 8720's version of § 15 (b)
with § 16 (b), supra, n. 2, the differences are relatively minor. Formally, the statement of purpose was moved to the front of the statute and various grammatical changes were made. A significant substantive change not appa.rent from the faces of the two sections is
that § 16 (b) beneficial owners are those owning more than 10% of
a registered security, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693's 5% requirement, Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15
U. S. C. § 78p (a), with H. R . 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., § 15 (.a)
{1934).
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of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer/$
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693's drafters, introduced § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider "to
carry on any short-term speculations [sic] in the stock.
He cannot, with his inside information get in and out of
stock within six months." Hearings on H. R. 7852 and
H . R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934).
The Court of Appeals concluded that § 15 (b) of S. 2693·
would have applied only to a beneficial owner who had
that status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated,
506 F. 2d, at 609, and we agree. Foremost appears not to
contest this point. Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 29.
The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's
change in the language imposing liability and its addition of the exemptive provision were intended to change
S. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no
such intent.
S. 2693 and its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a
number of scores, mcluding various provisions of § 15.
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 7852 and
H . R. 8720, supra, at 1-623.22 S. 2693 was recast into
Corcoran termed § 15 "one of the most important provisions in
[S. 2693] ." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate
Commtttee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6555 (1934).
But most of the proposed legtslat10n was directed at regulation of
the stock exchanges themselves and certam trading practices that
were coJlsidered undesirable regardless, of who performed the~Jl.
22
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H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the
bill's drafters thought valid. Hearings on H. R. 7852
and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary substantive criticism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was
that it did not prevent the use of inside information
to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situation. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra,
at 6557-6558. Criticism was also directed at making
liability for short-term profits turn on ownership "as
of record and/or beneficially." See id., at 6914. H. R.
8720 remedied these ·perceived shortcomings by providing in § 15 (b): "Any profit realized by such beneficial
owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or
sale and purchase ... shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer." 23 The term "such beneficial owner"
was defined in § 15 (a) to mean one "who is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum
of any class" of a registered security.
The structure of the clause imposing liability in the
revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693's
requirement that beneficial ownership precede a purchase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that
Congress intended to eliminate the requirement in the
revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the
requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no complaint was made about it.
See id., at 6465-6466. Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with
other problems.
28 The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by
H. R. 8720 was the elimination of the potential criminal liability.
The criminal liability aspect of S. 2693's version of § 15 (b) received almost no attention in hearings. But cf. Stock Exchange
Practices, supra, at 6966. It may have been thought, however, that
a criminal case could never be made out. The difficulties of proving
t.he mental elements on which criminal liability turned had already
led the drafters to eliminate those questions of fact in civil suits to
recover profits. See n. 26, mfra.
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The testimony on S. 2693 demonstrates that the drafters were emphatic about the requirement. In introducing the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in
S. 2693's language: "It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record
and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class
of stock .. .." It was possible to construe the phrase
"owning . . . 5 per centum" to apply to directors and
officers as well as to mere stockholders, so that trading by
directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b)
if their previous holdings did not exceed 5%. But Cor·coran made clear that the requirement of pre-existing
ownership of the specified percentage applied only to
beneficial owners.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. . . . The bill is not very well
drawn there. It ought to read to cover every director, every officer, and every stockholder who owns
more than 5 percent of the stock. That is the way
it was intended to read.
"Mr. MAPES. It ought to read 'and/or beneficially more than 5 percent' followed by 'is a director, or officer.'
"Mr. CoRCORAN. It is badly drawn. We slipped
on that. It ought to read 'every director and every
officer' and then 'every big stockholder.'"
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133; see
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555.
The legislative record thus reveals that the drafters
focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a
short-term purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner
only if his status existed before the purchase, and no
concern was expressed about the wisdom of this requirement. But the explicit requirement was omitted from
the operative language of the section when it was restruc-
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tured to cover sale-repurchase sequences. In the same
draft, however, the exemptive provision was added to
the section. On th1s record we are persuaded that the
exemptive provision was intended to preserve the requirement of beneficial ownership before the purchase.
Later discussions of the present § 16 (b) in the hearings
are consistent with this interpretation. 24 We hold that,
m a purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must account for profits only if he was a beneficial owner "before
t.hr purchasP.' ~
2

N " Mr PECORA
The theory wru:; that the ownership of 5 percent
of the stock would practically const1tute him an insider, and by virtue of that position he could acqmre confidential information whJCh
he m1ght use for his own enrichment by trading in the open market,
against the mterests of the general body of the stockholders. That
is the main purpose sought to be served."
Hearmgs on Stock Exchange PractiCes, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand
Pecora was counsel to the subcomrmttee of the Senate Committee
em Bankmg and Currency that conducted extensive hearings on
stock exchange operations prior to the enactment of the Act. He
was also one of the draftsmen of S. 2693. Heanngs on H. R. 7852
and H. R. 8720 before the Hon~e Committee on Interstate and
Fore1gn Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1934)
2
~ In Relwnce Electric Co., 404 U S. 418, the Court also had.
occasion to consider the applicatiOn of the exempt1ve proviSion in a
purchase-sale sequence There Emerson acqmred 13.2% of the
Rhare!:' of Relinnce's predecessor pursun.nt to a tender offer and
WJtlun s1x months dispo8cd of 1ts holdings m two sales of 3.24%
:md 9.96% The Court of Appeals for the E1ghth Circmt held that
rhc purchase, by wh1ch Emerson became a beneficial owner, was
covered by § 16 (b) But 1t ruled that Emerson was liable for the
profits on only Its first sale, because ''at the time of .. sale" of
Lhe· 9.96%, 1t was not a beneficial owner
The Court granted certwran on Reliance's petition to review this
constructiOn of ''at the time of
sale," and affirmed. The con-;tructwn of "at the time of the purchase," however, was not before'
the Court Iii., at 420-422. Emerson thus remamed liable for
the 3.24% sale, although 1L would have had no habliity under
.ruJ.t hald.ln~ tnclav The Court of Appeals fo:r the Seventh C.LrruJ.t.
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Additional considerations support our reading of the
legislative history.
A
f9ection 16 (b) imposes a strict pro!'hylactic rule with
respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County
Land Co., 411 U.S., at 595, we 11oted:
61
The statute requires the [statutorily defined] in~
side, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits
reahzed on all 'purchases' and 'sales' within the specified time period, without proof of actual abuse of
insider information, and without proof of intent to
profit on the basis of such ipformat~on/'
In short, this statute imposes liability without fault
within its narrowly drawn li:rpits, 26
has noted correctly that the construction of "at the time of . . .
sale" in Reliance Electric Co. is superfluous in light of the construction of "at the time of the purchase" adopted by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which we affinn here. See AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., F. 2d, at - - n. 12. But the procedural
posture of Reliance Electric Co . prevented a fu~l O!,>nsideration of
the meaning of the exemptive provision. See ibid. We express no
opinion on the interpretation of the provision by which the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit sought to avoid the apparent
superfluity of the "at the time of ... sa1e" language. /d., ~t - ,
- ; supra, n. 16.
26 "Mr. CoRCOR4N. , , . You hold th~ director, irrespective
of any intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 :Jllonths
after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence
of such intention or expectation, and you have to have this crude
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having
to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out
on a short swing.
·
41
Senator GoRE. You infer the intent from the fact.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. From the fact .
[Footnote 26 is continued on p. 19]

',.
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As noted earlier, Foremost recognizes the ambiguity
of the exemptive provision, but argues that where "alternative constructions" of § 16 (b)'s terms are available,
we should choose the construction that best serves the
statute's purposes. Foremost relies on statements generally to this effect in Kern County Land Co., supra, at
595, and Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In
neither of those cases, however, did the Court adopt the
construction that would have imposed liability, thus
recognizing that serving the congressional purpose does
not require resolving every ambiguity in favor of liability under § 16 (b). We reiterate that nothing suggests that the construction urged by Foremost would
serve better to further congressional purposes. Indeed,
the legislative history of § 16 (b) indicates that by adding the exemptive provision Congress deliberately expressed a contrary choice.. But even if the legislative'
record were more ambiguous, we would hesitate to adopt
Foremost's construction. It is inappropriate to reach
the harsh result of imposing § 16 (b)'s liability without
·fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress
wishes to impose such liability, we must assume it will
do so expressly or by unmistakable inference. ·
It IS not irrelevant that Congress itself limited carefully the liability imposed by § 16 (b). See Reliance
Electric Co., supra, at 422-425. Even an insider
"Senator KEAN. Suppose he got stuck in something else, and he
had to sell?
"Senator BARKLEY. All he would get would be what he put into it.
He would get his original investment.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. He would get his money out, but the profit goes
to the corporation.
"Senator KEAN. Suppose he had to selL
"Mr. CoRCORAN. Let him get out what he put in, but give thtt
corporation the profit."
Hea~:ings on Stock Exchange· Practices, supra, at 6556-6557,
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may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability
if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals
greater than six months. When Congress ha.s so recog~
nized the need to limit carefully the "arbitrary and
sweeping coverage" of§ 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough,
428 F. 2d 69'3, 696 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 40d U. S.
992 (1971), courts should not be qmck to determirte that,
despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Congress intended
the section to cover a particular transaction.

B
Our construction of § 16 (b) also is supported by the
distinction Congress recognized between short-term trading by mere stockholders and such trading by directors
and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Congress thought that all short-swing trading by directors
and officers was vulnerable to abuse because of their
intimate involvement in corporate affairs. But trading
by mere stockholders wa.s viewed as being subject to abuse
only when the size of their holdings afforded the potential
for access to corporate mformation. 27 These different
perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life.
11 This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange,
directed to the reporting reqmrements imposed by § 15 (a) of
. 2693 on beneficial owners
"Senator KEAN. Suppose a man is not a director at all and does
not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy
5 percent Do you think you are going to get him to file with the
exchange all the time JUSt the number of shares he has?
" Mr CoRCORAN. 1 thmk so, sir.

"Senator KEAN. I think it is all right to apply it to a director or
officer, but I think to reqmre the ordinary mvestor-''Mr. CoRcoRAN , Five percent IS a lot in a modern corporation.
Many corporations are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent.
"Senator KEAN They may own It or they may sell it. This ap:ri>liE'S to !lll corporatiOns 11nd you are getting down to the point wher~
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It would not be consistent with this perceived distinction to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made
when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to insider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the
possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial
owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information
attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But
the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Congress considered intolerable, since it was made when the
purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage
deemed necessary to make one an insider. 28 Such a stockholder is more analogous to the stockholder who never
owns more than 10% and IS thereby excluded entirely
you are interfering with the individual a good deal there. I agree
with you with respect to the officers and directors.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. A stockholder owning 5 percent is as much an
insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or
not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director.
"Senator KEAN He might not be."
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556. The distinctiOn is also reflected m the discussion of the technical flaw in
S 2693 See id., at 6555; Hearmgs on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720,
supra, at 133 SE'e also Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, supra,
at 7741-7743
2
A Thus, accordmg to the presumption of the statute, the purchaser did not have access to mside mformation in making the
purchase. It should be noted further that as a matter of practicalities the crumal pomt in the acqwsition of securities is not the technical "purchase," but rather the decisiOn t<> make an acquisition.
In the case of an acqUisitiOn of a large block of a corporation's stock, that decision may precede the "purchase" by a considerable period of time. A prudent mvestor will want to investigate all available mformat10n on the corporation. Such an investor
also may need time to finance the purchase, and may wish to
effectuate purchases without mfiuencmg the market price. These
realities emphasize that the acqUisition decision by a beneficial
owner normally will occur well m advance of the event that is
presumed to afford arces..'> to inside information.
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from the operation of . 16 (b), than to a director or officer whose every purchase and sale is covered by the statute. While th1s reasoning might not compel our con~
struction of the exemptive provision, it explains why
Congress may have seen fit to draw the line it did. Cf.
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959).

c
Section 16 (b)'s scope, of course, is not affected by
whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of
inside information. Congress, however, has left some
problems of the abuse of inside information to other
remedies. These sanctions a1leviate concern that ordinary investors are unprotected against actual abuses of
inside information in transactions not covered by
§ 16 (b). For example, Congress has passed general
antifraud statutes that sanction abusive practices by
insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat.
84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S, C. § 78j (b) ; 3 L. Loss, supra,
n. 11, 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who
· can show harm from the actual use of material inside
;information may have recourse, in particular, to § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975).29 It

.

Rule 10b-5 has been held to embrace evils that Foremost urges its
construction of § 16 (b) IS necessary to prevent. The Rule has been
applied to trading by one who acquired inside information in the
course of negotiations with a corporation, such as the negotiations
for Provident's purchase of the Foremost debentures. Van Alstyne,
Noel & Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080 (1969), 3 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 14511452. And a stockholder tradmg on information not generally
known has been held subJect to the sanctions of the Rule. Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smtth, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2
'1974) ; SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968),
cert. demed, 394 U. S 967 (1969) The liability of insiders who
"t1p' others, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F . 2d 1301 (CA2),
cert. denied, 404 U . S 1005 (1971), may reduce the threat that
'benefieial Qwners not t.hemselve~ represented on the boa,rd of direc29
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also was thought that § 16 (a)'s publicity requirement 80
would afford mdirect protectiOn against some potential
misuses of inside information. 31 See Hearings on H. R .
7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323,
tors will be able to acquire inside information from officers and
directors.
80 Section 16 (a), 15 U S. C. § 78p (a) provides :
"Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant
to sectiOn 78l of th1s title, or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of
such security on a natiOnal secunties exchange or by the effective
date of a registratiOn statement filed pursuant to section 78l (g)
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and,
if such security is registered on a national securities exchange,
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of
such Issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been
a change m such ownership during such month, shall file with the
CommissiOn (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indicatmg his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in h1s ownership as have occurred during such calendar
month
3 ' The drafters clea.rly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter
abuses not covered by § 16 (b) .
"[Mr. Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer,
ot principal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file
with the exchange and with the commission a statement of how
many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each
month to show whether there has been any change in his position
durmg the month. That is to prevent the insider from taking advantage of mformat10n to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of
information to the public about the company."
Thesr rrmarks were addressed to S 269~ Hearings on H R. 7852:
:and H. 8720, 81tpral .a.t 132.

a
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73d Cong., 2d ess., passed by the House, May 7, 19341
without the present§ 16 (b)) .

v
We must still consider briefly Foremost's contention
that the "before the purchase" construction renders
other enactments of Congress unnecessary and conflicts
with the interpretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Foremost and amicus Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co. pomt to §§ 16 (d) and 16 (e) of the Act, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 78p (d), (e), as congr~ssional actions that would not
have been necessary unless one selling the securities
the acquisition of which made him a beneficial owner is
liable under § 16 (b). Section 16 (d), in part, exempts
from § 16 (b) certain transactions by a securities "dealer
in the ordinary course of his business and incident to
the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary
or secondary market." 82 Section 16 (e) provides an
exemption for certam "foreign or domestic arbitrage
a2 Section 16 (d), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (d), provides:
"The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the provisions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale,
or an equity secunty not then or theretofore held by him in an Illvestment account, by a dealer in the ordinary course of his business
and inCident to the establishment or mamtenance by him of a primary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national securities
exchange or an exchange exempted from registration under section
78e of this title) for such security. The Commission may, by such
rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the
pubhc interest, define and prescribe terms and conditions with respect to securities held in an investment account and transactions
Qlade in the ordmary course of business and incident to the establishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market."
' Dealer' L.~ definrrl m § :3 (a) (5) of the Act, J5 U S C. § 78c (a) (5),
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transactions." 83 They argue similarly that the SEC's
Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b~2 (1975) , is unnecessary
if our construction of § 16 (b) is correct. Rule 16b-2
exempts from § 16 (b) specified transactions "in connection with the distribution of a substantial block of
securities." 34
Section 16(e), 15 u. s. c. §78p(e), provides:
"The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or
domestic arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to
carry out the purposes of this section."
34 Section 16 (b) provides in its final clause that it shall not
cover "any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection " 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) . Rule 16b- 2
provides:
" (a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase,
of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions
of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the
following conditions :
" ( 1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the business of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in
the ordinary course of such business, in the distribution of such
block of securit ies;
" (2 ) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such
block of secunt1es and is acquired by the person effecting the t ransaction, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or
other person on whose behalf such securities are being distributed
or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribut ion of such block of securit ies, or (ii) a security purchased in good
faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction
for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the
class being distnbuted or to cover an over-allotment or other short
position created m connectiOn wtth such distribution; and
" (3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of
t he Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securities on terms at least as favorable as those on which such person is
p articipatmg and t o an extent at least equal to the aggregate par.
38
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We do not consider these provisions to be inconsistent
with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make
them applicable to one selling the securities the purchase of which made him a beneficial owner. But the
exemptions would be necessary to protect stockholders
already qualifying as beneficial owners when they purchased 35 and they would, of course, apply to transactions
by directors and officers as well.
Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the
interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they
contend has been adopted by the SEC in the past. See
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 22-27, Reliance
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418
(1972). But the Commission has not appeared as an
amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commission's views have not changed we would not afford them:
the deference to which the views of the agency administering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance
ticipation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section
16 (b) of the Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance·
of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt
of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not preclude an exemption which would otherwise be. available under this
§ 240.16b-2.
"(b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this § 240.16b-2 '
with respect to the participation therein of one party thereto shall
not render such transaction exempt with respect to participation of
any other party therein unless such other party also meets the ·
conditions of this § 240.16b-2."
3
~ The press releasr accompanying the SEC's initial promulgation of'
Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this point. It explained: "The new Rule
[16b-2] affords an exemption for certain cases by providing that
underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an
officer or director of the issuer or one of its principal stockholders
who are regularly engaged in the business of buying and selling·
securities need not account to the company for profits realized from
purchases and sales made in the distribution of a security for the."
company . . .." SEC Release No . 34-26.4, June 8, 1935.
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Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 425-427, the Court rejected the
basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation
of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the
exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC's
theory did not reflect the intent of Congress.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act), 48
Stat. 896, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b) . That section of the
Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer
or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum" of a
corporation 1 from profiteering through short-swing securities transactions on the basis of inside information. It
provides that a corporation ma.y capture for itself the
profits realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of its securities within six months by a director, officer, or beneficial owner 2 Section 16 (b)'s last sentence,
'1 The corporate "insiders" whose trading is regulated by § 16 (b)
are defined in § 16 (a) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a), as 11 [e]very
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than
111\ exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 78l of
this t,itle, or who is a director or an officer of the iS&uer of such
security!'
~ Section 16 (b) , 15 U, S. C. § 78p (b), n'B.ds in full :
"For t.he purpose of preventmg the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director,
ot officer hy l'Pason of his relat.mnsh1p t,o the issuer, any profit

t/J>/'Jt
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however, provides that It "shall not be construed to cover
any transactwn where such beneficial owner was not
such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase, of the security mvolved .. .. " The ques~
tion presented here IS whether a person purchasing securities that put his holdings above the 10% level is a beneficial owner <~at the time of the purchase" so that he must
account for profits realized on a sale of those securities
within six months. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the negative. 506 F . 2d 601 (1974) We affirm.

I
Respondent, Provident Secunties Co., was a personal
holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively
to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find
realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and pur·chase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted
secunty) witlun any period of less than six months, unless such
security was acqmred m good fmth in connectwn w1th a debt previously contracted, shall mure to and be recoverable by the issuer,
irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
d1rector, or officer m entering mto such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasmg the security sold for a
period exceedmg SIX months. Smt to recover such profit may be
inst1tuted at law or m eqmty m any court of competent jurisdiction
by the issuer, or by the owner of any secunty of the issuer in the
name and in behalf of the issuer 1f the issuer shall fail or refuse to
brmg such smt withm sixty days after request or shall fail diligently
to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought
more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsectiOn shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any transactiOn or transactions whiCh the Commission by rules and regulatwns may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this,
<>ttb. ectlon. ''

1'
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a purchaser for its assets. Petttioner, Foremost-McKes..
on, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive
negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over
the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay.
Provident wanted cash m order to facilitate its dissolution, while Foremost wanted to pay with its own
securities.
Eventually a compromise was reached, and Provident and Foremost executed a purchase agreement
embodying their deal on September 25, 1969. The
agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds
of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75
million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures. 8
The agreement further provided that Foremost would
register under the Securities Act of 1933 $25 million in
principal amount of the debentures and would participate
in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures
would be sold to the public. At the closing on October
15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a
$40 million debenture that was subsequently exchanged
for two debentures in the principal amounts of $25 million and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a $2.5 million debenture to an escrow on the closing date. On
October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 million debenture representing the balance of the purchase
price. These debentures were immediately convertible
into more than 10% of Foremost's outstanding common
stock.
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of
underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be
closed on October 28. The agreement provided for sale
to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. On
!i

The debentures were issued expressly to acquire
and all of them were used for that purpose.

11}.SSefis9

Provident·~

]'
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October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million and
$7.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing the
amount of Foremost common into which the company's
holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October
28 the closing under the underwriting agreement was
accomplished.4 Provident thereafter distributed the cash
proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and
dissolved,
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of
October 20 were large enough to make it a beneficial
owner of Foremost Withm the meaning of§ 16.~ Having
acquired and disposed of these securities within six
months, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Foremost to recover any profits realized on the sale of the
debenture to the underwriters. Provident therefore sued
for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under
§ 16 (b). The District Court granted summary judgment for Provident and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Provident's principal argument below for nonliability
was based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973). There we held
that an "unorthodox transaction" m securities that did
not present the possibility of speculative abuse of inside
4
The underwriters delivered $25,366,666.66 in ca.sh to Foremost.
'T hat amount represented a purcha.se price of 1011,4% of the
principal amount of the debPnture ($25,312,500.00) plus interest
accrued from October 15 to the date of closing ($54,166 .66) . The
amount of profit rPahzed by Prov1dent has never been established
~ A beneficml owner IS one who owns more than 10% of an "equity
secunty" reg1stered pursuant to § 12 of the Act, 15 U S. C. § 78l.
See n . 1, supra. The owner of debentures convert1ble mto more than
10% of a corporatiOn's reg1stered common stock 1s a benefiCial owner
Withm the meanmg of the Act. SecuntJes Exchange Act of 1934,
§§3 (a)(lO), (11), 15ll . S C. §§78c (a)(lO), (11); Rule 16a-2 (b) ,
17 CFR § 240.16a-2 (b) (1975) . Foremost.'s common stock was
re~istered , thus ProvldPnt' holdmgs made 1t a beneficial owner.
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information was not a ' sale" within the meaning of
§ 16 (b) . Provident contended that its reluctant acceptance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets
was an ttunorthodox transaction" not presenting the possibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a
ttpurchase" within the meaning of § 16 (b). Although
the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had
adopted this type of analysis, 331 F. Supp. 787 (ND
Cal. 1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning
that Provident's acquisition of the debentures was not
ttunorthodox" and that the circumstances did not preclude the possibility of speculative abuse.. 506 F. 2d, at
604-605.
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories
of nonliability based on § 16 (b)'s exemptive provision:
"This subsectiOn shall not be construed to cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such
both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale
and purchase . . . / 1 The first was Provident's argument that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time
of ... sale." After the October 24 distribution of some
debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provident were convertible into less than 10% of Foremost's
outstanding common stock. Provident contended that
its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the underwriting agreement was closed on October 28. If this
were the case, the sale would not have been covered by
§ 16 (b) , since Provident would not have been a benesale." 6 The Court of
ficial owner ttat the time of
Appeals rejected thi~ argument because it found that
6 This contention was based on Reliance Electric Co . v. Emerson
Electnc Co , 404 U S. 418 ( 1972) There the Court held that a sale
made after a former heneficml owner had already reduced Its holdings
bf"low 10% was exempted from § 16 (b) by the phrase "at the tune·
Q ••• Sl).le" m the ~xempt1vP prov1s1on. See n . 25, infra.
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the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the
underwriting agreement.1
The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of
nonliability based on the exemptive provision that we
consider here.8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence
7 Section 3 (a) (14) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14), defines
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise
dispose of." But Provident argued that the October 28 closing date
was the day of sale because contractual conditions prevented the
contract from becoming binding until closing. The underwriting
agreement provided in paragraph 7:
"7. Termination of Agreement: This agreement may be terminated, pnor to the time the Registration Statement becomes effective, by you or by any group of Underwriters which has agreed
hereunder to purchase in the aggregate at least 50% of the Debentures, if, in your judgment or in the judgment of any such group
of Underwriters, there shall have occurred a material unfavorable
change in political, financial or economic conditions generally."
(App. A134 .)
And in paragraph 5, the agreement provided: "The several obligations of the Underwriters hereunder are subject to the following
conditions:
" (h) That, between the time of execution of this agreement and
the time of purchase, there sha.ll occur no material and unfavorable
change, financial or otherwise (other than as referred to in the
Registration Statement and the Prospectus), in the condition of the
Company and Its consolidated subsidianes as a whole; and the Company will, at the time of purchase, deliver to you a certificate of
two of its executive officers to the foregoing effect." (App. A134.)
The Court of Appeals agreed that conditions to performance
might prevent a contract from being a "sale" prior to closing. But
it ruled that all sigmficant conditions here were satisfied when the
registratwn statement required by paragraph 7 became effective on
0ctober 21, the day the underwritmg agreement was executed. The
court also found that after October 21, Provident was no longer
subJect to the risk of a declme in the market for Foremost's stock,
506 F. 2d, at 607 For reasons not apparent from its opinion,
the court did not address the possibility that paragraph 5 (h) left
'f?rovident subJeCt to market nsks See n 8, infra.
8 Our holding on this ISSUE' dispose>; of thi~:> case by precluding:
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the phrase "at the time of the purchase/' "must be
construed to mean prior to the time when the decision
to purchase is made.n 506 F . 2d, at 614. Thus, although
Provident became a beneficial owner of Foremost by acquiring the debentures, it was not a beneficial owner "at
the time of the purchase." Accordingly, the exemptive
provision prevf'nted any § 16 (b) liability on Provident's
part.
II
The meaning of the exemptive provision has been
disputed since § 16 (b) was first enacted. The discussion has focused on the application of the provision to
a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement
being whether "at the time of the purchase" means
"before the purchase' 1 or "immediately after the purchase." 9 The difference in construction is determinative of a beneficial owner's liability in cases such as
Provident's where such owner sells within six months of
purchase the securities the acquisition of which made him
a beneficial owner. The commentators divided immediately over which construction Congress intended/0 and
they remain divided. 11 The courts of appeals also are
in disagreement over the issue,
any liability on Provident's part. We therefore do not consider
whether the Court of Appeals properly rejected Provident's arguments based on Kern County and on the sale not having occurred
unt!l October 28
9 The alternative construction to "before the purchase" is sometimes denommated "simultaneously w1th the purchase," as it was
by the Court of Appeals 506 F. 2d, at 608
1 ° Compare C. Meyer, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at
112 (1934) (adoptmg a "before" construction), with Seligman,
Problems Under the Secunties Exchange Act, 21 Va. L. Rev. 1,
19-20 ( 1934) (adopting an "immediately after" construction).
11
Compare, e. g., Munter, Section 16 (b) of the Securities Ex~
chanJ?;e Act of 1934 An AlternatlVe to "Burning Down the Bam

•
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The question of what Congress intended to accomplish by the exemptive provision in a purchase-sale
sequence came to a court of appeals for the first time
in Stella v. Graham-Patge Motors Corp., 232 F. 2d 299
(CA2), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 831 (1956). There the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit without discussion, but over a dissent, affirmed the District Court's
adoption of the "immediately after the purchase" construction. That court had been impelled to this construction at least m part by concern over what the phrase
"at the time of . , purchase" means in a sale-repurchase
sequence, reasoning
'If the ['before the purchase'] construction urged
by [Graham-Paige] IS placed upon the exemption
provisiOn, It would be possible for a person to purchase a large block of stock, sell it out until his
ownership was reduced to less than 10%, and then
repeat the process, ad infinitum." 104 F. Supp.
957, 959 (SDNY 1952)
The District Court may have thought that "before
the purchase" seemed an unlikely construction of the
exemptive provisiOn m a sale-repurchase sequence, so It
could not be the proper construction in a purchase-sale
sequence. 12 The Stella construction of the exemptive
m Order to K1ll the Rats, 52 Corneit L. Q. 69, 74-75 (1966),
Note, Ins1der L1ab1hty for Short-Swmg Profits : The Substance and
Funct10n of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 616619 (1974), Comment, 9 Stan L. Rev 582 (1957) (adopting a
"before" construction), w1th, e. g., 2 L Loss, Securities Regulation
1060 (2d ed, 1961) (favoring an "immed1ately after" construction).
The wmght of the commentary appears to be w1th the "before the
purchase" construction The ALI Federal Secunties Code (Tentatwe Draft No.2, 1973), § 1413 (d) and Comment (6), cons1ders the
"1mmedw.tely after the purchase" construction "questionable" on the
statutorv language and propose:; an amendment to codify the result.
12 Stella was dec1ded he fore § 10 (b) of the Act, 15 U S C.
Y 7 1 (b)
11!-i •mplrmrnten h,
Rnl<" IOb-5, 17 CFR ~ 240.10b-fi
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provision has been adhered to in the econd Circuit,
Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F. 2d 348, 355-356
(CA2), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 854 (1970); 13 Perine v.
William Norton & Co., 509 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA2 1974),
and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. Emerson Electnc Co. v. Reliance Electric Co.,
434 F. 2d 918,923-924 (CAS 1970), aff'd on other grounds,
404 U. S. 418 (1972) .14 But in none of the foregoing
cases did the court examine critically the legislative
history of § 16 (b) .
The Court of Appeals considered this case against the
background, sketched above, of ambiguity in the pertinent statutory language, continued disagreement among
the commentators, and a perce1ved absence in the relatively few decided cases of a full consideration of the
purpose and legislative history of § 16 (b). The court
found unpersuasive the rationales offered in Stella and
its progeny for the "immediately after the purchase"
constructwn. It noted that construing the provision to
require that benefimal-ownership status exist before the
(1975), developed fully as a private remedy for actual abuses
of ms1de mformat10n . See 6 L Loss, supra, n. 11, at 3559.
The sale-repurchase abuse that worried the Stella court would
now mv1te § 10 (b) habJ!Jtv, see n 29, m/ra, as well as possible habJhty under § 16 (b)
13 To ratiOnalize its view as applied to the purchase-sale sequence,
the court in Newmark wrote
" [T]he presumed a<:cess to [mside] information resulting from
[the] purchase [that make:s one a benefiCial owner] provides him
w1th an opportunity, not available to the mvesting public, to sell
h1s shares at the moment most advantageous to him. Thus, a
purchase of shares which makes the buyer an insider creates an
opportunity for the type of speculative abuse the statute was
enacted to prevent
425 F 2d, at 356
14
When th1s Court dectded Relwnce Electnc Co., 404 U. S. 418,
the question presented here was no longer m the case. See n 25,
infra,,
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purchase in a purchase-sale sequence would not foreclose an "immediately after the purchase" construction
in a sale-repurchase sequence.15 506 F. 2d, at 614--615.
More sigmficantly, the Court of Appeals challenged
directly the premise of the earlier cases that a "before
the purchase" construction m a purchase-sale sequence
would allow abuses Congress mtended to abate. The
court reasoned that in § 16 (b) Congress intended to
reach only those beneficial owners who both bought and
sold on the basis of inside information, which was presumptively available to them only after they became
tatutory "insiders " 506 F . 2d, at 608-614.16

III
A
The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16 (b)
is well known. See Kern County Land Co., 411 U. S.,
at 591-592; Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric
Co., 404 U. S. 418, 422 (1972), and the authorities
16 The view of the Court of Appeals that "at the time of" may
mean different thmgs m different contexts is not uruque. See AllisChalmers Mfg . Co v Gulf & Western lndustrtes, F. 2d (1975), ccrt. penrlmg, No. 75-890 Wr Pxpres;; no opimon here on
this VIeW
16 Shortly before this case was argued the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circmt reachPd the same conclusion on somewhat different analysis. Allzs-Chalmers Mfg . Co., F. 2d, at - . The
court apparently would have reached 1ts result even in the absence
of the exemptive prov1s1on, reasoning that § 16 (b) covers no
transactwns by any § 16 (b) msiders who were not ms1ders
before their mitlal transaction - F. 2d, at - . Since we rely
on the exemptive proviSion, we intimate no view on the proper
analysis of a case where a d1rector or officer makes an mitial transaction before obt::nnmg ms1der status. See, e. g., Adler v.
Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840 (CA2 1959) Nor do we have occasion here
to assess the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the
&
Seventh C1rcmt to the PxemptJVf' provJSJOn. - · F 2d, at n. l 3. Sf'e n 2.'i m fm .
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eited therein. Congress recognized that insiders may
have access to mformation about their corporations
not available to the rest of the investing public. By
trading on this informatiOn, these persons could reap
profits at the expense of less well informed investors. In
§ 16 (b) Congress sought to "curb the evils of insider
trading [by] . . . taking the profits out of a class of
transactions in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great." Reliance Electric Co.,
supra, at 422. It accomplished this by defining directors,
officers, and beneficial owners as those presumed to have
access to inside mformation 17 and enacting a fiat rule
that a corporation could recover the profits these insiders
made on a pair of security transactions within six
months.1 8
Foremost points to this purpose, and invokes the observation in Reliance Electric Co. that "where alternative
constructions of the terms of § 16 (b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves
the congressiOnal purpose of curbing short-swing trading
by corporate insiders." 404 U. S., at 424 (footnote
omitted) . From these premises Foremost argues that
the Court of Appeals' construction of the exemptive provision must be rejected 19 because it makes § 16 (b) inThe purpose of § 16 (b) is stated explicitly to be "preventing
the unfa1r use of information which may have been obtained by
such benefiCial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationhip to the issuer " 15 U S. C. § 78p (b)
18 Sect10n 16 (b) stat~s that any short-swmg profits "shall inure
to and be recoverable by the 1ssuer, irrespective of any mtention
on the part of such benefic1al owner, d1rector, or officer m entering
into such transaction of holdmg the secur1ty purchased or of not
repurchasmg the secunty sold for a penod exceeding six months .'~
15 u s c. § 78p (b).
19
In lieu of the Court of Appeals' construction, Foremost offers a
coostructHm whPteby any purchaRes {lrior to the purchase making:
11
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applicable to some possible abuses of inside information
that the statute would reach under the Stella construe~
twn 20 We find this approach unsatisfactory in its
focus on Situations that § 16 (b) may not reach rather
than on the language and purpose of the exemptive proVISion itself. Foremost's approach also invites an imposition of § 16 (b)'s liability without fault that is not
consistent with the premises upon which Congress enacted th ection.

B
The exemptive provision, which applies only to beneficial owners and not to other statutory insiders, must
have been included in § 16 (b) for a purpose. Although
the extensive legislative history of the Act is bereft
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent, see Reliance Electric Co., supra, at 424, the evolution of§ 16 (b)
from its mitial proposal through passage does shed significant light on the purpose of the exemptive provision.
The original version of what would develop into the
Act was S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).. It provtded in § 15 (b)·
"It shall be unlawful for any director, officer,
or owner of securities, owning as of record and/or
beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class of
tock of any issuer, any security of which is registered
on a national securities exchange-" ( 1) To purchase any such registered security with
the mtention or expectation of selling the same security within six months; and any profit made by
uch person on any transaction m such a registered
ecurity extending over a period of less than six
one a benefiCial owner are exempted from the operation of 16 (h) .
See 2 L Loss, supra, n 11, at 1060
20
Newmark describes a possible abuse of inside information covered
onl nndPr thA Stella conRtruction. See n. l3, supra.
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months shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention or expectation on
his part in entering into such transaction of holding
the security purchased for a period exceeding six
month .''
In the next version of the legislation, H. R. 8720, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), § 15 (b) read almost identically
to § 16 (b) as it was eventually enacted. 21
"Any profit realized by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer from any purchase and sale or
sale and purchase of any such registered equity
security withm a period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure
to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of
any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of
holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing
the security sold for a period exceeding six
months . . . , This subsection shall not be construed
to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner
was not such both at the time of the purchase and
sale or sale and purchase of the security involved,
nor any transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection
2 1 As can be seen by comparmg H R. 8720's version of § 15 (b)
with § 16 (b), supra, n 2, the dlfferences are relatively minor. Formally, the statement of purpose was moved to the front of the statute and vanous grammatical changes were made. A significant subtanttve change not apparent from the faces of the two sections is
that § 16 (b) beneficial owners are those owmng more than 10% of
a registered security, while H. R. 8720 retained S. 2693 's 5% requirement. Compare Secunhes Exchange Act of 1934, § 16 (a), 15
U S C . § 78p (a) w11h H R 720, 73d C'ong., 2d Sess , § 15 (a)

( 19~4 ).
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of preventing the unfair use of information which
may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to
the issuer/ 1
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for S. 2693's drafters, introduced § 15 (b) as forbidding an insider "to
carry on any short-term specu[la]tions in the stock.
He cannot, with his inside information get in and out of
stock within six months." Hearings on H. R. 7852 and
H . R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1934).
The Court of Appeals concluded that § 15 (b) of S. 2693
would have applied only to a beneficial owner who had
that status before a purchase-sale sequence was initiated,
506 F. 2d, at 609, and we agree. Foremost appears not to
contest this point. Petitioner's Opening Brief, at 29.
The question thus becomes whether H. R. 8720's
change in the language imposing liability and its addition of the exemptive provision were intended to change
S. 2693's result in a purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner. We think the legislative history shows no
such intent.
S. 2693 and its House counterpart, H. R. 7852, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), met substantial criticism on a
number of scores, including various provisions of § 15.
See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 15 (1934); Hearings on H. R. 7852 and
H . R. 8720, supra, at 1-623.22 S. 2693 was recast into
Corcoran termed § 15 "one of the most important provisions in
[S. 2693] ." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate
Comm1ttee on Bankmg and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6555 (1934).
But most of the proposed legislation was directed at regulation of
the stock exchanges themselves and certain trading practices that
were considered undesirable rcgardles of who performed them.
22

74-742-0PINION
FOREMOST-McKESSON v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES 15

H. R. 8720 to take account of the criticisms that the
bill's drafters thought valid. Hearings on H . R. 7852
and H. R. 8720, supra, at 625, 674. The primary substantive criticism directed at § 15 (b) of S. 2693 was
that it did not prevent the use of inside information
to reap a short-term profit in a sale-repurchase situation. See Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra,
at 6557-6558. Criticism was also directed at making
liability for short-term profits turn on ownership "as
of record and/or beneficially." See id., at 6914. H. R.
8720 remedied these perceived shortcomings by providing in § 15 (b) : "Any profit realized by such beneficial
owner, director, or officer from any purchase and sale or
sale and purchase ... shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer." 23 The term "such beneficial owner"
was defined in § 15 (a) to mean one "who is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum
of any class" of a registered security.
The structure of the clause imposing liability in the
revised § 15 (b) did not unambiguously retain S. 2693's
requirement that beneficial ownership precede a purchase-sale sequence. But we cannot assume easily that
Congress intended to eliminate the ~equirement in the
revised bill. The legislative history reveals that the
requirement was made clear in the hearings, yet no complaint was made about it.
See id., at 6465-6466. Most of the hearings, therefore, dealt with
other problems.
23 The other major substantive change effected in § 15 (b) by
H . R. 8720 was the elimination of the potential criminal liability.
The cnminal liability aspect of S. 2693's version of § 15 (b) received
almost no attentwn m hearings. But cf. Hearings on Stock Exc?ange
Practices, supra, at 6966. It may have been thought, however, that
a cnmmal case could never be made out. The difficulties of proving
the mental elements on which criminal liability turned had already
led the drafters to eliminate those questions of fact in civil suits to
recover profit". SeP n 26, mfra.
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The testimony on . 2693 demonstrates that the draft-·
ers were emphatic about the requirement. In introducing the bill Corcoran pointed out a technical flaw in
S. 2693's language: "It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record
and/or beneficially more than 5 per centum of any class
of stock. ..." It was possible to construe the phrase
"owning . . . 5 per centum" to apply to directors and
officers as well as to mere stockholders, so that trading by
directors and officers would not be subject to § 15 (b)
if their previous holdings did not exceed 5%. But Corcoran made clear that the requirement of pre-existing
ownership of the specified percentage applied only to
beneficial owners.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. . . . The bill is not very well
drawn there. It ought to read to cover every director, every officer, and every stockholder who owns
more than 5 percent of the stock. That is the way
it was in tended to read.
"Mr. MAPES. It ought to read 'and/or beneficially more than 5 percent' followed by 'is a director, or officer .'
"Mr. CoRCORAN. It is badly drawn. We slipped
on that. It ought to read 'every director and every
officer' and then 'every big stockholder.' "
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 133; see
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6555.
The legislative record thus reveals that the drafters
focused directly on the fact that S. 2693 covered a
short-term purchase-sale sequence by a beneficial owner
only if his status existed before the purchase, and no
·concern was expressed about the wisdom of this requirement. But the explicit requirement was omitted from
the operative language of the section when it was restruc-

74-742-0PINIO
FOREMOST-McKESSON v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES 17

tured to cover sale-repurchase sequences. In the same
draft, however, the exemptive provision was added to
the section. On this record we are persuaded that the
exemptive provision was intended to preserve the reqmrement of beneficial ownership before the purchase.
Later discussions of the present § 16 (b) in the hearings
are consistent with this interpretation. 24 We hold that,
in a purchase-sale sequence, a beneficial owner must account for profits only if he was a beneficial owner "before
the purchase '' 25
u '' Mr. PECORA. The theory was that the ownership of 5 percent
of the stock would practiCally constitute him an insider, and by virtue of that position he could acquire confidential information which
he might use for his own ennchment by trading in the open market,
agamst the mterests of the general body of the stockholders. That
is· the main purpose sought to be served."
Hearings on Stock Exchange Pract1ces, supra, at 7741. Ferdinand
Pecora was counsel to the subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency that conducted extensive hearings on
stock exchange operatiOns prior to the enactment of the Act. He
was also one of the draftsmen of S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852
and H. R. 8720 before the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 83 (1934).
2 5 In Relwnce Electnc Co .. 404 U S. 418, the Court also had
occasiOn to consider the apphcatwn of the exemptive provision in a
purchase-sale sequence. There Emerson acquired 13.2% of the
,;hare::s of Reliance's predecessor pursuant to a tender offer and
w1thm s1x months disposed of 1ts holdmgs in two sales of 3.24%
and 9.9G% , The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
the purchase, by which Emerson became a beneficial owner, was
covered by § 16 (b) But 1t ruled that Emerson was liable for the
profits on only 1ts first sale, because "at the tlffie of . . . sale" of
the 9.96%, It was not a beneficial owner.
The Court granted certwran on Reliance's petitiOn to review this
constructiOn of "at the tlme of
sale," and affirmed. The constructiOn of "at the time of the purchase," however, was not before
the Court. ld., at 420-422 Emerson thus remained liable for
the 3.24% sale, although It would have had no hab1lity under
our holdin~ todav Tht> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
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IV
Additional considerations support our reading of the
legislative histor •
A
Section 16 (b) imposes a strict prophylactic rule with
respect to insider, short-swing trading. In Kern County
Land Co., 411 U. S., at 595, we noted:
««The statute requires the [statutorily defined] inside, short-swing trader to disgorge all profits
reahzed on all 'purchases' and 'sales' within the specified time period, without proof of actual abuse of
insider information, and without proof of intent to
profit on the basis of such information."
In short, this statute imposes liability without fault
within its narrowly drawn limits,28
has noted correctly that the construction of "at the time of .
sale" m Reliance Electrtc Co. IS superfluous in light of the construction of "at the time of the purchase" adopted by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circmt, wh1ch we affirm here. See AllisChalmers Mfg. Co ., F. 2d, at n. 12. But the procedural
posture of Reliance Electrtc Co . prevented a full consideration of
the meanmg of the exempt1ve provisiOn. See ibid. We express no
opmion on the interpretation of the prov1s1on by which the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Cmuit sought to avoid the apparent
superfluity of the "at the time of •. sale" language. Id ., at - ,
- ; supra, n. 16.
2 6 "Mr
CoRCORAN
ou hold the director, irrespective
of any mtentJOn or expectation to sell the security within 6 months
after, because it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence
of such mtenhon or expectatiOn, and you have to have this crude
rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having
to prove that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out
on a short swmg
"Senator GoRE You infer the intent from the fact.
" M r CoRCORA
From the fact
[FootnotP 26 i11 continued on p 19]
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As noted earlier, Foremost recognizes the ambiguity
of the exemptive provision, but argues that where "alternative constructions" of § 16 (b)'s terms are available,
we should choose the construction that best serves the
statute's purposes. Foremost relies on statements generally to this effect in Kern County Land Co., supra, at
595, and Reliance Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 424. In
neither of those cases, however, did the Court adopt the
construction that would have imposed liability, thus
recognizing that serving the congressional purpose does
not require resolving every ambiguity in favor of liability under § 16 (b). We reiterate that nothing suggests that the construction urged by Foremost would
serve better to further congressional purposes. Indeed,
the legislative history of § 16 (b) indicates that by adding the exemptive provision Congress deliberately expressed a contrary choice.. But even if the legislative
record were more ambiguous, we would hesitate to adopt
Foremost's construction. It is inappropriate to reach
the harsh result of imposing § 16 (b)'s liability without
·fault on the basis of unclear language. If Congress
w1shes to Impose such liability, we must assume it will
do so expressly or by unmistakable inference.
It IS not irrelevant that Congress itself limited carefully the liability imposed by § 16 (b). See Reliance
Electric Co, supra, at 422--425. Even an insider
"Senator KEA . Suppo~e he got stuck in something else, and he
had to sell?
"Senator BARKLEY All he would get would be what he put into it.
He would get his origmal mvestment.
'Mr CoRCORAN He would get Ius money out, but the profit goes
o the corporatiOn
"Senator KEAN Suppose he had to sell.
" Mr CoRcORAN Let h1m get out what he put in, but give the
corporatiOn the profit "
Hearmgs on St~:~ck Excilltnge· Practices, supra, at 655&-6557.
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may trade freely without incurring the statutory liability
if, for example, he spaces his transactions at intervals
greater than six months. When Congress has so recognized the need to limit carefully the "arbitrary and
sweeping coverage" of § 16 (b), Bershad v. McDonough,
428 F. 2d 69'3, 696 (CA7 1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S.
992 (1971), courts should not be quick to determine that,
despite an acknowledged ambiguity, Congress intended
the section to cover a particular transaction.

B
Our construction of § 16 (b) also is supported by the
distinction Congress recognized between short-term trading by mere stockholders and such trading by directors
and officers. The legislative discourse revealed that Congress thought that all short-swing trading by directors
and officers was vulnerable to abuse because of their
intimate involvement in corporate affairs. But trading
by mere stockholders was viewed as being subject to abuse
only when the size of their holdings afforded the potential
for access to corporate information. 27 These different
perceptions simply reflect the realities of corporate life.
This distinction is especially evident in the following exchange,
directed to the reportmg reqmrements imposed by § 15 (a) of
S, 2693 on benefiCial owners ;
"Senator KEAN , Suppose a man is not a director at all and does
not want to be a director, and he happens to own 5 percent or buy
5 percent. Do you thmk you are going to get him to file with the
exchange all the time just the number of shares he has?
"Mr. CoRCORAN. I think so, sir.
27

"Senator KEA , I think it is all right to apply it to a director or
'Officer, but I think to reqmre the ordmary investor- "Mr. CoRCORAN , Five percent is a lot in a modern corporation.
Many corporat10ns are controlled by 5 percent or 10 percent.
"Senator KEAN . They may own it or they may sell it. This applies to all corporations, and you are getting down to the point where,

14-742--0PINION
FOREMOST-McKESSON

v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES 21

It would not be consistent with this perceived distinction to impose liability on the basis of a purchase made
when the percentage of stock ownership requisite to in~
sider status had not been acquired. To be sure, the
possibility does exist that one who becomes a beneficial
owner by a purchase will sell on the basis of information
attained by virtue of his newly acquired holdings. But
the purchase itself was not one posing dangers that Congress considered intolerable, since it was made when the
purchaser owned no shares or less than the percentage
deemed necessary to make one an insider. 28 Such a stockholder is more analogous to the stockholder who never
owns more than lOo/a and thereby is excluded entirely
you are interfermg with the individual a good deal there. I agree
with you with respect to the officers and directors.
"Mr. CoRCORAN. A stockholder owning 5 percent is as much an
insider as an officer or director. Whether he is a titular director or
not, he normally is, as a practical matter of fact, a director.
"Senator KEAN. He might not be."
Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6556 . The distmctwn also IS reflected m the discussiOn of the technical .flaw in
S 2693. See td., at 6555; Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720,
upra, at 133 See also Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices, supra,
t 7741-7743
28 Thus, accordmg to the presumption of the statute, the purchaser d1d not have access to mside mformation in making the
purchase. It should be noted further that as a matter of practicalities the crucial pomt in the acquisitiOn of securities is not the technical "purchase," but rather the deCision to make an acquisition.
In the case of an acqmsihon of a large block of a corporation's stock, that decision may precede the "purchase" by a conSiderable penod of tune A prudent mvestor will want to investigate all available mformation on the corporation. Such an investor
also may need time to finance the purchase, and may wish to
effectuate purchases Without mfluencmg the market price. These
realities emphasize that the acqmsitwn deciswn by a beneficial
owner normally w1ll occur well in advance of the event that is
presumed to afford acress to inside mformation.
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from the operation of § 16 (b), than to a director or officer whose every purchase and sale is covered by the statute. While th1s reasoning might not compel our contructwn of the exemptive provision, it explains why
Congress may have seen fit to draw the line it did. Cf.
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA2 1959).

c
Section 16 (b)'s scope, of course, is not affected by
whether alternative sanctions might inhibit the abuse of
inside information. Congress, however, has left some
problems of the abuse of inside information to other
remedies. These sanctions alleviate concern that ordinary investors are unprotected against actual abuses of
ins1de information in transactions not covered by
§ 16 (b). For example, Congress has passed general J
antifraud statutes that proscribe fraudulent practices by
insiders. See Securities Act of 1933, § 17 (a), 48 Stat.
84, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 10 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b); 3 L. Loss, supra,
n. 11, 1423-1429, 1442-1445. Today an investor who
can show harm from the misuse of material inside
•informatiOn may have recourse, m particular, to § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1975). 20 It
29

Rule lOb-5 has been held to embrace evils that Foremost urges its
constructiOn of § 16 (b) IS necessary to prevent. The Rule has been
applied to tradmg by one who acquired inside information in the
course of negotiatiOns with a corporation, such as the negotiations
for Provident's purchase of the Foremost debentures. Van Alstyne,
Noel(~ Co., 43 S. E. C. 1080 (1969) ; 3 L. Loss, supra, n. 11, at 14511452. And a stockholder trading on information not generally
known has been held subJect to the sanctions of the Rule. Shapiro
Mernll Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smtth, Inc., 495 F. 2d 228 (CA2
1974), SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968),
cert. demed, 394 U. S. 967 (1969) The liability of insiders who
improperly "t1p" others, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F. 2d
1301 (CA2), cer1. demed, 404 U S. 1005 (1971), may reduce the
threat that beneficial owners no1 themH('Ives rrpresented on the boarcf.
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also was thought that § 16 (a)'s publicity requirement 80
would afford indirect protection against some potential
misuses of inside information. 81 See Hearings on H. R.
7852 and H. R. 8720, supra, at 134-135; H. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (to accompany H. R. 9323,
of directors will be able to acquire inside information from officers
and directors . We Cite these cases for illustrat1ve purposes without
necessarily implying approval.
30
Section 16 (a), 15 U. S. C. § 78p (a) provides :
"Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial
owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant
to section 78l of this title, or who is a director or an officer of the
issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of
such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective
date of a registration statement filed pursuant to section 78l (g)
of this title, or within ten days after he becomes such beneficial
owner, director, or officer, a statement with the Commission (and,
if such security is registered on a national securities exchange,
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of
such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days
after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if there has been
a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the
Commission (and if such security is registered on a national securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such
changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar
month."
81 The drafters clearly thought that § 16 (a) would help deter
abuses not covered by § 16 (b).
" [Mr. Corcoran.] [S]ection 15 (a), requires every director, officer,
or principal holder of any securities listed on an exchange to file
with the exchange and with the commission a statement of how
many shares he owns and to file that statement at the end of each
month to show whether there has been any change in his position
during the month That is to prevent the insider from taking advantage of mformation to sell or buy shares ahead of the release of
information to the public about the company."
These remarks were addressed to S. 2693. Hearings on H. R. 7852
and R R 8720, supra, at 132.
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Cong., 2d Sess., passed by the House, May 7, 19341
without the present§ 16 (b) ),

v
We must still consider briefly Foremost's contention
that the "before the purchase" construction renders
other enactments of Congress unnecessary and conflicts
with the interpretation of § 16 (b) by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
For.emost and amicus Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co. point to §§ 16 (d) and 16 (e) of the Act, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 78p (d), (e), as congressional actions that would not
have been necessary unless one selling the securities
the acquisition of which made him a beneficial owner is
liable under § 16 (b). Section 16 (d), in part, exempts:
from § 16 (b) certain transactions by a securities "dealer
in the ordinary course of his business and incident to
the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary
or secondary market." 82 Section 16 (e) provides an
exemption for certain "foreign or domestic arbitrage
3 2 Section 16 (d), 15 U S. C. § 78p (d), provides:
"The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not
apply to any purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, and the provisions of subsection (c) of this section shall not apply to any sale,
of an eqmty security not then or theretofore held by him in an Illvestment account, by a dealer in the ordinary course of his business
and incident to the establishment or maintenance by him of a primary or secondary market (otherwise than on a national securities
exchange or an exchange exempted from registration under section
78e of this title) for such security. The Commission may, by such
rules and regulations as it deems necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, define and prescribe terms and conditions with respect to securities held in an investment account and transactions
made in the ordinary course of business and incident to the establishment or maintenance of a primary or secondary market."
;' DealPr" i~ defined in§ 3 (a.) (5) of the Act, 15 U. S C. 78c (a) (5),
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transactions." 88 They argue similarly that the SEC's
Rule 16b-2, 17 CFR § 240.16b-2 (1975), is unnecessary
if our construction of § 16 (b) is correct. Rule 16b-2
exempts from § 16 (b) specified transactions "in connection with the distribution of a substantial block of
securities." 34
Section 16(e), 15 U.S. C. §78p(e), provides :
"The provisions of this section shall not apply to foreign or
domestic arbitrage transactions unless made in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in order to
carry out the purposes of this section."
34 Section 16 (b) provides in its final clause that it shall not
cover "any transaction or transactions which the Commission by
rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection." 15 U. S. C. § 78p (b). Rule 16b-2
provides:
"(a) Any transaction of purchase and sale, or sale and purchase,
of a security which is effected in connection with the distribution of a
substantial block of securities shall be exempt from the provisions
of section 16 (b) of the Act, to the extent specified in this § 240.16b2, as not comprehended within the purpose of said section, upon the
following conditions :
" ( 1) The person effecting the transaction is engaged in the business of distributing securities and is participating in good faith, in
the ordinary course of such business, in the distribution of such
block of securities;
"(2) The security involved in the transaction is (i) a part of such
block of securities and is acquired by the person effecting the transaction, with a view to the distribution thereof, from the issuer or
other person on whose behalf such securities are being distributed'
or from a person who is participating in good faith in the distribution of such block of securities, or (ii) a security purchased in good
faith by or for the account of the person effecting the transaction
for the purpose of stabilizing the market price of securities of the
class being distributed or to cover an over-allotment or other short
position created in connection with such distribution; and
" (3) Other persons not within the purview of section 16 (b) of
the Act are participating in the distribution of such block of securities on terms at least as favorable as those on which such person is
participating and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate par33
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We do not consider these provisions to be inconsistent
with our holding. Nothing on their faces would make
them applicable to one selling the securities the purchase of which made him a beneficial owner. But the
·exemptions would be necessary to protect stockholders
already qualifying as beneficial owners when they purchased 35 and they would, of course, apply to transactions
by directors and officers as well.
Foremost and the amicus also remind us that the
interpretation of the exemptive provision for which they
contend has been adopted by the SEC in the past. See
Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 22-27, Reliance
Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418
(1972). But the Commission has not appeared as an
amicus in this case. In any event, even if the Commission's views have not changed we would not afford them
the deference to which the views of the agency administering a statute are usually entitled, for in Reliance
ticipation of all persons exempted from the provisions of section
16 (b) of the Act by this § 240.16b-2. However, the performance
of the functions of manager of a distributing group and the receipt
of a bona fide payment for performing such functions shall not preclude an exemption whteh would otherwise be available under this
§ 240.16b--2.
" (b) The exemption of a transaction pursuant to this § 240.16b--2
with respect to the partiCipation therem of one party thereto shall
not render such transactiOn exempt with respect to participation of
any other party therein unless such other party also meets the
conditions of this § 240.16b--2 "
35 The press release accompanymg the SEC 's mitial promulgation of
Rule 16b-2 demonstrates this pomt. It explained : "The new Rule
[ 16b--2] affords an exemptiOn for certam cases by providing that
underwriters who happen to have a member of their firm also an
officer or director of the Issuer or one of Its prmcipal stockholders
who are regularly engaged m the busmess of buymg and selling
securities need not account to the company for profits realized from
purchases and sales made m the distribution of a security for the
rompan . . . ." SEC Release o 34-264, June 8, 1935.
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Electric Co., 404 U. S., at 425-427, the Court rejected the
basic theory on which the SEC based its interpretation
of the exemptive provision. Our re-examination of the
exemptive provision confirms the view that the SEC's
theory did not reflect the intent of Congress.
The judgment is
Affirmed.

MR. JusTICE WHITE joins in the judgment of the
Court, and in all but Part IV- C of the Court's opinion ..
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.
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No. 74-742. Argued October 7, 1975-Decided January 13, 1976
Respondent, a personal holding company contemplating liquidation,
sold assets to petitioner corporation. Respondent received from
petitioner as part of the purchase price convertible debentures
which if converted into petitioner's common stock would make
respondent a holder of more than 10% of petitioner's outstanding
common stock. A few days later, pursuant to an underwriting
agreement, one of the debentures was sold to a group of underwriters for cash in an amount exceeding its face value. After
making debenture and cash distributions to its stockholders,
respondent dissolved.. Under § 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Act) a corporation may recover for itself the profits
realized by an officer, director, or beneficial owner of more than
10% of its shares from a purchase and sale of its stock within
a six-month period. An exemptive provision specifies, however,
that § 16 (b) shall not be construed to cover any transaction
where the beneficial owner was not such both "at the time of"
the purchase and sale of the securities involved. Since the
amount of petitioner's debentures received by respondent was
large enough to make respondent a beneficial owner of petitioner
within the meaning of § 16, and its disposal of the securities
within the six-month period exposed respondent to a suit by
petitioner to recover profits realized by respondent on the sale
to the underwriters, respondent sought a declaratory judgment
of its non liability under § 16 (b). The District Court granted
summary judgment to respondent, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed, though for different reasons. Held: By virtue of the
exemptive provision a beneficial owner is accountable under § 16
(b) in a purchase-sale sequence such as was involved here only
I

II

FOREMOST-McKESSON v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES
Syllabus

if he was such an owner "before the purchase." Thus, the fact
that respondent was not a beneficial owner before the purchase
removed the transaction from the operation of § 16 (b). Pp.
7-27.
(a) The legislative history of the exemptive provision reveals
a legislative intent to deter beneficia.! owners from making both
a purchase and a sale on the basis of inside information, which
is presumptively available only after the purchase. Pp. 10--17.
(b) Had it been Congress' design when it enacted § 16 (b)
to impose liability in cases such as this, it should have done so
expressly or by unmistakable inference. Pp, 18-20.
(c) Congress may have sought to distinguish between purchases
by persons who have not yet acquired inside status through stock
ownership of at least 10% and purchases by directors and officers
because t.l1e latter are more intimately involved in corporate
affairs. Pp. 20--22.
(d) Other sanctions ren1ain available against fraudulent use of
inside information in transn,ctions not covered by § 16 (b). Pp.
22-24.
(e) Other provisions exempting certain transactions from § 16
(b) are not inconsistent with the "before the purchase" construction reached here. Pp. 24-27.
506 F. 2d 601, affirmed.
PowELL, J ., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRGER,
C. J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, and in all but Part IV-C of which WHITE, J.,
joined. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision
of the case.

